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DEFINITIONS
F-l VISA The F-l Visa is issued to foreign citizens who want to study at any level in 
U.S. schools from pre-college to graduate study. To qualify, a person must receive an I- 
20 form from an American institution which shows that they intend to pursue a full-time 
course of study in a field for which they qualify. By 1985, most Chinese students with F- 
1 visas had developed a plan to study on their own or with suggestions from overseas 
relatives.
F-2 VISA The F-2 Visa is issued to family members of a person holding an F-l visa. 
1-20 Form The 1-20 Form is issued to applicants for F-l visas, which documents that 
they have been accepted into a program offering a full course of study. This form is 
issued by the school administering the program and must be presented when applying for 
an F-l visa.
IAP-66 Form IAP-66 Form is issued to applicants for J-l visas, which documents that 
they qualify under one of the programs designated by the United States Information 
Agency (USIA). This form is issued by schools or other institution, such as a hospital, 
and must be presented when applying for a J-l visa.
IFCSS The Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS) is a non­
profit organization founded on July 30, 1989, immediately after the June 4th Beijing 
Tragedy, by overseas Chinese students in the United States. From the birth of the IFCSS, 
it has supported fighters for freedom and democracy in China, including human rights
Vll
activists, political dissidents, and independent intellectuals. Although it is not a political 
party, its influence on overseas Chinese students has enabled IFCSS to play an important 
role in the overseas as well as mainland Chinese democracy movements foi mv.re than 
one decade.
J-l VISA The J-l Visa is issued to persons who qualify under a program designated by 
USIA. Unlike the F-l visas, the J-l visas are not issued only to students, but also to 
several other categories of visitors, including research scholars, teachers, trainees, and 
international visitors. Most people who are sponsored by the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) government receive J-l visas, which denote a higher level of scholarship than the 
F-l visas. To receive a J-l visa, an applicant must possess a valid IAP-66 form and is 
generally subject to the “two-year rule.”
TWO- YEAR RULE The “two-year rule” is an American legal regulation that applies to 
people issued J-l visas. This regulation requires that a person reside outside of the Unites 
States for two years following the time for which he or she had a J-l visa in the United 
States. Meeting this requirement, the person is eligible to apply for an immigrant visa or 
specific categories of nonimmigrant visas. The consular officer, who issues the J-l visa, 
makes a determination at the time of the visa issuance confirming whether the person has 
received aid from the United States government or the Chinese government. If they have 
received such aid, they are subject to the two-year rule. Waivers to this rule can only be 
granted by the United States Information Agency (USIA).
SOURCE OF DEFINITIONS (not including IFCSS): Leo. A. Orleans, Chinese
Students in America: Policies, Issues, and Numbers (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1988), pp. 6-7. The definition of IFCSS is adapted from “Introduction of 
IP CSS,” www.ifcss.oru. Accessed on June 17, 2004.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis will detail the actual reasons behind the passage of the Chinese 
Student Protection Act (CSPA) of 1992. It will demonstrate that the passage of this 
act is rooted in American political desires, American partisan conflicts, and a 
sophisticated lobbying effort on the part of Chinese students and scholars, who had 
their own, often complicated, reasons for not wishing to return to China.
To set the stage for this work, it will provide significant background 
information on three topics: Chinese-American immigration history prior to 1989, 
the "Crisis of 1989" itself, and the respective responses of the American Congress 
and the Bush administration to the Tiananmen Square tragedy. This wall provide 
the backdrop against which the most important parts of this thesis will be set: the 
response of Chinese-American students to the Tiananmen Square tragedy and their 
lobbying efforts for legislative "protection" in the U.S.; and a critical evaluation of 
the CSPA and its actual results.
Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were employed to analyze 
the various primary sources used in this thesis, including one source—the China 
News Digest—which is the most popular, and for its time, the most important 




Nine years after she first heard about the Chinese Student Protection Act 
(CSPA) of 1992, a Chinese American who received her “June Fourth” Green Card 
was still excited and said, “It was so unbelievable! It was just a windfall!” 1 
However, Lin Zhuo, another Chinese student who is currently enrolled in a Ph.D. 
program at Yale University, called the green cards issued to the Chinese students 
and scholars under this act “Blood Cards.” He argued that the Chinese students and 
scholars then in the U.S. received their green cards at the price of the death of 
hundreds of Chinese students at Tiananmen Square in 1989.2
The green card referred to is the popular name for the 1-551 form, which gives 
applicants official immigration status (Lawful Permanent Residency) in the United 
States (U.S.). At the end of 1980s, U.S. green cards began to gain popularity in 
mainland China as well as in other Asian areas. A Chinese motto—“the black way 
is inferior to the red way; the red way is inferior to the green way”—vividly 
revealed this popularity. The “black way” means making a profit by running an
1 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese Students and Scholars in Grand Forks Oral History Project,” Tape 1, Department 
o f  History, University o f  North Dakota, 2004. In this project, each interviewee’s ora! history is recorded on 
one tape. A ll the tapes were labeled according to the choronological order o f  the interviews. To protect the 
privacy o f  the interviewees, the real names o f  the interviewees w ill not be given in this thesis.
' Linxiang Zhu, "Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars Oral History Project,” Tape 1, Department o f  
History, University o f  North Dakota, 2004. Also see Tong Xing, “ ‘June fourth Green Cards’ and 80,000  
Mainland Chinese in the U .S .,” hup: museums.cnd.oru i l.WV/ CM (>3 ctn(>31 2c.h/8.html??3. A ccessed on 
June 3, 2004. Dong Zhenhai, “On the Danger o f  the Radicalism ,” Imp: hRc.ora-hi-s /c  0 0 5  6 2 . Accessed  
on May 31, 2004.
illegal business such as smuggling cars. The “red way” means gaining personal, as 
well as family, advantages by becoming a communist official. The “green way” 
means achieving personal goals by going to the U.S., legally or illegally, and 
finally getting a green card. Becoming a U.S. permanent resident was the most 
desirable dream for mainland Chinese in the late 1980s according to this motto. 
This desire was strengthened by another Chinese motto—this one from Taiwan— 
“come, come, come to National Taiwan University; go, go, go to America!”3
Given this context, does the response of the Chinese American represent the 
opinions of approximately 80,000 Chinese who got green cards under the 
Protection Act? Is Lin Zhuo’s opinion as common among the Chinese students who 
are currently studying in America as Tong Xingv  article suggests? The following 
chapters will offer an answer to these questions by analyzing the events leading up 
to the passage of CSPA.
The purpose of this thesis is to challenge the central interpretation of the 
CSPA made by a number of Chinese scholars and specialists. Those scholars have 
accepted that Chinese students and scholars asked for—and received—the 
protection of the American government in the wake of June 4, 1989, largely 
because the lack of political freedom and human rights in China made this both 
necessary and desirable.4 This thesis will prove that this is far too simplistic an 
approach to a very complicated matter. Through a detailed analysis of various 
government sources, newspaper articles, oral history interviews with participants,
3 Norman Matloff, “An Immigration Bill as a Case Study o f  Congressional Lobbying and our Failing 
Democracy,” University o f  California at Davis,
Into:. heather.cs.ucdavis.edu pub.yImmigration/ A syR cf CSPA.html. Accessed on November 28, 2004.
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and an analysis of one of the first "web-based" communication systems ever 
employed by a grass roots movement, this thesis will detail the actual reasons 
behind the passage of the CSPA. It will demonstrate that the passage of this act is 
rooted in American political desires, American partisan conflicts, and a 
sophisticated lobbying effort on the part of Chinese students and scholars, who had 
their own, often complicated reasons for not wishing to return to China.
To set the stage for this work, it will be necessary to provide significant 
background information on three topics: Chinese-American immigration history 
prior to 1989, the "Crisis of 1989" itself, and the respective responses of the 
American Congress and the Bush administration to the Tiananmen Square tragedy. 
This will provide the backdrop against which the most important parts of this thesis 
will be set: the response of Chinese-American students to the Tiananmen Square 
tragedy and their lobbying efforts for legislative "protection" in the U.S.; and a 
critical evaluation of the CSPA and its actual results.
Both quantitative and qualitative research methods have been employed to 
analyze the various primary sources used in this thesis, including one source—the 
China News Digest—which is the most popular, and for its time, the most 
important electronic news forum for Chinese students in North America.
1 Fu Xuanning, “Impact o f  the 1993 Chinese Student Protection Act on American and Chinese Societies,” 
Journal o f  Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 95, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 3.
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CHAPTER II
UNWELCOME IMMIGRANTS AND SIX WAVES OF OVERSEAS STUDY
Chinese immigration to America began primarily in the middle of the 19th 
century. Fueled by news of the California Gold Rush, young male peasants of 
Guangdong province came to America to find economic opportunities. Most of 
them worked in the woolen mills, or in the shoe and garment manufacturing 
industries of the West. Others worked as laborers in areas such as mining, land 
development, and irrigation. Chinese workers were also involved in railroad 
construction. In the 1860s, approximately 15,000 Chinese were hired by the Central 
Pacific Railroad as it stretched into the western frontier.5
These workers created a vast network of track that opened up untapped 
resources not only in California but in the northwest as well. However, even before 
their involvement in railway construction, the Chinese were an important presence 
in California economic life. According to the report of the Joint Select Committee 
of the California Legislature in 1862, there were fifty thousand Chinese in the state 
who “paid almost fourteen million dollars annually in taxes, licenses, duties, 
freights, and other charges.... Their cheap labor would be of great value in
3 American Immigration Law Foundation: “A Brief History o f  Chinese Immigration to America,”
h t t p : www.ailf.org awards ahp 0001 essayOl htm, 2000. Accessed on May 31, 2004.
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developing the new industries of the state.”6 By 1880, it was reported that 25% of 
California’s workforce was of Chinese descent. Some Chinese immigrants even 
started their own factories, profiting from the rapidly expanding economic 
opportunities.7 *
In addition to the above contributions, a small group of Chinese immigrants 
were recruited to Mississippi by planters. After the Civil War, tensions were high 
between the black freedmen and white land owners. Many former slaves left the 
South rather than continue to work on the plantations as poorly paid laborers.
Q
Chinese immigrants moved there and partly eased the labor shortage. According 
to the U.S. census of 1880, there were fifty-one Chinese in Mississippi, mostly in 
Washington County. These Chinese first arrived during the Reconstruction period 
(1865-1877) from the Sze Yap, a district in south China.9 Although this was not a 
very large number, bringing Chinese to southern plantations might have become a 
major trend had later events not brought about the passage of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882.
Meanwhile, in California, these cheap workers with long pigtails became the 
number one target of the organized labor movement, which was the strongest 
purveyor of anti-Chinese sentiment. At this time, the major political parties were 
closely matched in strength and they supported organized labor’s position against
6 Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California, University o f Illinois Press, 1991 
(reprinted), p 44.
' American Immigration Law Foundation: “A Brief History o f Chinese Immigration to America,” 
http:. www.ailf.orc awards ahp 0001 essavOl .him. 2000. Accessed on May 31, 2004.
* Ibid.
Charles Reagan Wilson, “Mississippi Chinese: An Ethnic People in a Biracial Society,” 
imp: mshistorv.k 1 2.ms.us features/ teature33/chinese.html. Accessed on May 31, 2004.
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Chinese immigration in order to win its support in elections.10 Another factor 
leading Chinese immigrants to disaster was that there were few female Chinese 
immigrants. The stories of Chinese men addicted to opium and Chinese prostitutes 
were read in newspapers everywhere and these reports became important 
“evidence” that the Chinese belonged to “an inferior race.”11 During one of the 
early outbursts of anti-Chinese sentiment, Governor Leland Stanford, who later 
imported and employed thousands of Chinese to build the Central Pacific Railroad, 
demanded instant legislation to restrict Chinese immigration. As he put it in  his 
inaugural address in 1862:
To my mind it is clear, that the settlement among us of an inferior 
race is to be discouraged by every legitimate means. Asia, with her 
numberless millions, sends to our shores the dregs of her population.... 
There can be no doubt but that the presence among us of numbers of 
degraded and distinct people must exercise a deleterious influence upon 
the superior race, and to a certain extent, repel desirable immigration. It 
will afford me great pleasure to concur with the Legislature in any 
constitutional action, having for its object the repression of the 
immigration of the Asiatic races.12
Chinese immigrants were among the “inferior race.” And California 
Congressman Horace F. Page, who had sponsored four anti-Chinese bills and three 
resolutions in the House of Representatives before introducing an anti-prostitution 
bill, was another important champion of the anti-Chinese movement. However, 
America’s new reciprocal treaty in 1868 with China, which recognized the right of 
Chinese subjects to immigrate to America, forced leaders of the anti-Chinese 
movement to change from their goal of general exclusion to a goal of targeting
10 Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California, p 57.
11 Ibid, p 43.
12 Cited in Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California, pp. 43-44. This 
statement came from Senate Journal, 1862, 99.
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Chinese women. On February 10, 1875, Page introduced a bill, later known as the 
Page Law, to Congress. The Page Law consisted of two parts. The first part focused 
on prohibiting the immigration of coolies, unskilled Asian laborers, from China. 
Persons convicted of transporting coolies and unskilled laborers were to be 
imprisoned for a period not exceeding one year and required to pay a fine not 
exceeding $2,000. The second part prohibited transporting prostitutes from China. 
Persons guilty of this crime were to be sentenced to jail for a period not exceeding 
five years and required to pay a fine not exceeding $5,000.13 Obviously, the 
punishment for transporting Chinese prostitutes was more severe. In fact, this law 
proved to be ineffective in prohibiting the importation of unskilled laborers from 
China because there was no clear definition of “unskilled.” However, it 
successfully prevented Chinese females from entering America because it was very 
difficult for these women, who were not fluent in English as well as not educated, 
to prove to American custom officers that they were not prostitutes. From 1875 to 
1882, it was not just prostitutes but all Chinese females who encountered “at best 
hostility and at worst expulsion when they reached the ‘Golden Door.’” 14 As a 
result, the Page law increased the imbalance of the sex ratio of the Chinese 
American community as the following table shows:
Table 1: Chinese Female Population in the United States (females per 1,000 males)
Year 1860 1870 1880 1890
Females 54 78 47 37
1 ’ George Anthony Peff'er, If They Don't Bring Their Women Here: Chinese Female Immigration Before 
Exclusion, Appendix, Document 1: An Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration (The 
Page Law), University o f Illinois Press, 1999.
14 Ibid, back cover.
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Chinese Females per 1,000 Chinese Males
— —  Chinese Femaies per 1,000 Chinese Males]
Figure l: Chinese Females per 1,000 Chinese Males (1860-1900)
Source: Statistics taken from U.S. Department o f Commerce, Special Report, Chinese and Japanese 
in the United States, 1910, Bulletin 127 (Washington, D.C., 1914), 8.
According to U.S. Department of Commerce, there was a steady increase of Chinese 
females from 1860 to 1870 (see Figure 1). In 1880, five years after the enactment of the 
Page Law, the number of Chinese females decreased from 78 to 47 per 1,000 Chinese 
males, 31 less than the number of ten years previous. In 1890, eight years after the 
enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act, the ratio of Chinese females to males fell to 37 
per one thousand, the lowest in Chinese-American history.1'’Clearly, the restriction of 
female immigration exerted a strong negative influence on the development of Chinese 
society by making family formation a virtual impossibility.
The enactment of discriminatory legislation inhibited Chinese population growth, 
ultimately leading to a slowly balancing sex ratio produced not by significant increase in 
female immigration but by a decline in the number of male immigrants. Between the 
1890s and 1920s, the Chinese population in America actually declined from over 100,000
8
to approximately 85,000. In 1882, the last year before the Exclusion Act banned the 
migration of Chinese laborers, approximately 40,000 Chinese immigrants were admitted. 
However in 1883, only 279 Chinese were able to enter the U.S., and in 1888, only 10.15 6 
By preventing all Chinese without family already in the U.S. from entering the country, 
this law effectively halted new immigration. Furthermore, Chinese Americans were 
denied the right to apply for naturalization.
The Chinese Exclusion Act (CEA) of 1882 was the first law in U.S. history to ban a 
specific racial group from entering America. Only Chinese diplomats, merchants, and 
students were allowed entry into the country. All Chinese desiring to enter the country 
went through an interrogation session. Then some were allowed to enter the country, and 
some were detained in prison-like barracks, or deported. This act not only suspended 
Chinese immigration for ten years, but also declared the Chinese who had been in the 
U.S. as ineligible for naturalization and. Chinese immigrants challenged the 
constitutionality of the discriminatory act, but their efforts failed. In 1892, CEA was 
renewed for another ten years, and Chinese immigration was made permanently illegal in 
1902. The Angel Island Inspection Station built in San Francisco in 1910 was one means 
of enforcing the ban. For 33 years, Angel Island processed close to 175,000 Chinese who 
came to America only to find that the door had been closed to them. 17 Their American 
dream was shattered.
The door to America stayed closed to Chinese immigrants until 1943. As a gesture to 
its ally during World War II, the U.S. Congress passed the Magnuson Act which repealed
15 Ibid, p 24.
16 Bill Ong Hing, “Blast from the Past: Our Numbers, Past and Present,”
http: .'www.asianvvcck.com-2001 04 06-news 14 blast numbers.html. Accessed on June 2, 2004.
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the Chinese Exclusion Act. It gave China an annual quota of 105 people to allow 
immigrants already in the U.S. to bring over family members.17 8 However, Chinese did 
not enjoy equal treatment under immigration laws until the enactment of the Immigration 
Act of 1965, which repealed the iniquitous national origin quota system. From then on, 
Chinese immigrated to the United States in significant numbers, reaching a population of 
approximately 1.6 million in 1990.19
After the normalization of the relationship between the People’s Republic of China 
(P.R.C.) and the U.S. in the 1970s, the People’s Republic of China was allocated a annual 
quota of 20,000 immigrants to America in 1979.20 According to the following data, there 
was a sharp increase of immigrants with Chinese backgrounds from 1981 to 1990 (see 
Table 2). These immigrants from different regions of China moved to the United Slates 
for a variety of reasons. Before 1990, most joined relatives in the name of family 
unification. However, in China [including Taiwan], this increase in the 1980s was 
followed by a decrease after 1990, according to the data for 1991 and 1992. But the 
number of Hong Kong immigrants was increasing and it contributed to a general increase 
in the Chinese-American population in the long run (see Figure 2).
The reason behind this was the impending return of Hong Kong from Great Britain 
to the P.R.C. in 1997. Feeling uncertain about the future, many Hong Kong residents 
chose to immigrate to Canada and the U.S. before the return to Chinese control. To attract 
these potential immigrants, especially wealthy business people, the U.S. increased Hong
17 “A Brief History of Chinese Immigration to America,”
http:.■'V'www.ailf.ora/awards ahp 0001 cssavO 1 .him. Accessed on May 28, 2004.
18 William Wei, “The Chinese American Experience: 1857-1892,” http: iminierants.hannvcek.com. 
Accessed on May 28, 2004.
19 “Chinese American: Fact Sheet,” http:// members.aol.com/chineseusa/00fac.htm. Accessed on May 28, 
2004.








Kong’s annual immigrant quota from 5,000 to 10,000 in 1989. Due to immigration from 
Hong Kong, the total number of Chinese in the U.S. continued to increase in the early 
1990s.
Table 2: Chinese American Immigrants (1971-2000, in thousands)
C hinese American Immigrants, 1971-2000
Year
C hina (Taiwan 
inc luded) H ong Kong Tota l
1971-1980 202.50  / 20 .25  pe r year 47 .50  / 4 .75  per year 250.00
1981-1990 388.80 /38 .88  per year 63 .00  / 6 .3 per year 451.80
1991-2000 359.50 Z35.95 p e r  y e a r 104.50  /  10.45 p e r  y e a r 464 .00
1991 33.00 10.40 43.40











China (Taiwan Hong Kong Total
included)
Region
Figure 2: Chinese American Immigrants (1971-2000, in thousands)
Source: Statistical Abstract o f the United States, various years.
By 1990, students and scholars from mainland China were among one of the small 
groups of Chinese immigrants in America. In 1993, a new factor, the enactment of the 
CSPA, greatly increased their number. In just one year, approximately 65,600 Chinese 
students and scholars got their green cards. Altogether, during the following years, the 
total number of mainland Chinese green card holders increased to approximately 80,000 
under the terms of this Act.21 Most of these Chinese had originally come to America with 
a J-l or F-l visa. By 1989, the majority of Chinese students and scholars were J-l holders 
who were sponsored by the PRC government. After a stipulated period in the U.S., they 
were required to go back and work in China for at least two years before they could apply 
for another American visa. Students with F-l status were sponsored by U.S. universities 
or by themselves. They could stay in America as long as their status was legal.
As many scholars have observed, the loss to the U.S. of students “who have 
completed their education in this country is not a problem unique to China.” The brain 
drain has become a post-World War II phenomenon experienced by both the 
developing and developed nations of the world. What then made China more sensitive 
to this issue even in 1988?22 What impact do returned students make on their 
institutions as well as on China’s modernization in general? What does this “loss” 
mean to the Chinese government and how should it respond? To have a better 
understanding of these questions, it will be necessary to record and analyze seven 
waves of Chinese overseas study from 1872 to 19 89.23 This will provide a solid 
historic perspective of the Chinese overseas study programs in one century, the role
21 “Chinese American Immigrants,” him: . members.aol.com/chineseusa 00imu.htm. Accessed on May 28, 
2004.
22 Leo A. Orleans, Chinese Students in America: Policies. Issues, and Numbers, p 114, National Academy 
Press, Washington D.C., 1988.
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returned students have played in China’s modernization, and the current Chinese 
government’s overseas study policy.
Unlike the self-sponsored immigration to California in the 1850s, the first wave of 
Chinese overseas study was supported by reform-oriented Han officials in the Qing 
government such as Guofan Zen and Hongzhang Li.23 4 25With their support, a Chinese 
scholar, Hong Rong, initiated the first Chinese overseas study program, which aimed to 
cultivate young Chinese with expertise in modem science and technology.26 Through this 
program, thirty young men (ages 9-15) were selected every year from 1872 to 1875, and 
sent to the U.S. to study under the aegis of the central government. These students first 
enrolled in middle schools, then universities. However, fearing young Chinese 
assimilation by Western culture, the Qing government canceled this program in 1881 and 
brought most of the students back to China, among whom were Tang Shaoyi, Liang 
Cheng, and Tang Guoan, the future first prime minister of the Republic of China, the 
future Chinese ambassador to the U.S., and the first President of Tsing Hua University 
respectively. Only a few of the young Chinese stayed in the U.S. and completed their 
college education. For example, Tianyou Zhan graduated from Yale University and 
became one of the founders of Chinese modem technology."6
In order to found China’s own modem navy, the Qing Dynasty also sent 
approximately 100 Chinese students to Europe to study. Under the leadership of
23 Some Chinese historians and scholars prefer to divide the one hundred years o f Chinese overseas study 
into ten generations, such as Dai Yi and Song Jian.
24 Song Jian, “Overseas Study in One Century,” http: /www.china.oru.cn Chinese-ch-vnwai 313757.him. 
Accessed on May 28, 2004. Guofan Zeng and Hongzhang Li were the most important provincial Han 
officers from the 1860s to 1890s. Song Jian is a celebrated Chinese scientist who was trained in the Soviet 
Union. The essay I quoted was an outline o f Chinese Overseas study in one century. This essay is concise 
but had much of important data.
25 Ibid. Hong Rong is the first Chinese scholar who studied overseas. He got a bachelor’s degree in
Mechanical Engineering from Yale University.
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Hongzhang Li, these students became the backbone of the modem Chinese navy in the 
1880s. Although the Qing governors showed no interest in Western philosophy and other 
ideas, Fu Yan, one of the naval students, developed a great interest in Western science 
and knowledge. He was the first to translate The Wealth o f Nations and Evolution and 
Ethics into Chinese. These, as well as his six other translations, profoundly influenced the 
development of modem ideas in China. For good or ill, the wide spread distribution of 
Evolution and Ethics helped the rise of social Darwinism in China in the early 20th 
century.27
Although it was also encouraged by the Qing government, the second wave of 
overseas study was different from the first in every aspect, especially in the direct cause 
and the result. The second wave of overseas study—from 1903 to 1913 in Japan—was 
sparked by the Chinese failure in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Before this war, 
although it had suffered losses to some major European powers, the Qing dynasty still 
regarded itself as a dominant power in Asia. It had great influence in neighboring 
countries such as Vietnam and Korea. However, the Qing Dynasty was defeated again by 
foreigners in 1895. But this time, the invader was Japan—a small and important country 
from the same east-Asia area—not a major Western power. The Qing lost its entire 
Northern Sea navy in the war and even more at the negotiating table. According to the 
Maguan treaty with the Japanese in 1895, Qing ceded the southern portion of Fengtian 
(current Shenyang, Liaoning) province, the islands of Formosa (Taiwan), and the 
Pescadores Islands (Penghu Islands) to Japan. Qing also paid Japan a war indemnity of 
200 million Kuping (treasury) taels, approximately 393 million U.S. dollars.
Furthermore, China was forced to open various pons and rivers to Japan as well as to 
Western countries. Japan had now become one of the imperial powers who were active in 
dividing the Chinese market.28
At the same time, Western missionaries poured into China and established 
churches both in cities and throughout the country-side. When disputes arose between the 
church and the local Chinese, the local or central Chinese officers tended to judge in 
favor of the foreigners and Chinese Christians whenever traditional Chinese culture 
conflicted with Christianity. These local conflicts between Western missionaries and 
common Chinese eventually led to the rise of the “Fists of Righteous Harmony” (the 
Boxer Movement), which aimed to “uphold the Qing and exterminate the foreigners” in 
most northern provinces in 1900.29
Concerned about her own power, Empress Tsu His (Cixi) intended to make use of 
these “Boxers” to get all foreigners out of China. In the beginning, she recognized these 
Boxer groups as legal and gave them permission to attack the foreign embassies in 
Beijing. However, when it became obvious that these young nationalists could not defeat 
the well-armed Westerners, Cixi declared the Boxers outlaws and tried to negotiate with 
the International Relief Force.30
Through the Xinchou treaty—known as the Boxer Protocol of 1901—between 
Qing and the eight powers, the Qing government became little more than a puppet of the 
Western countries. Also, because of the U.S. contribution in the crackdown on the 
Boxers, Western powers accepted its “Open Door” policy, which had been proposed by
28 “The Treaty o f  Shimonoseki,” http.v/cn.wikipedia.ort’/vviki/Treatv of Shimonoscki. Accessed on May 
16, 2004.
29 Philip Y.L. Woo, “Boxer Uprising,” adapted by T.K. Chung,
http:/Avvv\v.thecorner.oriFhists/china/boxcr.htm. Accessed on November 3, 2004.
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American Secretary of State John Hay in 1898. Therefore, Chinese inland and coast ports 
were forced to open to these Westerners. Furthermore, a total of $786,440,000 was to be 
paid by the Chinese government to the invaders as “reparation”.30 1 32It was in this situation 
that the Qing government decided to reform the traditional education system and adopt a 
Western curriculum.
Meanwhile, the earlier failure in the Sino-Japanese War had itself inspired a wave of 
learning science and technologies from the Japanese. Starting in 1900, approximately ten 
thousand Chinese students went to Japan each year. They were sponsored by the central 
government, local government, or by their families. Among those students were Hu 
Hanmin, Wang Jinwei, and Song Jiaoren. These three students eventually became the 
leaders of China’s first democratic movement and, with support from the local 
governments, they overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 191172
The crackdown of the Boxer movement gave the U.S. an opportunity to play an 
important role in the Qing dynasty’s politics and economy. Before the Boxer movement, 
the Chinese market had been divided into several spheres of influence in accord with the 
business interests of Western countries such as Great Britain, Germany, and Russia. Until 
this time, the U.S. had no separate sphere of influence in China. To enter into the Chinese 
market as the other countries had, the U.S. initiated the “Open Door” policy and got it 
accepted by the other Western powers by showing its increasing power in arms during the 





To enlarge its influence in China and establish a closer relationship with the 
Chinese, the U.S. decided to sponsor young Chinese to study in America with the 
$10,785,286 gained under the 1901 Protocol in 1907. The Chinese ambassador to the 
U.S., Liang Cheng, played a crucial role in this issue. According to Qian Gang and Hu 
Jincao, when Liang Cheng negotiated with Secretary of State John Hay about how to 
make the reparation payment, John Hay accidently let it slip that the amount was too 
high. Liang picked up on Hay’s words and realized that some American officials must 
have made exaggerated “claims” for reparations. Liang decided not to focus on paying 
the reparation with gold or silver, but on decreasing the amount of the reparation. In 
1908, the U.S. Congress converted half of the U.S. payments—approximately 
$10,785,286—into a scholarship fund for Chinese overseas study. Consequently, 
Tsinghua Xuetang, a preparatory school for students who would be sent by the 
government to study in universities in the United States, was founded in 1911.33 From 
here approximately 1,971 students were sent to the U.S. to study science, technology, and 
humanities. This started the third wave of overseas study in China’s modem history. 
Including self-sponsored students, the total number of Chinese students who went to the 
U.S. after 1909 reached 5,000 by 1949. Many of them became experts in their field and 
founders of modem science and technology in China.34
A radically different experiment in overseas education was commenced in 1908 
when Li Shizeng, an anarchist, started a tofu factory near Paris and began to teach his 
Chinese workers French, basic science, and healthy behaviors. Following the principles
33 Qian Gang, Hu Jincao, “Stories of the Overseas Study Teenagers in the Late Qing Dynasty,”
http:"cul.sina.corn.cii/v/2004-04-28 33907.html. Accessed on May 29, 2004.
34 Song Jian, “Overseas Study Waves in One Century,” www.cas.ac.cn, htnii D ii-2003.02 15/7140.htm. 
accessed on May 16, 2004.
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of anarchism, Li managed his worker students with strict rules, and forbade them to 
drink, smoke, and gamble. However, his factory soon went bankrupt. Although Li had to 
send participating students back to China, he did not give up his idea. Before World War 
I, Li arranged for approximately 130 Chinese students to study in France. During the 
War, he created the China-France Education Association (CFEA) which aimed to train 
Chinese teachers and offered a basic education as well as an introduction to the concepts 
of anarchism to Chinese workers in French factories. Li successfully persuaded his 
friends back in China to establish branches of CF'” ' These branches were responsible 
for helping students prepare for overseas study. At this time there were approximately 
30,000 Chinese workers in France.35 Meanwhile, the increasing influence of America and 
Great Britain in China worried French politicians and educators. Thus, they welcomed 
Li’s efforts and had high expectations for his programs.
Beginning in 1916, studying in France and Russia became the fourth significant 
wave of overseas study. Different from the former overseas Chinese students, the people 
who went to France after 1915 were sons and daughters of poorer landowners, merchants 
or scholars. ’6 In 1916, over 100 Chinese went to France and became part-time students 
with the support of Li Shizeng.37 Most of them worked outside of the classroom to pay 
their tuition and living costs. Between March 1919 and December 1920, approximately 
1,600 participating students sailed for France. Most of them were China’s first generation 
of modem middle-school graduates and were in their early twenties. Only a few, 
including Deng Xiaoping, were under twenty. Although the steamship company offered
35 Richard Evans, Deng Xiaoping and the Making o f Modem China, p 11, the Penguin Group, 1995.
36 Ibid, pp 10-13. These young Chinese were inspired by scholars including Li Shizeng, Yuanpei Cai,
Zhihui Wu, and Jinwei Wang. Li ShiZeng (also called Li Yuying) was educated in Paris. He created the 
Sino-French Education Association in 1916.
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them a favorable price of 100 silver dollars for a ticket, most could not afford a ticket and 
had to borrow money from the shipping company.38
After arriving in France, students were divided into groups of about twenty by the 
officials of the Sino-French Education Association. Then the members of each group 
were sent to a provincial non-selective secondary school in which a special French class 
was offered. If things had gone smoothly, the students would have continued as language 
students until their French was good enough to allow them to follow an ordinary program 
of secondary education. However, in January 1921, the Sino-French Education 
Association announced that “it had run out of money and that only those students who 
could pay their own fees would be able to stay at school.”39 *This crisis was caused by 
mismanagement. Allowing too many worker-students to go to France, the association had 
failed to find new sources of income to meet its steadily rising expenditures. Another 
factor was that the principal supporters of this association had lost their interest in this 
program by 1921. Instead, they showed increasing interest in establishing institutions of 
higher education on the French model in both countries by obtaining funding from the 
French government out of money it had received from China under the Boxer Protocol of 
1901.40
For most of the students, the consequence was the dissolution of their language 
class which forced them to go job-hunting during the depressed era after the war. It was 







Ibid, p 15. 
Ibid.
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jobs in big factories were paid only half the wages of ordinary French workers.41 
Therefore, there was no way but to fight for individual survival. For many, this grim 
reality crushed their studying abroad dream. As a result, few of these people became 
scientists and artists; indeed, most turned out to be communist leaders, or writers and 
artists who favored communism in China. These young men, including Zhou Enlai, Deng 
Xiaoping, and Chen Yi, profoundly influenced the fate of China.42
In retrospect, it is clear that two events in European history greatly shaped those 
students’ lives as well as modem Chinese history. When young men such as Zhou Enlai 
and Deng Xiaoping went to Frarce, what they experienced was not only a new Western 
society, but also the worst aspect of a capitalist society— Europe during and after World 
War I. For these young Chinese, what was even worse was that after the war, China, part 
of the winning alliance, was forced to give its Shandong province, which had been one of 
Germ.any’s “spheres of influence”, to Japan under the terms of Treaty of Versailles.43 On 
the other hand, the new-born Communist Russia claimed that it would like to give back to 
the Chinese all the rights the former Russian Empire had gained in China and did in fact
41 Ibid., p 17.
4‘ Song Jian, “Overseas Study in One Century,” http://w\vw,china.orc.cn Chinese , ii-vuwai/313757.htm. 
Accessed on May 31, 2004.
43 iiMay Fourth Movement," http://en.wikipedia <'"• \ tki \lay_Fourth_Movement. Accessed on May 7, 
2004. China optimistically joined in World War 1 in order to oppose Japan’s aggression. China demanded 
the return o f the former German concessions in Shandong and the abolition of unfair treaties such as the 
Twenty-one Demands. But as a result o f the Treaty o f Versailles, the German rights in Shandong 
(Kiaochovv) were formally transferred to Japan. The decisions o f the Paris Peace Conference resulted in 
cat disappointment and anger among the Chinese with an increase in strong nationalist and anti-Japanese 
feelings. This eventually led to the formation of the May Fourth Movement in 1919.
In fact, the western powers did not want to give up their concessions in China. Moreover, before the end of 
the war, they had concluded secret treaties with Japan in which they promised to support Japan’s claims in 
Shandong in exchange for Japan's continued allegiance to the Allied cause. Thus the Western powers 
rejected China's demands at the Paris Peace Conference and the Shandong privileges were granted to Japan. 
As a result, anti-Japanese demonstrations and boycotts were organized on May 4, 1919, marking the 
beginning o f the May Fourth Movement. Additionally, anti-Japanese feeling had increased in China since
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return some territories which had belonged to China. It was in this situation that 
thousands of young nationalists, including Deng Xiaoping, developed a strong interest in 
communism and decided to go to Russia to seek truth.44
Two years after the revolution in Russia, some young Chinese left China for 
Moscow Oriental University (MOU, later Sunwen University) to study, where they were 
introduced to communism. Liu Shaoqi, Qu Qiubai, and Ren Bishi were among the first 
Chinese students there.45 Three years later, students already in Europe including Zhu De, 
Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, Li Fuchun, and others went to Moscow and enrolled at 
MOU. By 1930, the total number of Chinese students at MOU was over 1,000.46
The fifth wave of overseas study developed gradually during the period from the 
Sino-Japanese War through to World War II. In this case, students were financed by the 
government of the Republic of China, foreign governments or their families. Most of 
these students stayed and worked overseas after completing their studies because of 
difficulties caused by the wars. However, many young Chinese failed to realize their 
overseas study dream. One example was Ailing Zhang, a descendant of Li Hongzhang, 
who took the entrance exam of the University of London and had the highest score in the 
far east-Asia area.47 Zhang could not go to London because of the outbreak of World War 
II in Europe. Instead, in 1939, Zhang enrolled at Hong Kong University. Four years later,
the forced acceptance o f the Twenty-one Demands in 1915. The disappointment in 1919 further raised the 
nationalist feeling against Japan.
44 Song Jian, “Overseas Study in One Century,” www.cas.ac.cn/html Dir 2003 02 15 7140.htm. Accessed 
on May 16, 2004.
45 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
47 Li Hongzhang is the Chinese official who supported the first Chinese overseas study program in the 
1870s. Zhang Ailing is one of his descendants. Zhang’s father was addicted to gambling and opium. 
Zhang’s mother went to England to study in the 1920s after years o f unhappy marriage. Zhang later left her 
father and lived with her mother. Zhang’s mother encouraged Zhang Ailing to study overseas. She hired an 
English tutor for Zhang Ailing and the fee was $5 per hour. Zhang Zijing, “My Sister Ailing Zhang,”
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she began to publish novels in Shanghai and became one of the greatest Chinese writers 
of the 20lh century.48
Another example was a young man with the surname of Li. He was a doctor and 
planned to go to Germany to continue his study of medicine before the Sino-Japanese 
war. After the outbreak of that war, Li became a doctor in an anonymous camp and died, 
leaving his wife and two teenager daughters. Although Li did not realize his overseas 
study dream, he and his wife left a legacy—to be an independent person and have an 
independent mind—to their daughters. Li Shuxian was his eldest daughter. In 1955, she 
enrolled in Beijing University and met Fang Lizhi, her future husband and the future 
champion of the Chinese democracy movement in the 1980s.49
Among the Chinese who went abroad after World War II, near the end of this 
wave, were many who turned out to be leading experts in their fields, such as future 
Nobel Prize winners Tseng-Dao Lee and Chen-Ning Yang, well-known chemist Aoqing 
Tang, and nuclear scientist Guangya Zhu. The latter was one of the founders of the 
Chinese nuclear industry. According to Zhengning Yang, Tseng-Dao Lee and Guangya 
Zhu were selected by the government to study nuclear science in order to help China
http:// www.eduhridae.com/erxiantanu hbrarv-zhanaailina.htm. Accessed on May 1, 2004.
48 Ibid. Zhang moved to Hong Kong in 1952 and eventually went to America in 1955. She visited Hu Shi 
at the same year and decided to stay in America. (Hu Shi is a liberal philosopher who applied his liberal 
philosophy to China in the early twentieth century. He is well known as one o f the three leaders of the 
Chinese New Culture movement. Unlike the other two leaders who introduced Communism into China, Hu 
was educated in Cornell University and Columbia University with the support o f a Boxer Indemnity 
scholarship from 1910 to 1917. He quickly came under the influence o f liberal political philosophy in 
general and John Dewey's experimentalism in particular. Upon his return to China in 1917, Hu Shi became 
a leader in the Chinese New Culture movement, his most celebrated historical role.
Adapted from Jerome B. Grieder’s review on “Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the 
Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937.” Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. ) Accessed on May 17, 
2004 http:/ ornheus.ucsd.edu/chincsehisiorv pun'nriedcr.htm
49 “Interview with Fang Lizhi and Li Shuxian,” http: 'wvvw.linlins.com fame 2000-4-22-09-12-0S.html. 
accessed on May 17, 2004.
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produce atom bombs. However, the two young Chinese were prohibited from studying 
nuclear science by the American government. They changed their fields of study to 
physics and enrolled in graduate schools.30
The first five waves of overseas study played a crucial role in the development of 
higher education in China. Almost all the founders of the first batch of Chinese 
universities received advanced education and had some research experience abroad. 
According to Shen Keqi, the first Chinese Ph.D. in physics was earned by Fo-ki Li in 
England in 1907. The first Ph.D. received in America was in 1914 by John Yiubong Lee. 
As Professor Shen has indicated, there were 164 students going abroad for graduate study 
in physics before 1949, among them 116 in America, 25 in England, 12 in France, nine in 
Germany, one in Austria, and one in Canada.* 51
Altogether, approximately 5,000 Chinese students and scholars were living overseas 
prior to 1950. Of these, 3,500 were in the U.S., 1,200 in Japan, 443 in England, 197 in 
France, and 50 in West Germany. From 1949 to 1954, 1,424 of these scholars and 
scientists returned to China, including 937 from the U.S., 193 from England, 119 from 
Japan, and 85 from France. The total number of returning scholars increased to 2,500 by 
1960. Some of them, including Qian Xuesen, Chen Nengkuan, and Guo Yonghuai, could 
not go back to China because of the Cold War inspired restriction policy of the U.S. After 
the Korean War, the Chinese government finally got those scientists back under an 
agreement with the U.S. government after several high level meetings in 1954 and
Song Jian, “Overseas Study Waves in One Century,”
http:, wvvw.china.ore.cn/chinese/cli-vuwar 3 13757.htm. Accessed on May 31, 2004.
51 Shen Keqi, Zhao Kaihua, Early Histoiy o f  CUSPEA,
htl;xvvwvv.oepaweh.orc, news items, 2001 khzlnio talk.html. Accessed on May 20, 2004.
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1955. " Among the founding members of the Academic Committee in the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS) which was formed in 1955, returned overseas Chinese 
scholars accounted for as much as 92 percent of the membership. Twenty-one of the 
twenty-three medal winners who were recognized for their special contribution to China's 
development of "two bombs and one satellite" (A-bonu and H-bomb) are the returned, 
overseas-trained scholars.53
The sixth wave (1950-1963) of Chinese overseas study was by far the largest. 
After the revolution of 1949, China was closed to the West; therefore Chinese Ph.D.’s 
were cultivated in the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. From 1950 to 
1963, over 18,000 Chinese students and engineers went to Eastern European countries to 
study in exchange programs established between the PRC government and the host 
countries. It was reported that all of the students returned to China after they finished 
their studies and went to positions assigned by either central or local governments. In the 
early 1960s, the deterioration of the Sino-USSR relationship altered overseas study 
programs yet again and the number of Chinese students sent to Eastem-Europe sharply 
decreased (see Table 3). As a result of the badly deteriorated relationship, China finally 
stopped sending students to the USSR in 1964. The Eastern countries’ doors eventually
2 Qian Xuesen, “Father o f China’s Aerospace” and “King o f Rockets,” received Ph.D. degrees in both 
aerospace and mathematics from the California Institute o f Technology. According to Fox report, 
allegations arose that Qian was spying for the PRC during the 1950s. He lost his security clearances and 
was removed from work on U.S. ballistic missiles. Qian was invited back to the PRC and, after 
negotiations between the U.S. Government and the PRC, Qian was allowed to return to the PRC in 1955. 
Four other Chinese members o f Qian's Titan design team also returned with him to the PRC. 
http:/'/www.access.trpo.t’ov congress house-hr 105851 -html ch4bod.html/;‘anchor5317295. Accessed on May 
29, 2004.However, there are historical errors in the report o f Fox. The ABC News report argued that Qian 
Xuesen’s story was much less criminal than the Fox report suggests. According to Space historians, the 
contract for the Titan was not even let until October 1955, how could Qian get the “classified documents” 
o f the Titan missile program. Into: abcnews.uo.cony sections science PailvXev.s obeiu900602.lumi. 
Accessed on May 29, 2004.
53 “80 Percent o f China's Presidents are Chinese Returned from Overseas,”
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closed to Chinese students as well.54
Table 3: Chinese Overseas Students in East-Europe (1950-1960)
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
35 381 231 675 1518 2093 2401 450Si 450 450 450
Few of these Chinese students became celebrated scientists or artists, largely
because of the social and political turmoil in China. From 1958 to 1976, China
experienced the “Great Leap Forward” Movement, the Cultural Revolution, and the many
problems associated with the rule of the Gang of Four. During these twenty years, the
Chinese education system was virtually destroyed and normal higher education was
abolished. As one Chinese American scientist put it,
When the infamous political turmoil, "the Cultural Revolution", started in 
China, I was in the fourth grade. My formal school education was 
interrupted as the entire school system in Beijing was paralyzed. It did not 
resume until twelve years later, when I entered a physics department of a 
university in Beijing. Those twelve years constituted a dark age in the 
history of China, and in many people's lives including mine.’16
However, even though university faculties and scholars were punished because of
their education and status, becoming a scholar, especially a scientist, was still a dream for
many intellectuals’ children. During this “dark age”, one daughter of a university faculty
member kept teaching herself mathematics, chemistry, and physics. Longing to see the
world, she chose English rather than Russian as her first foreign language, as the former *54
http:-7www.cdu.cn/200403 0 1 3 100097.shtml. accessed on May 17, 2004.
54 Song Jian, “Overseas Study in One Century,” http: //www.china.cn chinese'ch-vmvai 313757.him. 
Accessed on May 18, 2004.
•5 Ibid. From 1957 to 1960, approximately 400 to 500 Chinese students were sent to Eastern-Europe every 
year. The total number o f students who were sent to East-Europe reached 9,594 in 1963. Excluding these 
students, 7,800 Chinese in the industry fields were sent to USSR and European countries. Among them 
were 609 administrators, 4876 engineers and technicians, and 2291 workers.
M’ Li wen Pan, “The Two Libraries That Changed My Life,” him: acd.ucar.edu -liwen. essav.html.
Accessed on May 31, 2004.
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is the most wide-spread.57 Another good example is that of a daughter of a couple who 
had college educations. In the middle school where she studied, there were only four 
students whose parents had Bachelor’s degrees. Because of her parents’ status, she gained 
special treatment when she worked for half a month at a factory every semester. In her 
experience, people who had common sense showed respect to intellectuals.58 59
After the deterioration of China-Soviet relations, especially in the period of the 
“Cultural Revolution,” China was almost completely closed to the outside world, and a 
whole generation lost the opportunity for proper higher education even within their own 
country. When some semblance of order was returned to higher education at the end of 
the 1970s, there was a severe shortage of qualified scientists and teachers at all levels. 
This shortage, coupled with the international political situation, became the main force 
that led Chinese political leaders and scientists to start the seventh wave of overseas study 
— the one to the U.S.5<)
’7 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese Americans Oral History 2004,” tape 1.
58 Ibid., tape 6. This girl and her family “occupied” and shared the house with an eminent scholar during the 
Cultural Revolution. The owner o f  the house did not treat this family as an occupying enemy, but taught the 
daughter classic Chinese and English. The girl’s mother was a staff member at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science. Growing up with celebrated scholars such as Yangiiang, she dreamed o f going to university 
and becaming a scientist. In her parents’ opinion, being a social scientist was good but dangerous in China. 
Being a scientist was much safer.
59 Shen Keqi, Zhao Kaihua, Early History o f  CUSPEA,
hno: www.ocpawcb.ore ncwsilcms 2001 khzhao talk.html. Accessed on May 20, 2004.
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CHAPTER III
SEVENTH WAVE OF OVERSEAS STUDY
One hundred years after the first group of Chinese students went abroad to study, 
the seventh wave of overseas study (SWOS), the one to the U.S., started in 1973. Similar 
to the 1872 wave, this most recent one was comprised of teenagers around thirteen years 
of age. However, unlike the first wave, the majority of these students were from elite 
families. They were offspring of either high ranking Chinese communist officials, or of 
established scholars.60 The development of the seventh wave was greatly influenced by 
the Sino-Soviet relations of the 1970s. In other words, the seventh wave of overseas study 
was one of the by-products of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations over the previous 
two decades. This chapter will first examine the origin of SWOS. Then two categories of 
overseas programs will be discussed and the demographic composition of Chinese 
students in the U.S. will be presented. Finally, this chapter will discuss the phenomenon 
of the Chinese brain drain; a phenomenon that was rooted in the decision of most of the 
Chinese students in the SWOS to stay or extend their stay in the U.S. even before the 
student protest in spring, 1989.
Two events in the USSR—the death of Stalin in 1953 and Khrushchev’s “secret 
speech” at the opening of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956— 
isolated China from the outside world and put an end to the sixth wave of overseas study.
60 Zeng Huiyan, “Green Cards Army, Chinese American’s Valuable Political Asset,” World Journal, 
September 5, 2004.
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However, it helped China gradually shake off the yoke of the USSR in the making of 
Chinese foreign policy.61 Owing to increasing Sino-Soviet antagonism and conflict, the 
Chinese leaders had to adjust China’s foreign strategy and policy in the 1960s. Thus, 
contact between China and the Western countries became necessary as a counter-balance 
against the USSR.62 It also helped give birth to a brand new wave of Chinese overseas 
study.
Before 1972, U.S. citizens were still out of contact with China while it had been 
relatively easy for non-American Westerners to visit China from mid-1964 to mid-1966. 
According to Geoffery Oldham,
Several Western scientists had traveled to China as tourists. There were 
also scientific exchanges between the Royal Society of Britain and the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the Royal Swedish Academies of 
Science and CAS, and between the French and Chinese governments, and 
there were official visits to China by scientists from Canada, Australia, 
and many other Western countries.63
To improve the prospects for communication between the U.S. and China, Robert 
Sheeks, associate director of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Pacific Science 
Board, and Harrison Brown, NAS Foreign Secretary, initiated a program which would 
sponsor efforts to explore the expansion of U.S.-China bilateral scholarly and scientific 
relations in 1965. With the support of both the Edward W. Hazen Foundation and the
61 Sun Qiming, The Sino-Soviet Antagonism and Chinese Diplomacy —The impact of the deterioration in 
the Sino-Soviet relations on China (III), School o f Culture and Law.Tongji University,Shanghai 
200092,China.
http://alsch.tonaii.edu.cn/main/main sub/ioumaldovvnload/200?fiftlUiansaction.doc. Accessed on May 18, 
2004.
62 Ibid.
63 Kathlin Smith, The Role o f  Scientists in Normalizing U.S.-China Relations: 1965-1979. The New York 
Academy o f Sciences.
www.ciaonci.ora.coni'nva02-nya02ac.html. Accessed on May 18, 2004. The original quote is from 
Oldham, C.H. Geoffery, “The Cultural Revolution: New Prospects for Chinese Science.” Technology 
Review, v. 71, Oct./Nov. 1968. On January 4, 1971, the Executive Committee of the CSCMC met and
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Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Committee on Scholarly Communication with 
Mainland China (CSCMC) was established in the spring of 1966.64 However, the Cultural 
Revolution, which started in 1966, further isolated China from the rest of the world. 
Indeed, China was in total domestic upheaval from 1966 to 1970. By 1971, only France, 
North Korea, North Vietnam, and Sweden had diplomatic personnel in Beijing who could 
be considered scientific attaches.65 Therefore, the CSCMC “remained intact through these 
years, but its activities were confined largely to monitoring developments in China, 
gathering information about the state of Chinese research, and facilitating the exchange 
of scientific reprints. Most scholars agreed that there could be no communication with the 
Chinese until Peking made a political decision in favor of it.”66
Prospects for communication with China appeared especially bleak during the 
first three years of the Cultural Revolution. However, politics—both domestic and 
international—forced the normalization of the relationship between the U.S. and China in 
an unexpected way during the 1970s. The political agendas of both countries also 
determined the possibilities for bilateral science contacts.67 By the early 1970s, the U.S. 
and China shared some common ground in international politics, as both countries 
wanted to strengthen their positions against the USSR and both sought a negotiated peace 
in Vietnam.
At a less formal level, once it was politically possible for scientists to contact each
decided to change the Committee's name to the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's 
Republic of China (CSCPRC).
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. There are two names for the Capital o f China. One is Beijing, and another is Peking. In this thesis, 
Beijing is mainly used except in the direct citations.
67 Kathlin Smith, The Role o f  Scientists in Normalizing L.S.-China Relations: 1965-1979. The New York 
Academy o f Sciences. www.ciaonct.oru/conPnva02/nva02ae.html, Accessed on May 18, 2004.
other directly, communication and exchange among U.S. and Chinese scientists, 
especially American scientists of Chinese descent, played an important role in re­
establishing the relations between the people as well as governments of both countries.68 
Some of these scientists, such as Yang Chen-ning, had access to China’s highest leaders. 
According to Kathlin Smith, the importance of these individuals as bridges between two 
cultures increased and contributed to many of the successes which came out of the 
relationship following normalization.
Chinese-American scientists and engineers in government agencies and 
private companies were recruited into the service of the relationship, and 
those in universities played an important role in the recruitment, reception, 
and training of Chinese students and scholars coming to US institutions of 
higher education. An especially prominent example of the latter was the 
T.D. Lee scholars program, initiated by Nobel laureate Tseng-Dao Lee of 
Columbia University, which has sought to identify the best and brightest 
young physicists in China and to insure that they were placed in the 
premier US physics programs.69
The T.D. Lee scholars program mentioned by Smith was better known as the 
China-United States Physics Examination and Application program (CUSPEA). It was a 
nine-year academic exchange program which sent 915 Chinese students to American 
universities from 1981 to 1989.70
As one result of the normalization of U.S.-China relations, a wave of Chinese 
overseas study with a focus in the United States began at the end of the 1970s. Before this
os Ibid. In this paper, Smith focuses on the activities o f the Committee on Scholarly Communication with 
the People’s Republic o f China (CSCPRC). She examines how the early interchanges in the relatively non­
political arena of science helped to build trust, identify common ground, and demonstrate that two societies 
could work together after years o f estrangement.
w Richard P. Suttmeier, “Scientific Cooperation and Conflict Management in US-China Relations.” 1978 
to the Present, the New York Academy o f  Sciences.
Imp:. 64.233.167,104 searchVcr-caclie: 507  4UGp  rOJ:www.ciaoiiet.on’/conr,iiva()2'nyaU2ad.html+Lee'T  
senu-Dao& hl-cn. Accessed on May 18, 2004.
70 Zhao Kaihua, “CUSPEA Introduction,” http:, 'bimp.pkn.edu.cn/euspea introdnc introdnc,him. Accessed 
on May 18, 2004.
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wave commenced, Chinese scholars and students had lost contact with U.S. universities 
for almost three decades. The first contact in the education field was an overseas study 
program sponsored by the Chinese Foreign Ministry (CFM). Under this program, twenty- 
eight “Little Red Guards” (fifth graders) studying at an elementary school affiliated with 
the Beijing Foreign Language College had been selected and sent to the U.S. and Europe 
in 1973. Four of them studied in New York City for four years and then went back to 
China. Hong Huang, the twelve year old daughter of a high ranking female official in 
CFM, Zhang Hanzhi, was among them. This program was developed to meet the 
increasing demand for English-speaking professionals in the wake of President Richard 
Nixon’s historic trip to China.71
Hong went back to Beijing in 1977 and received her high school diploma in 1978. 
In 1980, she returned to America and studied international politics at Vassar College. 
When Hong was a junior in 1983, her stepfather, Qiao Guanhua, a former Chinese 
Foreign Minister, became very sick. Hong wanted to visit him and still be able to reenter 
the U.S. Her American boyfriend also wanted to get a Chinese visa. At this time, it was 
very difficult for either to get a visa. To make it easier, they decided to marry.72
71 Hong Huang, “Little Red Guards in New York,”
http://www.tfhinasite.com/content/Literalures/HongMuana/Newyork LittleRedGuard.litm.
Accessed on May 19, 2004. Interested readers may read the sources in an article titled “Retired Woman 
Diplomat’s Life Attracts Readers,”
ini»:/'wv.'w! .Ldiiiuulailv.coni.cn/en/doc '2003-12/09/contem 2b8517,him. Accessed on May 18, 2004. 
Zhang's name is closely linked to the history o f the People's Republic o f China for her contributions as one 
o f the finest first-generation diplomats. She participated in a series of important Sino-American activities, 
such as President Nixon’s visit in 1972. Along with her later husband Qiao Guanhua, she also played an 
important role in restoring China's U.N. seat. Of the four students who studied in New York, one o f them 
became a Chinese foreign affairs official and two immigrated overseas. Now Hong Huang is a publisher 
and still lives in Beijing.
/2 Xu Gehui, “Interview with Hong Huang,”
http: ''www.cliiiiasite.com/contein Literatures I loncHuanuWithChenKaiGe2.htm. Accessed on May 18, 
2004.
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Meanwhile, another situation that developed in 1981 illustrated the fragile state of 
U.S.-China relations during the early years of normalization. In this case, a Chinese 
undergraduate student married his American bride in Changsha, Hunan province. Unlike 
Hong’s quiet marriage in America, this young couple appealed to numerous Changsha 
local officials as well as central government officials to get permission to marry but were 
repeatedly refused. In the early 1980s, to marry a foreigner, especially an American, was 
rare and controversial. Neither local nor central government officials wanted to take the 
responsibility of giving permission to Liang Heng to marry his American girlfriend, in 
case she was a spy.71 *3 In despair, the couple wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping, the Premier 
of P.R.C. After reading the letter, Deng supported their marriage and criticized the local 
officials as being ridiculous.74 As a result, they were allowed to marry at last. Obviously, 
the Chinese local officials doubted the intentions of the American bride. Trust between 
the U.S. and Chinese governments as well as between citizens was still questionable. This 
marriage incident, especially Deng Xiaoping’s approval of their marriage, also illustrated 
the inefficient and backward nature of the Chinese local government.
Given the difficulties for even Hong Huang to get a U.S. visa, it was clearly a 
privilege for a Chinese citizen to go abroad. Unlike the daughter of the former Chinese
71 Liang Heng, Son o f the Revolution, pp 279-284. The local Foreign Affairs Office which had authority
over Liang Heng’s girlfriend, Judy, presented no objections. The document permitting Chinese-foreign 
marriage came from the ministry in Beijing. The problem was the authorities who had control over Liang
Heng. Several months earlier, a notice from the Minister o f Higher Education forbade student marriages. 
Liang was a student and he was required to obey the decision of the leadership. According to Liang, Hunan 
province was very backward. The influence o f the Gang of Four was unusually pernicious and the new 
reform policies were resisted at every turn.
Liang’s mother and Uncle Lei were “horrified by the news that Liang had an American girl friend. It took 
Liang nearly three hours there talking them around, beginning by assuring them that such a relationship 
was now legal, despite so many years o f anti-American propaganda.” The leaders o f Liang’s department 
told him sternly that he “must love [his] motherland. There is a difference between insiders and outsiders."
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Foreign Minister or the husband of an American citizen, other students from the Chinese 
elite found the door to America closed until 1978. In that year, the science counselor of 
President Jimmy Carter invited a Chinese delegation to the U.S. and discussed overseas 
study exchange programs. In December, fifty Chinese went to U.S. universities and 
became the first Chinese university students to study abroad since the Cultural 
Revolution. After signing the Student Exchange Program treaty with the U.S., the 
Chinese government negotiated similar treaties with Britain (1979), Egypt (1979), 
Canada (1979), Holland (1979), Italy (1980), and other countries.75 China had finally 
opened its door to the Western countries after approximately three decades of isolation.
At the same time, the decision to send students abroad to study was supported by 
overseas scientists of Chinese descent such as Nobel Physics laureate Tseng-Dao Lee and 
biochemist Rui Wu, who created educational opportunities for Chinese students in the 
U.S. Initiated by Dr. Lee, the China-US Physics Examination and Application (CUSPEA) 
program began to select Chinese students and send them to U.S. universities in 1981. 
Through this program, 915 Chinese students in physics gained financial support from 
U.S. host universities and received a world-class graduate education. The success of this 
program inspired similar programs in other disciplines which aimed to bring more 
Chinese students to the U.S., including the China-U.S. Biochemistry and Molecular 
Biology Examination and Application (CUSBMBEA) program.76
Dr. Lee, the founder of CUSPEA, was a world-renowned physicist without either 
a high school diploma or a bachelor’s degree. Lee was bom on November 24, 1926, in
75 Song Jian, “Overseas Study in One Century,” http: www.china.cn. Chinese ch-vmvai.31 .1757,him.
Accessed on May 18, 2004.
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Shanghai, China, the third of six children of Tsing Kong Lee, a business man. Because of 
the Sino-Japanese war, Lee spent his adolescence in turmoil. He could not even get a 
formal high school diploma due to Japan’s invasion of Shanghai. Even worse, Lee 
experienced an extraordinarily harsh time as a homeless wanderer before arriving at 
Kunming city where he enrolled in the Southwest United University (SUU).
In December 1941, fifteen year old Lee was forced to leave Shanghai for 
Hangzhou, then Fuyang in Jiangsu Province. To find a place to study, Lee left Jiangsu 
and went through four provinces—Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Guangxi—to get to 
Guizhou province. On his way to Guizhou, he contracted malaria from which he did not 
recover until 1943. Through most of his journey, Lee had no money for clothes or food. 
Sometimes he walked by himself, and sometimes he accompanied other young Chinese. 
When he was lucky, he received a ride. Unfortunately, a car accident severely injured Lee 
and he had to stay in bed for six months.77
In keeping with his original plan, Lee finally arrived in Guizhou and attended the 
entrance examination for Zhejiang University. He passed the exam and registered in an 
undergraduate program in physics. However, the Japanese soon invaded Guizhou. Lee 
had to leave for Sichuan province and then Kunming in Younan. He finally transferred to 
SUU and became a student of Professor Wu Dayou, an eminent physicist. According to 
Professor Wu, Lee was smart and hard working. To learn more from Professor Wu, Lee 
regularly visited Wu outside of the classroom. Whatever kind of challenging exercises 
Wu assigned to Lee, Lee solved them quickly and then asked for more.
77 Zhu Guangya, “Fifty Year of Tseng-Dao Lee’s Physics Research,”
Imp: ,\vwvv.hiedii.net wanukan'IuiUan/honchen. honuS 18.htm. Accessed on May 19, 2004.
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Then, in 1945, a new Chinese government program was developed to support 
students for study in the U.S., aimed at training scientists capable of making atom bombs. 
As the most celebrated physicist at SUU, Wu recommend his two students, Zhu Guanya 
and Tseng-Dao Lee. This turned out to be one of the most crucial opportunities for Lee 
on his way to becoming an eminent physicist. Although Lee had only studied with Wu 
for 14 months, he recognized Wu as the professor who most greatly influenced him.78 
Lee was awarded a Chinese Government Scholarship on the basis of Professor Wu’s 
recommendation in 1946. This scholarship took him to the University of Chicago, where 
he earned his Ph.D. in 195 0.79 The suffering of Lee and other Chinese during the Sino- 
Japanese war made him a life-long Chinese nationalist, despite the fact that he became a 
U.S. citizen. Lee’s U.S. study experiences inspired his later project called CUSPEA 
which brought approximately one thousand talented young Chinese to the U.S.
Shortly after President Nixon’s trip to China, Tseng-Dao Lee visited mainland 
China in 1972. In the following years, Dr. Lee made several visits to China and was 
invited to demonstrate his physics theory to Mao Zedong in 1974.80 In 1979, the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS) invited Dr. Lee to give a series of lectures at its graduate 
school. During his lectures, Dr. Lee encountered several gifted students. Cherishing great 
expectations for the younger generation of China, he tried to create opportunities for them 
to study in the U.S.81
78“Outstanding Physicist Tseng-Dao Lee,” http:''.'home,cfe21 ■coni/aova2000/historv/nober4izhengdao.l)tni. 
Accessed on May 19, 2004.
79 “Tsung-Dao Lee Biography,” hitp:/.-vvwvv.nohel.se/phvsics/laureates/1957/lee-bio.htnil. Accessed on 
May 18, 2004.
80 “Interview with Tseng-Dao Lee,” http:-'www.davoo.coin content2001 -10o  1. content 259192.htm. 
Accessed on May 20, 2004.
81 Shen Keqi, Zhao Kaihua, “The Early History of CUSPEA,”
http:/'www.ocDaweb.on’. newsitems/2001 khzltao taik.html. Accessed on May 20, 2004.
35
The first problem Dr. Lee encountered was that there was neither Graduate 
Record Examination (GRE) nor Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) centers 
in China in 1979. In place of the GRE and TOEFL tests, Dr. Lee used the qualification 
examination papers of Columbia University to give both oral and written tests to some of 
the students at CAS. Then he selected and recommended five of them to Columbia 
University. All five students were accepted and given funding by the Columbia Physics 
Department in 1979.82
The success of sending five students to Columbia University inspired Professor 
Lee to bring more young Chinese to the IJ.S. In November 1979, he proposed to 
Professor Jici Yan—Vice-President of CAS and Dean of the CAS graduate school— 
that more Chinese students be selected and sent to study in his department at 
Columbia University. Therefore, a second examination was administered in Beijing at 
the end of December 1979. In addition to students from the graduate school of CAS, 
applicants from Beijing University (Beida) and other universities attended the 
examination. With the scores of this exam and Professor Lee’s recommendations, 
three Chinese students were admitted into Columbia University and another ten 
students were accepted by the City College of New York (CCNY), Virginia Tech, 
Camegie-Mellon and other universities. These were the two programs which were 
later called the pre-CUSPEA.83
Emily Y. Shu was one of these eighteen students. Shu was bom to a family 
with a strong academic tradition. Her grandfather was Mao Yishen, a Chinese master 




CAS, Shu had been sent to Yan’an and worked several years as a peasant like most of 
her peers. During the dark age when “all the intellect and intellectuals were 
condemned to hell in China,” Shu kept studying after working in the fields every night 
with a strong belief that someday her effort would be rewarded.84 According to a later 
cuspean (the CUSPEA members call themselves cuspean), most of the early cuspeans 
shared similar stories.85
With the experiences gained in the pre-CUSPEA program, Dr. Lee decided to 
enlarge it to send approximately 30 students to America each year. He wrote to Fang 
Vi, the Chinese Vice-Premier, to introduce the program titled CUSPEA and to gain 
Fang’s support.86 In the early 1980s, the Chinese government covered all college 
education costs including tuition, housing and dining for a student. Similar to the old 
planned economy system, higher education was also closely controlled by the 
government. Therefore, graduates waited for the central or local government to assign 
them specific jobs rather than find jobs for themselves. In this situation, the 
government-sponsored overseas study opportunity was viewed as a kind of assignment 
to the students reared in the old system. Although all the students in the pre-CUSPEA 
program gained financial support directly from American universities, Dr. Lee 
arranged with the U.S. government to provide J-l status for them, to make sure that 
they could not change their status and stay in the U.S. after they finished their study.
The new CUSPEA program began in 1980. Participating Chinese universities 
and institutions were responsible for selecting qualified students and supervising the
84 Linxiaag Zhu, “Chinese American Oral History 2004,” tape 1.
85 Ibid.
8(1 Song Jian, “Overseas Study in One Century,” http: .'vvvvw.china.cn Chinese ch-vmvai 312757,linn. 
Accessed on May 1S, 2004.
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written and oral exams. Dr. Lee was a coordinator between the Chinese students and 
American universities. He had several responsibilities, including persuading American 
universities to admit these students without TOEFL or GRE scores; writing 
recommendation letters for the students; mailing all students’ application materials; 
and buying airline tickets with his own money for American professors who 
administered oral tests to Chinese students.87 8 89
The students had to take three important exams: the pre-exam at their 
universities (commenced in 1982), the written exam, and the oral exam conducted by 
U.S. professors. In fact, the most difficult job for these students was preparing well for 
these three exams. For students at universities which strongly supported this program, 
specific review courses were offered and every exam-related demand of the students 
was satisfied, as was done at Lanzhou University (Landa) and the University of 
Science and Technology of China (USTC). Located not far from the Chinese Nuclear 
Research Center, Landa could pool many nuclear scientists and offered specific
OQ
courses for its students.
However, not every university supported this program at the beginning. 
According to one Cuspean, Beijing University (Beida) was apathetic when the first 
CUSPEA exam was announced. The leaders of this university followed a “No 
opposition, No support” policy. That meant the university would not offer any help for 
the students who had registered to take the CUSPEA exam. Most of the first Beida 
Cuspeans began review work in the summer of 1980. When a Cuspean tried to
87 Ibid.
88 Shen Keqi, Zhao kaihua, “The Early History o f CUSPEA,”
http://www.ocpaweb.org-'newsitems/200l--’khzliao talk.html. Accessed on May 20,2004.
89 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese American Oral History 2004,” tape 1.
38
translate the physics terms from Chinese to English, there was no faculty to help. 
Indeed, the undergraduate students enrolled in the spring semester of 1978, had to 
teach themselves the relativity theory and quantum physics upon which they would be 
tested. Worrying about not having enough time to review, only approximately 30 out 
of 150 physics students at Beida registered to take the test in October of 1980. 90
To save time to prepare for the coming CUSPEA exam, the students began to skip 
their classes in Marxist theory. However, this class was required for everybody by the 
university. The idea of students skipping this class irritated the Chairman of the Beijing 
University Communist Committee (BUCC). To prevent the students from skipping, the 
Chairman assigned one staff member to sit at the back door of the classroom and also 
required the instructor to check the attendance. There were over 150 students in that 
class. Each class period, it took the instructor half an hour to check for the students, 
leaving only 20 minutes left to get through his lecture. To avoid possible punishment 
from the university, students who skipped class asked their friends to say “yes” for them 
when the instructor called their names. Soon, the BUCC Chairman figured out the 
students’ trick and took more severe measures to target those who dared to miss the 
“important” study of Marxist Theory. Realizing they had no way to skip the class, 
students attended the class at last, with a physics book covered by different papers. 
According to a Beida Cuspean, the vast majority of male student had taken almost all 
above “measures”.91
90 Ibid, tape 2.
91 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese American Oral History 2004,” tape 2. The interviewee did not indicate specific 
measures the chairman took. One possibility was that there were some student communist members at 
Beida and more students who wanted to become party members. These students knew who was absent and 
who was not. The leaders threatened to punished students who did not show up. Fearful o f being assigned a 
poor job after graduation, students had to show up. Similar to these stories, my classmates usually brought
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One specific policy proposed by Dr. Lee was permitting all young people to take 
the exam, regardless of their political backgrounds. Altogether, 400-500 students 
attended the first written exam, including undergraduate students, graduate students and 
young lecturers from institutions and universities all across China. It turned out that 
several universities which were looked down upon by Beijing University (Beida) 
achieved excellent results. None of the top three students was from Beida, which claimed 
to be, and was regarded as, China’s Harvard. This humiliating result wounded the pride 
of Beida leaders. They soon discovered that several universities, such as Landa and 
USTC, offered special courses for students who registered to take the CUSPEA exam. 
Beida leaders finally realized that the CUSPEA program was more important than they 
had thought. Furthermore, the outcome of the test soon became one of the criteria foi 
evaluating the perfonnance of Chinese college physics education programs. Like other 
universities, Beida began to offer training courses for students who planned to take the 
CUSPEA exam in 1981.92
At the beginning, there were two main channels used to distribute the news 
related to CUSPEA. According to a participating student at a university in Beijing, she 
got the news through both sources. In April 1980, she read a small article in the People's 
Daily which announced the first CUSPEA exam. She also learned about this program 
through personal channels. Her brother introduced her to Emily Y. Shu, a pre-cuspean in 
1980. The two events happened near the same time and she could not remember which 
occurred first. What she could remember, however, was that although the People's Daily
their GRE vocabulary into every class when I was an undergraduate student in Beijing in the middle of the 
1990s.
92 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese America Oral History 2004,” tape 1.
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treated the announcement of the first CUSPEA exam as a small piece of news, the 
Beijing intellectuals were excited and discussed it at great length.93
According to the data provided by Professor Zhao Kaihua at Beida, there were 
126 Chinese physics students enrolled in fifty U.S. universities in 1981, the first year of 
the CUSPEA program (see Table 4).94 95During the following years, the number of 
enrolled students in the CUSPEA program gradually decreased, falling to 103 in 1985 
(see Figure 4). Several factors caused this enrollment decrease. First, this program aimed 
to select the best, rather than the most, students and send them to top U.S. graduate 
schools. According to Professor Fang Lizhi, one of the committee members who decided 
how many people would be selected, both Chinese professors and Dr. Tseng-Dao Lee 
were concerned about the students’ capability in physics rather than the total number.9'̂
Second, the establishment of TOEFL test centers in China in 1981 offered 
Chinese students more choices to accomplish their overseas study dreams. From then on, 
more and more Chinese students took the TOEFL and GRE tests in order to apply to 
American universities independently. It also took several years for students to realize the 
difference between a J-l visa and an F-l visa. For Chinese students, the main difference 
was that the “two-year rule” applies to J-l holders. This regulation requires that a person 
reside outside of the United States for two years following the time for which he or she 
had a J-l visa in the United States. Meeting this requirement, the person is eligible to 
apply for an immigrant visa or specific categories of nonimmigrant visas. As mentioned 
earlier, all Cuspeans had to accept J-l status due to Dr. Tseng-Dao Lee’s arrangement.
94 The number is from the data in appendix II.
95 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese American Oral History 2004,” tape 2.
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However, there is no similar rule applied to an F-l holder. For students who wanted to 
stay in the U.S, F-l status was a better choice.
Third, a change in Chinese policies regarding overseas study in 1985 actually 
favored self-sponsored students. In the early 1980s, undergraduates were not permitted to 
leave China until they had completed their studies and worked for five years — a policy 
designed to decrease the chance of losing specialists already in short supply. There were 
also restrictions with regard to certain professions, for instance engineers, university 
lecturers, and high-level physicians. In 1985, these restrictions on self-supporting 
students were loosened. Anyone who was accepted by a foreign institution and had the 
necessary funds could get permission to leave. The change of policy, the gradual spread 
of the TOEFL and GRE test sites, and the advantages of F-l status made privately 
sponsored overseas study more desirable in the eyes of many Chinese students. Partly as 
a result, the number of CUSPEA students enrolled in U.S. universities decreased to 95 in 
1986 and then to 72 in 1987/6 96
Table 4: CUSPEA Students Enrolled in the U.S. Universities (1979-1989)
Enrolled by Year
year 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 total
students 5 13 126 124 119 108 103 95 72 76 74 915
























Figure 3: CUSPEA Students Enrolled in the U.S. Universities 
Among the 915 CUSPEA students enrolled from 1979 to 1989, 61% were from 
three Chinese univei des: the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC in 
Hefei), Beijing University (peking in Beijing), and Fudan University (fdu in Shanghai). 
The data in Figure 4 reveal that the base cities of the CUSPEA students—Hefei, Beijing, 
and Shangshai—are also u:e birthplaces of the 1986 student demonstration. Considering 
the famous Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi and his roles as a committee member of the 
CUSPEA program as well as Vice President of USTC, it is not difficult to speculate that 
there are some relationships between the CUSPEA program and the 1986 student 
demonstration; a series of student demonstrations that some have seen as the logical 
precursor to the pro-democracy movement of 1989.
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Students Background
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Figure 4: CUSPEA Chinese Participating Universities (1979-1989)
NOTES: bnu (Beijing Normal University), cas (Chinese Academy o f Science), eenu (East China 
Normal University), fdu (Fudan University), jlu (Jilin University), lzu (Lanzhou University), nju (Nanjing 
University), nku (Nankai University), peking (Beijing University), qhu (Tsinghua University), shjd 
(Shanghai Jiaotong University), ustc (University o f Science and Technology o f China), whu (Wuhan 
University), zju (Zhejiang University), zsu (Zhongshan University).
According to Orville Schell, Professor Fang made dozens of trips and academic 
lectures all across China between 1985 and 1986.07 Many statements which breached the 
Four Cardinal Principles were made in these lectures.97 8 Furthermore, he even used such 
occasions to denounce high ranking officials as described in the following, which made 
him many enemies.
Fang publicly denounced the vice-mayor of Beijing, Zhang Baifa, for 
contriving to join a scientific delegation that had been invited to attend a 
conference on synchrotron radiation in New York state. Fang had learned
97 Orville Schell, “China’s Andrei Sakharov,” httm/Vw ww.tsuuarc.lv film,'SchcllFl./.himl. Accessed on 
May 25, 2004.
98 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese American Oral History 2004,” tape 3. Four Cardinal Principles are: the principle 
o f upholding the socialist path; the principle o f upholding the people's democratic dictatorship; the 
principle o f upholding the leadership o f the Communist Party o f China; and the principle of upholding 
Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought. These principles were stated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and had not 
been open to debate in mandland China.
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of the case because China's lone synchrotron was jointly operated by his 
own university and the Institute of High Energy Physics, in Beijing. Fang's 
refusal to overlook this kind of junketing and feather-bedding by the Party 
elite, and his willingness to bring such cases to the attention of student 
activists, made him an even greater favorite of young intellectuals 
disgusted with such behavior. When criticized by ranking Party leaders for 
his lese majeste, Fang replied, "As for Zhang Baifa appropriating the 
conference seats that should have gone to the University I just want to ask 
him what he knows about synchrotrons. Is he willing to take a test?" As a 
result of his attack on the vice-mayor, Fang's trip to the Institute of 
Advanced Study planned for January, 1986, was suddenly canceled. It was 
not until two months later that Fang, still refusing to recant, was finely 
allowed to leave the country."
Fang’s wife, Li Shuxian, was a physics professor at Beijing University. Beijing
Spring, the publication of the Chinese Alliance for Democracy, praised Fang and his wife
for inspiring “a whole generation of young Chinese.” * 100 For instance, future student
leader Feng Congde was one of Li’s students. Another future leader, Wangdan, also
developed a close relationship with Professors Li and Fang. As he put it,
As a student I used to visit them very often. Li Shuxian inspired me like a 
mother, in my life. But Fang Lizhi had the most important influence on 
my thought. He used to say, we are not hostile to the Communist Party, 
but opposed. He advocated a political opposition to the party. An 
intellectual must have a rational position in politics.101
Furthermore, Professor Fang was in the center of the 1986 student demonstration. 
This demonstration began at Fang’s own university, USTC, and spread to twenty large 
Chinese cities. In this set of demonstrations, students demanded “a speed-up in political 
reform.” Tens of thousands of protesters “flooded the streets of urban China carrying 
placards and banners emblazoned with such slogans as NO DEMOCRATIZATION, NO 
MODERNIZATION and GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEOPLE, AND
Orville Schell, “China’s Andrei Sakharov,” Into: . w\v\v.[square.tv/fiIni Schell 1;I.Z.himl. Accessed on 
May 25, 2004.
100 “Interview with Wang Dan,” Beijing Spring, http:/ \vw\v. ceocities.com/Cant tolltill 72SS- vvdbis.htm.
Accessed on May 24, 2004.
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FOR THE PEOPLE.”102 Accused by Zhou Guangzhao of having "HR .eminated many 
erroneous statements reflecting 'bourgeois liberalization'" and of having departed from 
the Four Cardinal Principles, and then denounced by Deng Xiaoping himself, Professor
Fang was ousted from the Chinese Communist Party in January 1987.103
The relations between the CUSPEA program and the 1986 student demonstration 
should also be examined in a broader social environment. First, there was severe inflation 
in China in 1986 and many intellectuals were forced to go into business. According to 
one lecturer at a university in Beijing, he quit his job and became a businessman because 
he had no money to buy an ice cream for his daughter.104 People blamed the corruption in 
the Communist Party for the bad economic situation. Second, the Chinese Communist 
Party had lost the people’s support and trust after the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese 
intellectuals, especially the younger generation, adored U.S. culture and ideas. By the 
mid-1980s, the “going abroad craze” had already become a phenomenon among college 
students; premier Chinese universities including Beida and Qinhua were gradually 
developing into preparation schools for overseas study programs. However, a definitive 
analysis of the relations between the CUSPEA program and the 1986 student 
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According to statistics from Beijing University, 94% of CUSPEA students were 
male (see Table 5). One third of CUSPEA students enrolled in four eastern U.S. states: 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania (see Figure 5 and Table 6). These 
four states would develop into the most influential district of the Independent Federation 
of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS) in 1989. The Midwest and Pacific areas hosted 
the second and third most CUSPEA students.











Figure 5: CUSPEA U.S. Participating Universities (1979-19889)
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Table 6: CUSPEA Students in U.S. Universities (1980-89)
CUSPEA Students in U.S. Universities (1980-891103
area east miat mw ne nw paci south sw
student 308 78 198 69 57 113 6 87
Even as the new CUSPEA program took shape in 1979, a self-sponsorship 
program had developed unexpectedly and quietly at the CAS graduate school. In 1977, 
CAS welcomed its first 800 graduate students after the Cultural Revolution. Before Hu 
Yaobang was appointed to the position of the General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party, he took charge of CAS and let scientists themselves run their research 
and teaching programs while most other Chinese universities were still firmly controlled 
by more politically-oriented professors and administrators. Consequently, these 800 
graduate students enjoyed great freedom in both academics and politics compared to their 
peers in other colleges. For example, in 1979 the reading room of CAS was full of 105
105 Northeast (ne): Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island; 
East(east): New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania; Mid-Atlantic (miat): Maryland, District of 
Columbia, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina; South (south): Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, 
Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Puerto Rico; Mid-West (mw): Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, 
Wisconsin, Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota; Northwest (nw): Utah, , Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Alaska; Southwest (sw): Texas, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mexico; Pacific (paci): California, Arizona, Nevada, 
Hawaii. Northeast (ne): Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island; 
East(east): New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania; Mid-Af'antic (miat): Maryland, District of 
Columbia, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina; South (south): Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, 
Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Puerto Rico; Mid-West (mw): Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, 
Wisconsin, Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota; Northwest (nw): Utah, , Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Alaska; Southwest (sw): Texas, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mexico; Pacific (paci): California, Arizona, Nevada, 
Hawaii. Chapter o f  the Independent Federation o f  the Chinese Students and Scholars in the Uniied States. 
http://rt‘search.nianet.org/~luo.1FCSS/Archives. Constitution Charter draft 89.PDF. Accessed on May 24, 
2004. Also referenced “Report on IFCSS 1993 Joint Conference” June 4-5, 1993. Washington D.C. 
http: ww w.ibiblio.oru'mib. nackaces, ccic ifcss.NR, 4th N R 4146. Accessed on May 24, 2004.
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articles criticizing Mao Zedong and no student was punished for posting critical essays 
(Dazi Bao).106
At the beginning of the seventh wave of overseas study, the government- 
sponsored programs were developed by scholars who had gone overseas in the 1920s and 
1930s. Those scholars had had little contact with Western countries after 1960, and they 
did not know that American universities had been financially supporting graduate 
students since the on set of the Cold War. Thus, Peiyuan Zhou, the Dean of CAS, 
negotiated a treaty with the American Academy of Science that called for the Chinese 
government to pay all the costs of Chinese visiting scholars at American institutions. 
Knowing nothing about the capabilities of Chinese scholars but very interested in cultural 
exchanges with China, American and Canadian institutions welcomed the first fifty 
Chinese scholars in 1978.107 Few of these fifty Chinese scholars were known by the 
Chinese public. This made the overseas programs even more curious in the eyes of 
common Chinese. For people who had neither overseas relatives nor high ranking 
parents, planning to go abroad was only an unattainable dream.
In 1979, the government-sponsored overseas studies program was enlarged and 
the total number reached 500.108 The 500 selected were talented Chinese scholars and 
specialists, who soon gained the respect of their American colleagues because of their 
capabilities. It was then that the Chinese government found out that paying the way for 
the specialists to do research in the U.S. was a financial mistake, as they could have been
106 Zhu Xueyuan, “First Chinese Self-Sponsored Overseas Study.”




sponsored by their hosting institutions like other foreign researchers.109 In the same year, 
CAS selected over 100 young students from the 800 graduate students and pooled them 
into one group titled “Overseas Study Class.” These students moved from Linxueyuan to 
Yuquan Drive and were trained to prepare for study in Europe. 110 There is little 
information about these 100 students because this program was soon replaced by another 
one. The later program selected high school graduates and sent them directly to 
Europe.111 While those selected by the government were waiting for school leaders to 
make arrangements for them, those who were not selected were also trying to figure out a 
way to study abroad. Their English teacher at CAS, Mary Van de Water, became their 
informal application “advisor”.112
After the normalization of the U.S.-China relationship, Van de Water noticed that 
the government sponsored overseas study programs left little flexibility for individual 
decision-making. She also noticed that these programs were not particularly efficient. 
Thus, Van de Water suggested to Madam Pei Li, the director of the Foreign Language 
Department, that they introduce American grad ate admission policies to students and 
encourage them to apply independently. At the same time, she also indicated her 
concerns that students’ applying independently might be punished by CAS.113
Madame Li, the widow of Guo Yonghuai, was a native Chinese who had been 
educated at Cornell University in the 1940s.114 She knew that Van de Water’s plan would
109 Ibid.
110 Linxueyuan is the main campus o f the Graduate School o f CAS.
'11 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese American Oral History 2004,” tape 1.
112 Zhu Xueyuan, “First Chinese Self-Sponsored Overseas Study,”
httn: www.edubridue.com erxiuntanu library lni\ue.htm. Accessed on May 24, 2004.
112 Ibid.
114 Ibid. Guo Yonghuai was a celebrated Chinese scientist who went back to China vith Qian Xueseng in 
1955. He died on one o f his business trips.
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be good for Chinese students but agreed that there was a chance the students would be 
punished by the school. After thinking it over, she introduced this idea to Ping Peng, the 
Associate Dean of the CAS graduate school who was in charge of academic affairs. 
Several days later, Mr. Peng agreed to the suggestions of Madam Li and Van de Water. 
According to Van de Water, Peng walked back and forth in his office and said: “I am old 
and there is nothing for me to fear. You can go ahead and make the program 
successful.” " 5 With the permission of school leaders, especially Ping Peng, the first 
group of self-sponsored overseas study students from Linxueyuan of CAS began their 
applications in October 1979, while the other 100 students in Yuquan Drive were still 
waiting for the government to make arrangements. 15 16 178The self-sponsored students 
completed their applications so quickly that one of the students got his application done 
and received admission from the University of Pittsburg in twenty-one days. In one year, 
more than 500 students went to America and continued their graduate studies there. This 
number was actually larger than the total number of the government-sponsored 
programs."7
According to Zhu Xueyuan, students in Beida and Qinghua did not begin to apply 
by themselves until 1982. By then almost all graduate students in CAS had left for 
America."8 However, their universities as well as the Chinese government did not pennit 
them to apply by themselves. The only exception was made for the offspring of high
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid. Linxueyuan was the building where the majority o f the students lived. The selected 100 students 
moved out o f Linxueyuan to Yuquan Drive.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid. The author did not give an exact number. Chinese writers traditionally preferred a graceful style 
rather than accurate fact. Although a historian himself, Zhu Xueyuan followed such a style. However, his 
essay is still valuable because Zhu himself was one o f the students in Linxueyuan. He got his Ph D. in 
Physics at Montana State University. His publications include “The Far-East Ancestors o f the Magyars : A 
historical and linguistic excavation,” Ccniral Asian Studies, 1999.
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ranking officials and relatives of overseas Chinese. Some of them took the TOEFL and 
GRE exams and gained financial support from U.S. universities. According to a Beida 
student in the Atmospheric Physics department, the first student in her class who took the 
TOEFL and went abroad in 1984, was the son of a Chinese official in the Foreign 
Minister’s Department. Some of these students allegedly gained financial support 
illegally from either the central or local government. According to the News Digest, the 
former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang accused his successor Zhao Ziyang of using 
state funds to support overseas studies of the children of high ranking official’s at a 
meeting attended by fifteen CCP politburo members in March 1989.
[Hu Yaobang] pointed out that Zhao sends lots of offspring of CCP 
ranking officials abroad and spends large amount of foreign currency on 
those offspring since Zhao was put in the chief position of CCP. Hu 
further claimed that “it never happened when I was in the position.”119
Although Hu was regarded as one of the most respected leaders in the 1980s by
Chinese intellectuals, even he might have taken this privilege as two of his four children
were in the U.S. when he died. Obviously, going abroad was a privilege of the elite and
their offspring.120
With neither high ranking parents nor overseas relatives, common students and 
college lecturers had to accept a five-year or two-year work requirement before they 
could apply to go abroad. Some of them tried all possible ways to bypass these rules. For 
example, one interviewee in the Chinese American Oral History Project was a graduate 
from Beida. She took her first TOEFL test in 1984. However, she could not get an 
official transcript from the university due to the two-year work requirement, or perhaps 
due to the common social status of her parents. By making a registrar stamp and stamping
119 Bo Xiong, “How Did Hu Yaobang Die o f Heart Attack?” News Digest, April 30, 1989.
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it on her transcript, this interviewee finally got all the materials she needed to apply to 
U.S. universities. According to this person, such an experience was not unique and many 
students from common families shared similar stories.121
For these students who went to the U.S. without funding from the Chinese 
government, getting a U.S. visa was the most difficult task. According to Leo Orleans, 
the number of F-l visas issued by the U.S. Embassy and Consulates continued to be 
much smaller than the number requested. For example, the U.S. Embassy and the four 
U.S. Consulates in China turned down more than half the F-l visa applicants in 1986.122
From 1979 to January, 1988 the U.S. Embassy and Consulates issued 
approximately 56,000 visas to Chinese scholars and students, almost two-thirds of 
whom (34,000) were J-l holders.123 Of these, 12,500 went back to China, and 21,000 
enrolled in degree programs or did research. During this period, only 500 J-l holders 
changed their status legally or illegally.124 In 1986 and 1987, approximately 16,000 J- 
1 Chinese students and scholars entered the United States.125 Orleans’ data largely 
supported the argument of Dorothy Zinberg, who declared that before the student 
demonstrations of December, 1986 virtually all government-sponsored scholars and 
students who studied overseas had returned to P.R.C.126 However, only two years later 
in 1988, the Chinese government had to face the reality that most students then 
studying abroad would not return.127 Some Chinese officials argued that more than
120 Ibid.
121 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese American Oral History 2004,” tape 7.
122 Leo A. Orleans, Chinese Students in America; Policies, Issues, and Numbers, p 40.
123 Ibid, p 112.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid, p 111.




half of the 40,000 J-l students and scholars from 1978 to 1988 stayed abroad.128 Their 
arguments matched the numbers given by Orleans. By June 1989, over 40,000 
Chinese students and scholars were in the U.S. Among them, approximately 30,000 
were J-l visa holders and 10,000 were F-l visa holders.129 Harry Harding has argued 
chat an increasingly serious brain drain began to loom because the Chinese academic 
and research environments were still rather impoverished and poorly managed. In fact, 
China was charging the U.S. government with encouraging a “brain drain”.130
There are several problems related to these data. First, the visa numbers do not 
reflect the exact number of Chinese students and scholars because many Chinese 
scholars might have had more than two U.S. visas from 1979 to 1988. For example, 
physicist Lizhi Fang went abroad “several hundred times” with J-l visas.131 Second, 
by 1986, students and scholars holding J-l visas were required to fill out a new LAP- 
66 form during each year that they remained in the United States. In this way, the 
USIA could get two separate numbers: one for new students and one for continuing 
students. By adding the two figures together, it was possible to get the total number of 
J-l visa holders. Unfortunately, these data were not collected after 1985. Thus, 
Orleans’ estimated data remains the most accurate available.
There were several reasons which explained why students chose to stay 
abroad. First, most of the students and scholars were in the basic science fields, and
128 Ibid.
129 Leo A. Orleans, Chinese Students in America: Policies, Issues, and Numbers, p 42. (to be confirmed) 
According to Orleans, there were approximately 28,000 Chinese students and scholars in the U.S. by 
January 1988, including 21,500 J-l holders and 7,000 F-l holders. With the already known total number of 
the Chinese students rnd scholars (40,000) in the U.S. by June 1989, I got the number o f J-l holders 
according to J - l’s percentage by January 1988.
130 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972, Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1992, p. 195.
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there were as yet few research facilities in China which could match those in the U.S. 
Second, salaries were low compared to those available in America. A full professor’s 
salary was about $500 per year in China, less than one percent of the salary of an 
American full professor. For an instructor at a college, the salary was less than $300 
per year.13 32 Obviously, China could not match the environment in the Western 
countries either academically or economically.
Some scholars have given different explanations for the Chinese brain drain 
phenomenon. According to the eminent film director Zheng Xiaolong, the overseas 
Chinese would not go back to their hometown until they were recognized for their 
academic or business achievements by the local society. Yijing Huanxiang (dress well 
to go back home) is an attitude firmly entrenched in Chinese culture.1,3 Another 
scholar, Hong Huang, claimed that the education she experienced in the U.S. made her 
a person who always had different ideas from others. It was in the U.S. that she 
learned to express herself rather than simply echo the ideas of the Units and the 
Party.134 With no compatible environment either materially or intellectually, Chinese 
officials were already confronted with a serious “brain drain” before the student 
protest in spring, 1989.
For the students who were still in mainland China, studying abroad was 
acknowledged to be the best way to accomplish their life dreams. Beyond this, there 
was a status question involved: students staying in China were regarded as 
intellectually inferior or less motivated than those who went abroad. According to a
131 Linxiang Zhu, “Chinese American Oral History 2004,” tape 3. Although the number is given by 
Professor Fang, it might be over-stated.
132 Ibid.
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Chinese American who went to the University of Alberta before he graduated from a 
medical college in Beijing, twenty-five of his thirty classmates went abroad before 
they graduated. Approximately twenty of them went abroad in 1989, the same year the 
Chinese students organized their protest movement.13 435 A Beida graduate revealed that 
over 90% of her seventy classmates in atmospheric physics came to the U.S.136 Two of 
the student leaders of that movement, Feng Congde and Chai Lin, had passed the 
TOEFL and the GRE exams before they participated in the movement. According to a 
graduate student of Beijing University, both Beida and Tsinghua had become 
preparation schools for America and Canada.137
In 1988, Leo A. Orleans analyzed all the push-and-pull factors related to this 
“brain drain” in the late 1980s and concluded that these factors had been “reasonably 
stable over the past decade.” He argued that “it would be too easy to place all the 
blame on the student demonstrations in China in the winter of 1986,” according to his 
analysis,
This short-lived turmoil seemed almost an aberration; it was handled 
gently by the authorities and, by now, most of the overt dissent seems to 
be limited to a relatively small group of vocal and highly publicized 
intellectuals. For the overwhelming majority of students, conditions in 
China appear to be approximately back to where they were before the 
demonstrations and, one would expect, more professionally appealing now 
than in the early 1980s.138
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Unlike his other arguments in this book, the above analysis is much weaker 
and less convincing. First, there is no evidence to support his argument that the student 
protest “was handled gently by the authorities” and that “most of the overt dissent 
seems to be limited to a relatively small group.” Second, he used seven vague words 
to express his opinion, including “seems,” “seemed,” and “appear.” Although one can 
appreciate Orleans’ statement that the change in the characteristics of students and 
scholars in the U.S. was the main factor which caused the brain drain, his rather 
simplistic analysis of the 1986 student demonstration as well as the Chinese 
government’s response must be challenged for the following reasons.
First, as the American social scientist Seymour Martin Lipset observed, "the 
special role of students in fostering rebellion and radical politics, both of the left and right, 
now [1989] evident in China, Korea and other countries, is an old and continuing 
story."139 More than 90 years ago, students and young intellectuals at National Beijing 
University (NBU) organized the New Culture Movement, calling on young China to re­
establish the greatness of the country by adopting democracy and science from the 
West.140 Flowever, the Chinese diplomatic failure in Paris in 1918 fermented the anti- 
Japanese as well as anti-Western sentiment. Students and intellectuals at NBU started the 
May Fourth Movement in 1919. From then on, patriotism and nationalism, especially 
Jiuwang (help China get rid of the control of Western powers and save China from being 
conquered) came before China’s “enlightenment, which aimed to introduce Western 
democracy and science to China. From then on, the Chinese democracy movement was
139
140
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tied to the struggles for the independence of China.141 Nationalism rather than democracy 
became the theme of the later Chinese student movements until the appearance of the 
“Democracy Wall Movement” in 1979. Although suppressed by the Chinese government, 
this movement was the first Chinese student movement which put “democracy” in first 
place. This movement also inspired the founding of Chinese Spring, the first Chinese 
overseas democratic group under the leadership of Wang Bingzhang.142 In this context, 
the importance of the 1986 student demonstration is that it aimed at “democracy” rather 
than following the tradition of earlier Chinese student movements to promote nationalism. 
Orleans failed to recognize this feature of the 1986 student demonstration due to his lack 
of understanding concerning modem Chinese history.
Second, the 1986 student demonstration was not a “short-lived turmoil [that] 
seemed almost an aberration,” but was the beginning of a long series of uprisings which 
led to the 1989 Pro-democracy Movement (PDM). In fact, the 1986 demonstration had a 
great influence among overseas Chinese students. Luo Ning, one of the first cuspeans, 
participated in drafting the open letter protesting the "Anti-bourgeois Liberalization 
Campaign" in 1987 during which three prominent Chinese dissidents—Fang Lizhi, Liu 
Binyan, and Wang Ruowang—were ousted from the Chinese Communist Party. The 
letter was signed by thousands of overseas Chinese students and scholars.143 Four days
141 Zhu Xueqin, “Two Mental Diseases Since the May Fourth Movement,” 
http://www.public.iastate.edu/--chengli/webs/zhu/zhu90.httn. accessed on November 3, 2004.
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after Fang’s dismissal, the Chinese were stunned to hear that Hu Yaobang, the Party 
General Secretary and the man widely considered as Deng Xiaoping's chosen successor, 
had been removed from office because of his support of students.144 These responses of 
the Chinese government, especially the last one, severely shrank the influence of the 
reformers in the Chinese Communist Party.
However, Leo A. Orleans’ simplistic analysis has not weakened his main 
argument that more and more Chinese students and scholars preferred to stay in the U.S. 
partly because of career considerations, and partly because of the lure of incomes and 
life-styles to which all Chinese students can aspire in the United States. As a result of this 
“brain drain,” the seventh wave of overseas study seemed to threaten the development of 
China by keeping talented Chinese in the U.S. when these scholars and specialists were 
needed by a variety of industries such as information technology and medicine.




OVERSEAS STUDENTS’ INVOLVMENT IN 
THE 1989 PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the 1986 student demonstrations in 
major Chinese cities did not signify only a short-lived turmoil but were the oeginning 
of a long series of uprisings which led to :he 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement (PDM). 
This chapter will discuss three main channels through which overseas Chinese 
students became involved in the 1989 PDM, illustrate the various activities and 
programs in which they participated, and examine their degree of involvement. It will 
demonstrate that most Chinese students in the U.S. were not involved in the 1989 
PDM either personally or financially. Finally, it will argue that going back to China 
after the Tiananmen Square Tragedy was not as significant a risk as Chinese students 
in the U.S. subsequently claimed.
There were three main ways in which overseas Chinese became involved in the 
1989 PDM. The first was through overseas political groups. By 1989, the first and 
only overseas Chinese political group was the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (CAD) 
based in New York City. It was actually regarded as one of two instigators of the 1989 
PDM by the Chinese government.14' Founded by Wang Bingzhang in 1983, CAD 
aimed to promote democracy and improve human rights conditions in China. Its 
ultimate goal was to transform the totalitarian Chinese government into a democratic
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one. By April 1989, CAD had worked at the forefront of the Chinese democracy 
movement for six years. Its publication, China Spring, was so popular among overseas 
students that they called the entire CAD organization China Spring. Since the 
organization was banned by the Chinese government, CAD used an underground 
network of supporters to smuggle activists’ manuscripts out of China and China 
Spring into the country. During the 1980s, smuggled copies of China Spring circulated 
widely in China. At its zenith, CAD claimed fifty branches on five continents.145 46 In 
1988, Wang Bingzhang returned to China and established the Chinese Democracy and 
Justice Party (CDJP) to press for free elections and civil rights. The CDJP was 
declared illegal by the Chinese government, and Wang was exiled three weeks after he 
arrived in China.147 However, Wang’s group was dogged by controversy after he 
returned to the U.S. Accused of mixing his public and private financial affairs, Wang 
was taken to court by CAD in January 1989. In March, CAD won a temporary 
restraining order which barred Wang from withdrawing $73,000 he had moved from 
the group’s savings account to a separate account.148 In April, Wang’s supporters 
broke away and formed a new' faction called the Chinese Democratic Party. Racked by 
internal strife, CAD did not respond quickly to the student demonstrations which 
started in Beijing on April 16. Wang Bingzhang and Tang Kuangchuang, his associate 
in the democratic movement, finally booked a flight to Beijing but while en route they 
were barred from boarding a Japanese airliner to China from Tokyo on May 4th.
145 Lin Fangzhen, “Aimed Beijing Protestors, U.S.-Based Dissidents Fought Among Themselves,” China 
News Digest, June 26 1989. There were two “instigators.” One was CAD. Another one was Fang Lizhi.
146 Ibid.
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Calling Wang and himself the pioneers of this student movement, Tang Kuangchuang 
vowed to do everything possible to return to mainland China.149 In spite of this pledge, 
Wang failed to return for 14 years.150
The second channel for overseas Chinese involvement in the PDM was 
through local Chinese communities in the U.S. These communities usually consisted 
of Chinese students and scholars at a particular university. For example, the Stanford 
Chinese Student and Scholar Association represented Chinese students and scholars at 
Stanford University. These associations were recognized by both their universities and 
the Chinese Embassies. Usually they received activity funding of between $500 and 
$1,000 per year from the- Chinese Embassies in the U.S. or Canada. When Chinese 
embassy officers visited the local universities, it was usually representatives of these 
associations who gave the officers a formal reception. Therefore, by 1989, the leaders 
of local associations had developed a close relationship with the Chinese Embassies in 
the U.S. or Canada. Furthermore, all Chinese students and scholars depended on their 
district consular officials in some crucial situations, such as extending their passports 
and changing their status. That gave significant control over students and scholars to 
the Chinese Embassy officers. Beyond this, the vast majority of overseas Chinese 
students were widely scattered around the United States and Canada. For these 
reasons, unlike the professional activists, the majority of Chinese students in the U.S. 
were mere onlookers in the overseas and mainland democracy movements both before 
and after June 4, 1989.
149 Bo Xiong, “Two Dissidents Barred From Retumning Hime,” China News Digest, May 16 1989.
150 BBC News: “China’s Veteran Dissident," http: oiews.bbc.co.uk 2/hi/asia-pacific'259359?.stm. 
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The third overseas 1989 PDM participation channel consisted of information 
groups which distributed news through the internet. By March 1989, there were two main 
newsletter groups: Social.Culture.China (SCC) and the Electronic Newsletter for Chinese 
Students (ENCS). SCC was a world-wide group founded in January 1988. ENCS was a 
weekly newsletter edited by students at Ohio State University.151 Both groups usually had 
huge volumes of electronic traffic which provided information on everything from 
passport knowledge to advance notice on Oscar awards.
By March 1989, there was still no Canada-based news group due to the strict 
control of the Chinese embassy on Chinese students in that country. However, on March 
4th, two Chinese students in Canada initiated a news group later called the News Digest. 
To avoid the control of the Chinese Embassy, they invited two friends in the U.S. to join 
them in distributing information to students in Canada.152 The original plan was to select 
five percent of the news from SCC as well as ENCS, and then forward it to Chinese 
students in Canada by e-mail.153 It started as a loose news group which had only 
approximately 400 direct readers, with free news service provided two or three times per 
week. Successfully meeting the demand of an increasing need for information about the 
1989 Student Movement, News Digest became a daily news group at the end of April and 
gained over 4,000 direct readers in May 1989.154 In the summer of 1989, ENCf closed 
due to a shortage of manpower and gave its reader list to News Digest. Almost at the 
same time, a news group at Arizona State University joined News Digest and again 
enlarged its readership. In September, 1989, News Digest was renamed the China News
131 Ziye Zhou, “Hello, Friend,” China News Digest, 22 March.
152 Xiong Bo, “The Making o f ‘China News Digest,’” China News Digest, March 2004,
luto://www.cnd.org/CNDhistory.html. Accessed on June 18, 2004.
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Digest (CND) with over 4,000 readers. With approximately ten volunteer staff, it 
provided daily news service through listserv accounts at Arizona State and Kent State 
Universities, and a mailing list at the University of Toronto.155
As will be discussed in the rest of this chapter, the development of CND was 
closely tied to the development of 1989 student protests in China which were sparked by 
the death of Hu Yaobang, the former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General 
Secretary.156 Hu Yaobang had been Deng Xiaoping’s chosen successor but after the 
student protest of 1986, Hu was accused of leaning toward bourgeois liberalism and was 
removed from power in 1987. No one protested openly when Hu Yaobang was purged. 
However, people recognized him as a champion of enlightened rule after he died. Public 
mourning for Hu lasted from April 16 to April 22, and it evidently became a cover for 
protest against those still in power. According to Chinese labor advocates Han Dongfang 
and Zhao Hongliang,
It was clear that people were concerned not only with Hu 
Yaobang’s death, but also other topics. [During the mourning,] what I 
heard and talked about were things happening around me...Every one 
knows that there was a cruel competition in the early stage of the Western 
capitalist society. The capitalists did everything to achieve the possible 
highest profit without consideration of the economic or political weak, the 
social influences, and the environment. Now the same things occur in 
China (Han).
My parents said: “It was very easy to raise you three kids although 
our salaries were not high. Now you also have a temporary job, but why 
do we run out of money?”. . .Now the factories fail to provide salaries for 
workers. So they have to lay off some people. But they call it “integration” 
rather than “lay off.” That is what reform brought to us (Zhao).157
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Obviously, the economic reforms started in 1979 disappointed many Chinese 
including workers and intellectuals. Workers could no longer count on life-long 
employment. Entrepreneurs and party officials profited from the economic reforms, but 
intellectuals did not. “As poor as a professor, and as stupid as a Ph. D student” became 
one of the popular Beijing slogans by the end of the 1980s.158 As Alexis de Tocqueville 
noted in his study of the French Revolution: it is not always when things are going from 
bad to worse that revolutions break out. More often, people take up arms when an 
oppressive regime that has been tolerated without protest for a long period suddenly 
relaxes its pressure.159 Tocqueville’s assessment neatly fits the China of the 1980s. 
According to Time journalist Daniel Benjamin, China had become a hospitable and 
prosperous place for many of its inhabitants after the economic reforms of 1979. Between 
1978 and 1987, it achieved a 132.8% rise in per capita income, while the economy grew 
at an average rate of approximately 10% per year. However, as noted above, the benefits 
of the reform were not spread equally. According to Stanley Rosen, a professor of 
sociology at the University of Southern California, by 1989 there was a widespread 
feeling that Chinese society had become unjust.160 What made the situation even worse 
was an inflation rate of 36% in early 1989, with electricity scarce and a dropping rate of 
steel production. The problems in industry aroused bitter debate on economic policies 
among high ranking officials and dramatized the difference between the reformers and 
the conservatives. At the same time, high inflation caused a widely spread “shopping
158 Ibid.
159 Daniel Benjamin, “State o f Siege: With Tiananmen Square the Epicenter, a Political Quake Convulses
China,” Time, May 29 1989, p 44.
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fever” in both metropolises and rural areas; salt and cotton were hard to buy anywhere.161 162
This inflation hurt the average Chinese so badly that people lost trust in Deng Xiaoping, 
who had promised a better future after the Cultural Revolution. They felt Deng and the
1 AOother leaders did not know how to solve these economic problems.
It was in this context that Hu Yaobang died of hear attack after his dispute with 
Zhao Ziyang, who was accused by Hu of bringing about this nation-wide economic chaos 
at a CCP politburo meeting.163 Although Hu had fought with his heart disease for a long 
time, his death was still unexpected for common Chinese due to the public’s lack of 
information of politicians’ personal lives. The following week of public mourning gave 
democratic activists opportunities to spread their ideas among Beijing students and 
citizens. According to student leader Wang Dan, China’s problems could not be solved if 
they limited their activities to mourning one person. A systematic reform had to be 
undertaken to make sure China was on the right track. Thus, student leaders decided to 
use the mourning of Hu to demand political rights, including freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press.164 On April 18, approximately 1,000 students held a discussion on 
their demands. They settled on a seven-demand petition and carried it to various 
government offices.165
161 Ding Jian, “News about Congress in China,” China News Digest, March 23, 1989.
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According to Richard Evans, the seven demands were: to clear the name o f Hu Yaobang; to repudiate the 
campaigns which had been waged against bourgeois liberalization and spiritual pollution; to publish details 
about the assets and incomes o f party leaders and their relatives; to allow freedom o f speech and a free 
press; to increase funding for education; to raise the salaries o f teachers and other intellectuals; and to lift 
all restrictions on street demonstrations.
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With a strong interest in Chinese human rights and democratic developments, 
News Digest forwarded three newsletters to its members on April 16 (CST). The first was 
about the release of Yang Jing after eight years in prison. The second consisted of three 
e-mails which reported on Hu Yaobang from his time in the hospital to his death.166 Feng 
Qun, one e-mail sender from the University of Florida, also gave his comments on Hu. 
Interestingly, Feng ended his comments with a question: “Why it is him but not those 
who deserve?”167 Like his peers back in mainland China, Feng made a sinister death-wish 
to express his dissatisfaction with current leaders. The last forwarded e-mail talked about 
the development of one e-mail system in China.168
Reports concerning the Beijing students did not appear in the News Digest 
newsletters until 23:30, April 20 (EDT, Beijing time April 21), due to problems with the 
computer mail system.169 Of the five newsletters sent out that day, four were about the 
Beijing students. The sources used in compiling these newsletters were the New York 
Times, Reuters, the Globe and Mail, and the Toronto Star.]1° In the newsletter titled 
“10,000 Students Gathered at Tian-An-Men Square Mourning for Hu Yaobang,” the 
News Digest forwarded its readers three e-mails which had originally been posted on 
SCC. Of the three, one was from an individual’s e-mail account at the University of 
Indiana and one was from Camegie-Mellon University. The second e-mail was a 
response to the first e-mail.171 This indicated a very important trend of the three 
electronic news groups—the development of a discussion channel to meet the readers’
l66“‘Never Give In’— After 8 Years in Prison,” “Hu Yaobang Passed Away!!!” and “E-mail System 
Developing in China,” China News Digest, April 16, 1989.
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169 “News for Chinese Students,” China News Digest, April 20 1989.
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needs. Another issue which should be stressed is the content of the two individuals’ e­
mails. The e-mail from Indiana was titled “Re: Student Demonstration in Beijing” with 
four key words “Small bottle, wrong person” added in the next line. The e-mail quoted 
three sources from the New York Times, including phrases such as “the only sign of litter 
was a freshly broken ‘small bottle’ [in Tiananmen Square]” and “everything is going up, 
only Xiaoping’s stature isn’t going up.” The pronunciation of Deng’s first name, 
Xiaoping, is the same as the Chinese translation of “small bottle.” Obviously, the e-mail 
tried to tell overseas students that many Chinese believed Xiaoping should die. 172
The e-mail from Camegie-Mellon University called the mourning for Hu 
Yaobang “another Tiananmen Square Incident.” By ending with “history is repeating 
again,” this e-mail reminded its readers that in 1976 when people had mourned for Zhou 
Enlai, they had actually been expressing their resentments towards Mao Zedong.173 
Although the e-mail did not provide information in detail, every overseas Chinese student 
knew that Mao Zedong had died at 82, eight months after Zhou’s death on January 8, 
1976. Mao’s death in fact put an end to the Cultural Revolution and made the rise of 
Deng Xiaoping possible. Now, was it time for Deng Xiaoping to hand over power to a 
younger leader? To make their wish more clear, the editors of News Digest changed the 
title of the fourth newsletter from “Chinese Student Protest Death of Leader” to 
“Xiaoping healthy at 84; Yaobang, only 73, has died first.”174
Back in Beijing, the political and cultural center of China with over seventy 
universities and colleges, students brought their petition to Tiananmen Square for Hu
172 Ibid.
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Yaobang’s official funeral before dawn on April 22. Three of their leaders kneeled and 
raised their petition with their weeping fellows all around them. But no official 
responded. Premier Li Peng left without a gesture to the students and their leaders.'7"'’ 
Although a student leader, Wuer Kaixi, instantly pointed out that the kneeling of the 
student leaders revealed the real anti-people image of the government, he failed to realize 
that it also revealed the image of a nation that had been oppressed for four thousand 
years. As a result of this oppression, even the most rebellious group—the young 
generation of the 1980s—was ready to kneel down and put themselves in a position of 
supplication. From a strategic perspective, the kneeling also revealed the immaturity of 
the Beijing student leaders who had few experiences in organizing pro-democracy 
activities. They might have written an open letter like their mentor, Fang Lizhi, or given 
their peers lectures to gain more support. As was revealed later, Wuer Kaixi himself did 
not regard kneeling as a good strategy. In fact, he was first asked to kneel down to 
represent the students. He refused this suggestion. Then another student, Guo Haifeng, 
volunteered to kneel and hold the petition.
Between April 21 and April 26, News Digest sent out only one newsletter to its 
readers. This newsletter reported that students and scholars in the Ann Arbor area met Hu 
Qiaomu, the most famous theoretician of the Chinese Communist Party, on April 14. 
According to the report, Hu Qiaomu did not answer any of the questions posed by the 
students on issues such as corruption, dictatorship, and inequality. These questions 
indicated that overseas students shared the same concerns about political reform as their 175
175 Carma Hinton, Richard Gordon, The Gate o f  Heavenly Peace, “Chapter II: The Death o f Hu Yaobang 
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younger fellows in Beijing even before the death of Hu Yaobang (Overseas students were 
usually graduate students either in a master’s or Ph. D. program, while the majority of 
Beijing students were undergraduate students.) More to the point, these questions were 
also a planned challenge to Hu Qiaomu. As one reader of News Digest put it,
That would be fun. Now he has to face the Chinese student abroad.
He will know how people hate the “anti-spirit-pollution” and “anti­
liberalism” movements. He will know his image in the eyes of people. He 
will see how rich the capitalist US is and how poor the communist China 
is. He will learn what is the freedom of speech. He will know how little he 
is [compared] to Prof. Fang Lizhi in the heart of people and in the book of 
history.176
As a response to the unfriendly atmosphere, Hu Qiaomu spent twenty-eight 
minutes reading aloud People’s Daily news reports in the forty-five-minute discussion.177 
After that, Hu discussed the increased press freedom in mainland China compared with 
the 1960s and 1970s. The response of Hu Qiaomu might not have been foreseen by 
students in the Ann Arbor area. They asked for another discussion and were refused. 
Obviously, overseas students tried to use this opportunity to show their dissatisfaction 
with the conservative high ranking officials and intellectuals. And they published an 
article “Hu Qiaomu in Michigan” in detail in the World Journal.l78 News Digest did not 
post the adapted information from the World Journal until one week later because it was 
not important or interesting news for the average reader until the demonstrations occur in 
Beijing after the death of Hu Yaobang.
On April 26, a People’s Daily editorial helped to escalate the Beijing student 
protests by denouncing the demonstrations as “Dongluan” (turmoil, upheaval, and chaos) 
when Zhao Ziyang, a more liberal leader, was visiting Korea. Appearing in the official
Li Xiaolin, “Re: CCP’s King of Leftists Will Visit US,” China News Digest, March 23, 1989.
177 “Hu Qiaomu in Michigan (Not Alice in Wonderland),” China News Digest, April 22 1989.
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Communist Party newspaper, this editorial amounted to a charge of criminal conspiracy 
to overthrow the government. The editorial and its charge reminded many people of the 
“Tiananmen Incident” of 1976. Similar to that incident, demonstrations in 1989 were 
inspired by the death of a leader. Also “a small handful of conspirators” were supposedly 
plotting to bring down the state and an irrevocable judgment against them was passed. 
Irritated by the editorial and their government, Beijing students planned a grand 
demonstration with 150,000 participants from 45 universities and colleges on April 27.179 
Although police were placed on alert throughout Beijing and positioned to blockade key 
intersections along the route, the students met little resistance from the police and 
marched 25 miles peacefully from the university belt in northwestern Beijing to 
Tiananmen Square in the city’s center.180
The People’s Daily editorial and the following April 27 demonstration 
sparked overseas students’ enthusiasm for the Beijing student movement. Not satisfied 
any more to be onlookers and just share information from the newspapers or shout 
slogans, more and more overseas students began to support and become involved in 
the student movement. Some began to contact Beijing students by telephone to get the 
most recent news. Others began to organize donations to provide financial support to 
Beijing students. Ding Jian, a graduate student at the University of California in Los
178 Ibid.
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Angles, collected the most recent news by phone and posted it in News Digest on 
April 26. In this newsletter, Ding Jian also called for overseas students to participate in 
the Beijing student movement by joining their organization and by giving financial 
support. This was the first newsletter that called for action of the overseas students 
in the News Digest. Its appearance indicated that some overseas students were ready to 
participate in the 1989 pro-democracy movement.
“Through telephone and E-mail talk with some friends,” overseas students put 
their ideas together.182 83 In an e-mail which was posted in News Digest on April 27, 
Ding Jian proposed an Overseas Support program based on five points: First, overseas 
students should respond only to the requirements of the Chinese Solidarity Student 
Union (CSSU), in case their inappropriate help might put CSSU in trouble. Second, 
overseas and mainland students should use one name, the CSSU, to support each other 
and to gain large number of members so the government could not easily proclaim it 
to be illegal. Third, overseas students as a whole should keep the same pace as the 
mainland students to ensure their own safety. Their belief was that Chinese law 
traditionally does not punish the majority. Thus, as long as overseas students took less 
radical measures or just followed the mainland students, they would not be punished 
by the government. Fourth, overseas students should prevent individuals from 
introducing their own ideas “which may bring disaster into the whole organization.” 
This point was an amendment to the third one. Last, but not 'east, overseas university
182 Ding Jian, “Telephone Talking with Students in Beijing University,” China News Digest, April 26 1989.
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counterparts should contact the CSSU headquarters before conducting any 
activities.184 *
Although eager to give support to their Beijing fellows, overseas students in 
the U.S. had still not established direct contact with CSSU leaders by May. They also 
needed to learn to coordinate activities among themselves. To establish direct contact 
with CSSU, overseas students collected information on the student leaders (names, 
phone numbers, and addresses) and posted them in their electronic newsletters. 
Chinese students at several influential universities, such as UCLA, also tried to 
establish a direct relationship with CSSU. To coordinate their activities, intercampus 
coordinators contacted the CSSU headquarters and exchanged information. Then they 
sent information to the other universities.183
While the Beijing pro-democracy movement escalated after the publication of 
the April 26 editorial, overseas students found another way to show their 
enthusiasm—making financial contributions. On April 27, the News Digest reported 
on activities at Eastern Michigan University. Students there made phone calls to Fang 
Lizhi and several student leaders. They also collected $250 to support the ongoing 
demonstrations. The next day, students at Columbia University also shared their fund­
raising experiences through SCC and the News Digest. On April 29, Ding Jian made a 
call for donations to the Chinese Solidarity Student Union (CSCU) in the News Digest. 
According to this announcement, students at over twenty overseas universities had 




reports titled “Donation Update” to acclaim the participating universities and to
encourage more people to join in (see Table 7).186 187
Table 7: Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars Donations in May
2-May 4-May 9-May 12-May 17-May 19-May 21-May
Dollars 8,477 15898 7 32,729.54 36,207.54 36,637.54 44,876 58,505
Universities 16 20 48 51 52 62 70
SOURCE: China News Digest, May 19889.
However, the donation information updated in the News Digest by May 9 was not 
complete. Several major universities, including those in the Boston area, were not added 
to the list, so the numbers of universities given in Table 7 by May 9 is less than the actual 
total of participating universities. Compared with the number of participating universities, 
the report on the amount of money collected in the News Digest was more accurate 
because it included the total amount collected in the Boston area after May 2.18/ It also 
revealed more information than the total numbers. For example, from May 9 to May 17, 
the total amount of the donations consistently ended with “.54.” Was it just a 
coincidence, or was it a symbolic way to remind the overseas students as well as the 
Chinese government that they were inheriting the legacy of the 1919 May Fourth 
Movement. In China, a state with significant curbs on free expression, demonstrators had 
often used “legitimate” causes—such as anti-Japanese sentiment and the commemoration 
of a popular Chinese leader—to gather together and to express dissent in socially 
acceptable terms. To have a better understanding of overseas student’s involvement in 
May, it is necessary to record what was going on in Beijing after April 27.
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187 Jisheng Song, “Donation Updated,” China News Digest, May 4 1989.
188 Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department o f State, Wash DC, A Student Demonstration of 
Sorts in Tiananmen Square (November 21, 1985)
http://wwvv.avvu.edu/-nsarcliivNSAF.BB/NSAEBB !(>■ docuinenls-;01-02.htTn. Accessed on June 19, 2004.
74
With the triumph of the April 27 demonstration, few Beijing students were 
ready to go back to class, although most of them were not sure what they should do next. 
Disagreements over tactics between student leaders and among intellectuals developed 
and weakened the leadership.189 In two days, three new student organizations—the 
Beijing Higher Education Institution Student Union, Solidarity Student Union, and 
Student Self-Govem[ment] Union (the Coalition of Independent Student Unions)— 
formed and claimed that they represented students. These three student organizations all 
demanded legal status and dialogue with the government after they were labeled 
illegal.190
Some influential intellectuals, including Dai Qing, argued that students should 
go back to class because demonstrations alone could not bring a total change of the social 
system in China.191 Prominent Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi also tried to persuade student 
leaders to go back to class.192 Student leaders who met Fang Lizhi usually agreed with 
him during their discussions, however, they changed their ideas after they went back into 
the streets.193 For example, Wang Dan had been a follower of Fang before the grand 
demonstration. He also had supported Fang’s “back to class” tactic.194 In an interview 
Wang Dan gave to a Canadian television reporter on May 10, he argued that the student 
movement should move to a new stage. In that stage, the main goal of students should be 
to build a democratic environment on campus by running their own newspaper,
189 Zhong Rui, “On the Difference Between Beijing and Shanghai Student Movements,” China Spring,
June 1991. hitp://bizc ora/bis;ze'097/Q45.htm. Accessed on June 19, 2004.
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broadcasting, etc.n:> However, in a discussion with five other student leaders the next 
day, Wang Dan changed his stand after they analyzed the government responses. It was 
reported that several local Beijing colleges began to punish their students because of their 
involvement in the protests. It was feared that if there was no additional measures taken 
to push the movement to a summit, the government would put student leaders into prison 
after all the students returned to class. Therefore, Wang Dan and Wuer Kaixi proposed a 
hunger strike as their next tactic.194 596 In just one day, Wang Dan once again became a 
radical leader in the streets.
Unable to achieve a consensus within the Coalition of Independent Student
Unions, Wang Dan and Chai Ling bypassed their new organization and made personal
appeals to students at Beijing University on May 12. Chai Ling’s speech was so well
received that they gained hundreds of followers in one night. On the morning of May 13,
the government finally agreed to meet with a “Dialogue Group” elected by Beijing
students. But before this news reached the universities, the hunger strikers had already set
out for Tiananmen Square.197 The government was now placed in a very difficult
situation. As Carma Hinton and Richard Gordon have observed,
The Hunger strike could not have come at a worse time for the 
government. That week a historic meeting, years in preparation, was to 
take place: The President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, was 
coming to China. A grand welcoming ceremony was scheduled to take 
place in Tiananmen Square—which was filled, at the moment, with 
thousands of students.198
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http: 'hizc.oiuTis/zc/()94-86. Accessed on June 9, 2004.
195 Carma Hinton, Richard Gordon, The Gate o f  Heavenly Peace, Chapter V: The Hunger Strike,




Less than twenty-four hours before Gorbachev’s arrival on the afternoon of April 
14, the government began talks with the elected Dialogue Group. The student leaders 
promised that their conversations would be broadcast so that other students at Tiananmen 
Square would be able to listen. Yan Mingfu, a leading reformist minister, was the main 
official representative. However, there was no sound system at the place where they had 
the dialogue. Suspecting that they were being sold-out by their leaders, the hunger 
strikers rushed into the dialogue room and disrupted the session after they found they 
could not hear the promised broadcast at the square.199 Thus, on the very eve of 
Gorbachev’s arrival, talks between the student leaders and the government were broken 
up by the hunger strikers. On the night of the same day, twelve widely-respected scholars 
and journalists, including Dai Qing and Su Xiaokang, came to the square. They all were 
well known supporters of liberal reform in China. They praised the students, and then 
pleaded for them to leave, but their appeal was ignored.200
The next day, the government canceled the grand ceremony planned for 
Gorbachev at Tiananmen Square and gave the Soviet leader a quick welcome at the 
airport. For the next three days, while the Chinese leaders continued their discussions 
with Gorbachev, sympathy for the students and anger at the government grew among 
common Chinese citizens. On May 16, 300,000 people marched in the streets of Beijing. 
On the 17th and again on the 18th, the total number of protestors reached one million.201 
With the pennission of reform-minded officials, some official media began to report 








to talk with the hunger strikers.202 For example, the Minister of the United Frontier Yan 
Minfu went there, promising that there would be no punishment after students went back 
to campus. He argued that the views contained in the April 26 People’s Daily editorial 
were wrong. He then pleaded for students to go back to campus. However, students on 
the Square refused to cooperate with these reform-minded officials.
These actions suggested a shifting of the party line. Not wanting to be left on the 
wrong side, local party leaders and universities started to permit their workers and 
students to go to Tiananmen and show support for the Beijing students. After three days 
of the hunger strike, it seemed not only right but safe to participate in the movement. 
According to Ding Jian,
More than one hundred Beida faculty start to boycott teaching, some of 
them have joined the hunger strike. Quite a few universities’ leaders, 
including presidents from Gangyuan [Beijing Technology University], 
Beihang [Beihang University], Xiehe Yida [Yehe Medical University], 
etc, go to the square to express their solicitude and support. Some brought 
straw hats to the students, some offered the powerful loudspeakers to help 
the students to keep order and efficient communication in the crowded 
square.203
Meanwhile, moderate government leaders tried whatever measures they could 
think of to get the students to leave the Square because they knew if they could not 
control the situation at the square, the government’s hard-liners were more than willing to 
use force. However, it was no longer clear who really represented the students after the 
hunger strikers interrupted the May 14 talks. On May 16, the reformist official Yan 
Mingfu appealed directly to the crowds in the Square. He promised that the government 
would not punish students after they went back to campus. In stead of cooperating with
202 Ibid.
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him, the students at the Square responded that they had nothing to do with the political 
struggle within the party and they were not going to rely on anyone but themselves.204
Only hours after Yan’s appearance in the Square, Zhao Ziyang delivered a 
written letter on behalf of the five-person CCP politburo. This letter contradicted the 
April 26 editorial by promising that there would be no punishment after the students 
returned to campus, but still the strike continued.205 On May 18, Premier Li Peng held a 
televised meeting with student leaders, but once again no compromise could be reached. 
The next day, Zhao Ziyang lost out to the hard-liners in the party and the government 
declared martial law.206 As army units moved towards the city, Li Peng addressed an 
emergency meeting of state and army leaders. His speech was broadcast and it clearly 
irritated many Beijing citizens. Under the leadership of Zhao Hongliang, a group of 
Beijing workers declared the founding of an independent union, and “the new union 
helped mobilize citizens to block the Martial Law Troops.” For approximately 48 hours 
the troops were stuck in a sea of people, moving neither forward nor back.207
As soon as the hunger strikers received the news of the declaration of martial law, 
they announced an end to the hunger strike and began a mass sit-in.208With the help of 
Beijing citizens, especially the new-founded independent union of workers, they 
successfully blocked the army and forced the troops to pull back to the suburbs.209
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However, after the immediate danger passed, student leaders soon found themselves in 
the center of a power struggle to control the Square and its population. Struggles among 
different groups for power grew increasingly ugly. On May 23, student leaders turned 
down the proposal of Hou Dejian who had suggested the students organize a vote to elect 
their President and Vice President.210 With no proper channels to express their opinions, 
students who had different ideas tried to conquer the broadcast station in order to control 
the Square themselves. According to student leader Feng Congde, he and his group had to 
suppress an average of three to four rebellions per day. In such an intense atmosphere, the 
leaders with more radical agendas had the advantage of attracting more followers. These 
people were not among the student leaders who had been elected on campuses. They 
came to prominence through the hunger strike and gained credibility by promising to 
make the greatest sacrifices. The hunger strike leader Chai Ling became Commander-in- 
chief of a new organization—the Defend Tiananmen Square Headquarters.211
Due to the huge number of protestors and the disorder among students, the Square 
was getting more and more squalid by the end of May. Furthermore, the students’ 
financial, political, and emotional resources were running low.212 To persuade students to 
leave the Square, some concerned intellectuals set up joint daily meetings with workers’ 
and citizens’ groups, the independent student unions, and people who organized to defend 
Tiananmen Square Headquarters. A proposal to end the mass sit-in on May 30 was
210 Carma Hinton, Richard Gordon, Tiananmen: the Gate o f  Heavenly Peace, “Chpater VII: Culture in the 
Square ' n: -■mitbhs.com.'cui-bin/BBSanc?/urouns/Group S/Salon/64. Accessed on June 9, 2004. Hou 
Vjian is the first pop star in mainland China in the 1980s.
l he record o f the 1989 pro-democracy movement in this thesis is based on the documentary film 
Tiananmen: the Gate o f  Heavenly Peace. This film is widely regarded as the most creditable work on the 
topic o f Tiananmen.
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Feng Conde, “Joint Meeting and the May 27 Meeting,” Seminar on Rethinking the 1989 Pro-democracy 




passed with the support of all participants, including Chai Ling, at the joint meeting of 
May 27. Wang Dan announced this decision in the Square on the same day and gave 
this information to news reporters. However, after their meeting with journalists, Li Lu 
and Chai Ling changed their minds and expressed their disagreement with the decision.214 
Then another joint meeting was held on the Square that same night. A new proposal to 
end the mass sit-in on June 20 was accepted.215 Realizing that he could not have much 
influence on the students in the Square, Wang Dan chose to focus on affairs on campus. 
He had no further discussion with Li Lu and Chai Ling on the critical issue of “leaving or 
stay.”216
There were two factors— the constantly changing population at the Square and 
the marathon benefit concert held in Hong Kong—which greatly contributed to Chai 
Ling’s ability to prevent the struggle being moved back to the campuses. Like some 
student leaders, students who grew discouraged or disgusted chose to leave the Square.217 
Their places were immediately occupied by enthusiastic newcomers from all over the 
country. When those who thought it best to leave voted with their feet, there was always a 
majority who would choose to stay at any given time. On the night of May 30, a shipment 
of bright new tents and other supplies arrived and flooded the Square. With these supplies 
from Hong Kong and these new followers at the Square, Chai Ling won control of the
2,3 ibid.
"I4 Li Lu, “On Beijing Joint Meetings,” Seminar o f  Rethinking the 1989 Pro-democracy Movement, 
lntn:7w\v\v.tsQuare.lv/ehinese/archives/h4.hnnltr4.6.2. Accessed on June 20, 2004.
J15 Ibid.
216 Carma Hinton, Richard Gordon, Tiananmen: the Gate o f  Heavenly Peace, “Chpater VII: Culture in the
81
situation, primarily by allying with those provincial students who were determined to
Although the above account gives no role for overseas students in the May pro­
democracy movement, hundreds of overseas students did pour their time, energy, 
wisdom, and money into it. However, far away from the center of the struggle, they were 
merely ardent followers and their participation was greatly influenced by the Beijing 
student activities. According to the China News Digest (see Figure 6), there was a steady 
increase in donations from May 2 to May 9. A.s long as the Beijing student organizations 
were labeled illegal, the money collected could not be mailed to students because they 
had no legal account. Therefore, the only way the overseas students could get the money 
to Beijing was through reliable people who were returning to China. By May 19, the 
money raised at four North American universities had been sent to Beijing in this way.2 *19 
However, the majority of the involved overseas students still faced the old problem of 
how to send the donation money back to China.
After May 9, the increasing rate of donations slowed down until approximately 
May 18, primarily due to the disagreement over tactics among Beijing student leaders 
(see Figure 6). Some student leaders wanted to bring students in the streets back to the 
campuses. Some planned to “test the state’s sincerity [in dialogue] before deciding on
2IS Ibid. The record o f events which led to the Tiananmen Tragedy is based on the documentary film
Tiananmen: the Gate of Heavenly Peace. This film was directed by Carma Hinton and Richard Gordon.
Before this film, there were mainly two radical perspectives on the 1989 Pro-democracy Movement: the
counter-revolutionary turmoil or the great democracy movement. Hinton and Gordon directed a film based 
on approximately 300 hours o f video tapes, numerous related documents, and dozens o f main participants 
accounts. This film put “June 4 th” on a historic and cultural stage of China. It does not simply damn the 
cruelty o f the government nor praise the protestors, but questions as well as challenges the traditional ideas 
and perspectives.
219 Rupert Zhu, “How to Send Donation Money to Beijing Students,” the China News Digest, May 19 1989.
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future action.220 Some radical leaders wanted a new “June Third Movement” to spread
the movement from campus to the broader society.221 According to Bo Xiong on May 12,
I called Beijing this noon. Apparently, all schools there have more 
connections with those famous intellectuals. There will be actions to have 
Mr. Qin Ben-li to come out as a leader in Beijing .... Now, the new “May 
Fourth Movement” we just have had is going to be a new “June Third 
Movement” (started general boycott of market in Shanghai in 1919)— 
from campus to the society.222
At the same time, it was still difficult for overseas student agents in Beijing to find a 
proper channel to get the donations to Beijing until May 17. On that day SCC reporter 
Ding Jian called upon oversea universities to send the donations through the International 
Red Cross and other local Red Cross offices.223 CND posted an announcement from 
UCLA right after Dian Jian’s call. It called for all the “Lian Yi Hui” (local Chinese 
student and scholar associations) to take all possible steps to show their support.224 25
Partly as a result of this call for donatio ns as well as a response to the one-million 
people protest on May 17 in Beijing, the overseas Chinese student and scholar donations 
increased sharply again after May 19, reaching $58,505 on May 21.22:> Another factor that 
contributed to this increase was the involvement of Beijing workers and citizens during 
the first three days of the martial law. According to the News Digest, “about two million 
people” went into the streets to protest against the government. Official news media, such 
as the Science-Technology Daily, reported upon the students’ and peoples’ activities in 
Tiananmen Square and these reports “[had] a big effect in driving more people on (to the)
220 Bo Xiong, “Wuer Kaixi, the Student Leader in Beijing,” China News Digest, May 10, 1989.
221 Bo Xiong, “Qin Benli Is Invited as Chief Editor for Students magazine,” China News Digest, May 12, 
1989. During the May Fourth Movement in 1919, a general boycott o f market started in Shanghai on June 
3, and that marked the movement transferring from campus to the society.
222 Ibid.
223 Ding Jian, “Call Help from Red Cross,” China News Digest, May 17 1989.
224 Ibid"
225 “Donation Updated,” China News Digest, May 21, 1989.
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street to join students.”"26 To collect more money for the on-going movement, overseas 
students expanded their fund-raising activities from their campuses to local Chinatowns. 
The joining of the wealthier Chinese Americans and Chinese Canadians was another 
factor that contributed to the dramatic increase in the total amount of donations after May 
19 (see Figure 6).26 27 28
Figure 6: Overseas Students Donation in May 
Accompanying the steady increase of donations was the growing number of 
participants. According to CND, its direct readers increased from approximately 400 
in March to over 1,000 at the end of April and the whole of May.228 This also cheated a 
demand that more and instant information about the Beijing student movement be 
provided. To meet this demand, the News Digest adjusted its operating rules and 
became a daily news group on April 26. The daily posted newsletters increased to five 
newsletters at the end of April (see Table 7). Although this increasing trend did not
226 Rupert Zhu, “Great Change is Coming,” China News Digest, May 19 1989.
22' Jisheng Song, “Donation Updated,” China News Digest, May 22 1989.
228 Bo Xiong, “The Making o f China New Digest,” http: www.hxwz.com CNDhistorv.html. Accessed on 
June 20, 2004.
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last long due to the disagreement among student leaders in Beijing in early May— 
from May 7 to 11, only seven news letters were posted in the News Digest—it began 
to resume its quantity of postings after the hunger strike started on May 13 (see Table 
8). This increase continued and was heightened after the announcement of martial law. 
As a result, the News Digest posted 63 newsletters in only two days, right after the 
Beijing citizens successfully blocked the army on May 21 (see Table 8). Although the 
number of posted newsletters began to decrease after May 22, the News Digest still 
produced an average of eleven newsletters per day from May 23 to June 1.
Table 8: Production of Newsletters in the News Digest in April
April 16 20 22 26 27 28 29 30
newsletter 3 5 1 1 4 4 3 5
Table 9: Production of Newsletters in the News Digest from May to June
May to June 02-06 07-11 12-17 18-20 21-22 23-27 28-01 02-06
newsletter 19 7 22 42 63 44 66 63
SOURCE: China News Digest, April, May, and June 1989.
By combining the information in Figure 13 and 14, it is easy to see that both 
the amount of donations and newsletter production increased sharply after May 20. 
This indicated that overseas students participated in the pro-democracy movement to a 
greater degree after the declaration of martial law. A closer look at the topics in the 
News Digest strengthens the above argument. After May 19, students in both the U.S. 
and Canada began to take further actions while they continued their fund-raising 
activities. For example, students in Canada took part in a march from Montreal to 
Ottawa on May 19 because the Chairman of the Chinese National People’s Congress,
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Wan Li, would be there the next day.229 Two days previously, students in Vancouver 
failed to secure a meeting with Wan Li. They urged their fellows in Toronto and 
Ottawa to have a try. As a response to this call, as well as to the Beijing Student 
Protests, students in Ottawa began to organize a mass sit-in in front of the Chinese 
Embassy. As their organizer put it,
We Chinese students in North America can learn something from our 
fellow students in Beijing. If we tell the Chinese Consulates here that we 
are planning a sit-in in front of the Consulate during Wan’s visit unless the 
Consulate let us meet Wan, the consulate officials would certainly give 
our request more attention.230
Although this protest was a new strategy for overseas students, it was not a 
radical one compared to what their Beijing fellows had done. Since they had just 
learned this technique from the Beijing students, they believed there should be no risk. 
In fact, many believed that an agreement between the students and the government 
was closer after the million people protest on May 17.231 *
In this intense atmosphere, SCC reporter Ding Jian and a few other overseas 
students went to Beijing to set up a regular channel for future donation at their own 
expense. If things went well, they would stay there for a few months to represent 
overseas students, giving them a voice in the movement. According to the News 
Digest, overseas students supported “a step-by-step change.” It was also suggested that 
[The Beijing students should] concentrate on issues [such as freedom of the press and 
freedom of association] rather than on specific personnel changes.” For the sake of
229 “March To Ottawa In Supporting Students At Home,” China News Digest, May 19, 1989.
230 “Try Again to Meet Wan Li,” China News Digest, May 17 1989.
231 “Million Chinese March for Democracy— Agreements is Closer,” China News Digest, May 17 1989.
2,2 “Chinese Students In the US Left For Home To Join Students On TAM Square,” China New Digest, 
May 21 1989.
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social stability, Beijing students should give the Chinese Communist Party a chance at 
this “critical moment.”233
However, a further investigation reveals that the enthusiasm of some overseas 
students demonstrated on the China News Digest did not really represent the degree of 
involvement of the majority of the overseas students. According to its fund-raising 
update information on May 22, the total amount of donations was approximately 
$60,000, a number which hardly indicated a huge level of involvement. Assuming 
average donations ranged from $10 to $50 per person, it was possible that 1,200 to 
6,000 had made donations. This means only 3%-15% of overseas Chinese students 
and scholars were “financially” involved in the Beijing protests. Considering $10 is 
too small a number, it would be helpful if $30 is used as the average donation per 
person. Then there might be 2,000 people—5% of overseas students and scholars— 
who had donated money.
Another way to estimate the average donation per person is to adopt the 
average amount donated in the Chinese flood donation campaign of 1991. According 
to IFCSS, overseas Chinese students had conducted flood relief donation campaigns 
on every campus and in every research institution during and after the summer flood 
in China. A total of over $100,000 had been collected and sent to the flood area via all 
channels.234 In this campaign, the Chinese Student and Scholar Solidarity Union at 
Purdue (CSSSUP) had collected $3,525 from 168 people at Purdue and off campus.23'’ 
Students at Purdue University had also been one of the most active groups which
: " Rupert Zhu, “What China Need Now and What to do?” China News Digest, May 19 1989.
234 - jp e g s  Headquarter Memo on Flood Relief Project,” China News Digest, March 2, 1992.
2:0 “Flood Donation Report from Purdue University,” China News Digest, January 29, 1992. Purdue 
University donated $2,700 to the 1989 Beijing Student Protests. There were only three universities which
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supported the 1989 Beijing Student Protests (BSP). The name of their organization 
indicated that they inherited the title of the Chinese Solidarity Student Union which 
was established during the early period of the Beijing student protests. Assuming 
every local Chinese student and scholar community in the U.S. participated in the pro­
democracy movement in the U.S. to support their mainland fellows, each of them 
might have donated $20 (3525 divided by 168). That meant approximately 3,000 
(60,000 divided by 20) Chinese students and scholars had financially supported BSP. 
Thus, 7.5% of the 40,000 Chinese students and scholars in the U.S. had actually been 
involved in the movement. Considering that there were 18 Canadian institutions and 
one Norwegian university which also participated in this fund-raising and contributed 
18, 674.5 Canadian dollars, the number of U.S. participants should be less than 7.5% 
of 40,000. The result of this calculation matches the number given by many 
professional democratic activists.* 236 Clearly, neither the amount of donations nor the 
participating population indicated a deep involvement of overseas Chinese students 
and scholars in the 1989 Beijing Protests.237
Several overseas Chinese scholars also argued that very few Chinese students 
and scholars were actually involved in the PDM. According to the former President of 
the Chinese Alliance for Democracy, Wu Fangcheng, there were approximately 250 
overseas students and scholars at the University of Kentucky which was one of the 
most active universities in the overseas democracy movement (ODM). Of the 250 
Chinese, at least 50% had never participated in any activity related to ODM after June
donated more than Purdue in 1989. They were University o f Alberta (4,056 Canadian dollars), UC 
Berkeley ($5,000), and UC Dan Diego ($3,000). “Donation Update,” China News Digest, May 22, 1989.
236 Wu Fangcheng, “Democracy, Green Card, and Blood Mantou (Steam Bread),” China Spring, June 1990.
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4 1989. Before June 4, the percentage was much less than 50% at that university.237 38 As 
China Spring reported, at least 80% of overseas students and scholars had never 
participated in any activity overseas democratic movement even after June 4 
(ODM).239
In conclusion, approximately five percent of overseas Chinese students and 
scholars actually participated in the PDM in the U.S. Among them, Jian Ding was one 
of the most active. Therefore, most of the Chinese students and scholars in the U.S. 
would be pretty safe if they had to go back to China after they finished their study and 
research based on the following two reasons. First, they had not participated in the 
PDM. Second, Chinese law traditionally does not punish the majority. Evidently, their 
later claim of encountering great risk if forced to go back to China was groundless.
237 “Donation Update,” China News Digest, May 22 1989. The 70 participating universities and colleges 
included 16 institutions in Canada and one university in Norway. To make the calculating easier, I chose 
40,000 as the number o f the total overseas students in North America.
238 Wu Fangcheng, “Democracy, Green Card, and Blood Mantou (steam bread),” China Spring, June 1990.
239 Li Jinghing, “IFCSS? Green Card Party? Democracy Group?” China Spring, February 1993.
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CHAPTER V
RESPONSES OF THE U.S. MEDIA, SCHOLARS, AND GOVERNMENT 
This chapter starts with western media’s accounts of the 1989 Student Pro- 
Democracy Movement and the Tiananmen Square Tragedy. Different from the 
perspectives of some overseas Chinese students, many American media experts 
predicted the imminent collapse of communism in China. Then it discusses various 
responses of U.S. scholars, politicians, and the Bush Administration. Finally it ends 
with the conclusion that the bills led to the Chinese Students Protection Act had been 
shaped by the intense struggle between the Capitol Hill and the White House on China 
policies.
As a response to the Pro-Democracy Movement in China in the spring of 1989,
and also encouraged by what had happened in Eastern Europe, many American media
experts predicted the rise of a new democratic China. According to Nelson Rosit, a
doctoral student in the history department of the University of North Dakota:
I remember, as do most persons over thirty, watching, during the spring of 
1989, the television broadcasts from Beijing reporting on the Tiananmen 
Square pro-democracy demonstrations. I also remember media experts 
predicting the imminent fall of communism and the rise of a new 
democratic China.240
240 Nelson Rosit, “A Critique of: Blood Cards or Not -  The Chinese Student Protection Act o f 1992 by 
Linxiang Zhu.”
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However, the 1989 Beijing student protests ended in tragedy with approximately 
700 deaths on June 3 and June 4.241 After this tragedy, The Chinese Communist Party 
was still in control of China. Jiang Zeming, the former mayor of Shanghai, became the 
obvious successor to Deng Xiaoping when the former General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, 
was ousted on June 22. As a response to both the tragedy in Beijing and the American 
journalists’ reports on it, the U.S. Congress passed a series of laws to support the students 
who were involved in this movement, for instance, the Emergency Chinese Immigration 
Relief Act of 1989, also called H.R. 2712. This act permitted nationals of the People's 
Republic of China “who entered the U.S. under non-immigrant status as students or 
teachers to apply for immigrant status without returning to China for two years as 
normally required under the Immigration and Nationality Act.” 242 It also “requires 
consideration of asylum applications by Chinese nationals who fear persecution upon 
return to China as a result of Chinese population control policies.”243 However, President 
George H. W. Bush vetoed this bill on November 30, 1989, because he was “extending 
and broadening these measures to provide the same protections as H.R. 2712.”244
To override Bush’s veto, Congress organized a hearing on H.R. 2712 on 
January 23, 1990. During the hearing, Senator Gorton stated:
I believe that that [U.S. - China] relationship should be undertaken 
within a frame of reference in which we are constantly aware that the present 
Government of the People’s Republic of China is illegitimate in exactly the 
same way that the governments of Eastern Europe were illegitimate. In the 
long run, and perhaps even in the short run, that government will be fortunate
241 “Tiananmen Square Uprising: A Perspective,” http:// wvvw.sinomaiiia.com CHINANEWS/ 
tiananmen_perspective.htm. Accessed on June 21, 2004.
242 “Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act o f 1989,” Y l .1/8:101-360, Nov. 14, 1989.
243 Ibid.
244 George Bush, “Memorandum o f Disapproval for the Bill Providing Emergency Chinese Immigration 
R elie f/’November 30, 1989. hum .bushlibrarv.tamu.edu papers. 1989 891 13002. lit ml. Accessed on June 
21, 2004.
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if it suffers the fate of the Communist rulers of Czechoslovakia; unlucky if it 
suffers the fate of Ceausescu, but one or the other such fate inevitably awaits
it.245
In his prepared statement, Senator Gorton argued that “with their personal safety assured 
and their confidence restored, the Chinese students will be encouraged to continue their 
fight to bring democratic reforms to China.”246 Thus, in his eyes, the student bill was an 
important investment in the future of Chinese politics because these students were the 
very people who would bring an end to the communist government of China.
The year 1989 is regarded as a key year in modem world history in the eyes of 
many Westerners. In Eastern Europe, the Communist leadership fell in one country 
after another. Free elections and coalition governments sprang up in Bucharest, 
Budapest, Moscow, and Prague. In China, the crisis starting in April seemed to match 
what happened in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It looked like a 
democratic era for the whole world was coming and some scholars applauded it as the 
“End of History. . . .  the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human
747government.”
Whether or not 1989 was the “End of History,” the crisis of 1989 in China had 
its own profoundly economic and social origins. Economic reforms, beginning in 
1979, destroyed the old planned markets, while at the same time a diverse economy 
was taking shape. The Chinese “Opening to the World” policy broadened the outlook 
of the people, especially the intellectuals and college students, in many ways. For 
example, the Voice of America (VOA) and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
245 Chinese Students in America and Human Rights in China, Y4. J89/2:S.hrg. 101-1270, p. 8 .
246 Ibid, p 11.
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radio broadcasts were no longer banned. Many university students had listened to 
them daily as a means of improving their English listening ability. Young urban 
Chinese showed great interest in Western ideologies and came to doubt nearly every 
traditional way. Radical students were questioning whether or not it was worth it for 
them to continue to be Chinese citizens and work for the nation.247 48 Furthermore, the 
developing Chinese economy was contrasted with the “economic miracle” in Taiwan 
and South Korea. Feeling they had been mislead by the government’s propaganda, 
intellectuals and students lost their faith in state socialism and doubted Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic policies. Coinciding with this great decline of ideological 
conformity was an expansion of student enrollment and a new international wave of 
democracy.249 The Chinese higher education system had greatly expanded since 1978. 
The total university enrollment had expanded from 0.63 to 2.1 million, with the 
number of universities increasing from 404 to 1075 by 1989.250
However, due to their bitter experiences during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 
to 1976, many Chinese intellectuals, including university faculties, were tired of 
“ideological debates” and concentrated on their own academic or scientific studies. 
According to Jin Guantao, one of the most influential current Chinese philosophers, 
Chinese intellectuals as a whole had lost their independent personality and moral courage
247 Francis Fukuyama, “The End o f History,” The National Interest, Summer 1989.
248 Philip Gunningham, “Interview with Chai Lin,” May 28, 1989, 
http://www.tsquare.tv/chinese/archives/chailin89528.htnil. Accessed on July 2, 2004.
249 S. Rosen, “The Impact o f Reform Politics on Youth Attitudes," in Davis, D. and Vogel, E.F. (eds.), 
Chinese Society on the Eve o f  Tiananmen, pp 283-305.
250 China Statistical Yearbook 1990. I gained this information from Zhao Dingxin, “Foreign Study as a 
Safety-vale: the Experience of China’s University Students Going Abroad in the Eighties.” This paper was 
e-mailed to me by Dr. Zhao. Dr, Zhao Dingxin is an associate professor in the Department o f Sociology of 
McGill University.
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to challenge the regime in action, even in thinking.251 As a result, college students either 
showed no interest in social problems or failed to gain access to proper channels to 
discuss social and political problems which confused them in a society where only one 
voice could be heard. No wonder when journalists interviewed the students who attended 
the 1989 protest, most of them did not know what democracy was and what their concrete
252aims were.
This demonstration was like other demonstrations that had occurred in modem 
Chinese history, in that it started with mourning the death of an important and popular 
official. This had been the cause of the mass demonstration, in 1976, mourning Zhou 
Enlai, the popular premier of China from 1949 to 1976. The 1989 Student Movement in 
1989 started by mourning the death of Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party from 1982 to 1986. On April 18 and 19, approximately 2,000 students 
went to Xinhua Gate and tried to force their way into Zhongnanhai, the place containing 
the residences and offices of China’s top leaders. They demanded freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, freedom to demonstrate, more money for education, and the 
disclosure of the private bank accounts of some top officials' children. The first three 
demands had become routine since Deng Xiaoping detained Wei Jingsheng in 1979 and 
suppressed the “Democracy Wall,” a movement led by Wei Jingsheng which had called 
for democracy to become China's "Fifth Modernization" as a precondition for other 
aspects of modernization during the winter months of 1978-79.253 The latter two demands 
reflected people’s anger at government corruption. At the very beginning of the 1989
251 Jin Guantao, “The Rationalism o f Chinese Culture and Its Defects,” the Chinese Intellectual, Fall 1989.
2' * 2 Michael S. Serrill, “Beijing Spring,” Time May 8 1989, p 38.
2x1 Geremie Barme and John Minford, Seeds o f  Fire, New York: The Noonday Press, 1989, 277-78.
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protest, journalists from Hong Kong and other areas reported it from both the Chinese 
government’s and students’ perspectives. Some students were accused of throwing 
bottles and bricks at police.254 25Reports of students being detained also were shown in
255newspapers.
As a result of Deng Xiaoping’s call on April 25 for “tough measures” to stop the 
protest, The People's Daily, the party organ, published a strongly worded editorial which 
irritated the students. As a response to the editorial, the first secretary of Shanghai, Jiang 
Zeming, restructured China’s most outspokenly liberal newspaper, the World Economic 
Herald, and fired its editor, Qin Benli.256 Students from Beida took these actions as 
provocations and immediately began organizing their largest protest yet. “The 
government wants to intimidate us, but the measures they have resorted to only make us 
angry,” Beida student Jia Guangxi said minutes before the giant march began.257 In 
defiance of warnings from the government, 150,000 students from 32 Beijing colleges 
staged a massive demonstration moving toward Tiananmen on April 27.258 The April 27 
demonstration was one of the largest and most successful demonstrations ever held in 
Beijing. It was supported by the people, especially the workers, with their cheering and 
donations.
However, this protest had no concrete aim. Beyond the immediate wishes of the 
crowds for a clean sweep of China’s rampant corruption and a free press, the picture was
254 “Second Attempt to Storm Zhongnanhai,” Xinhua News Service (April 19, 1989), in FBIS-CHI-89-075 
(April 20, 1989), 24-25.
255 “Police Break Up Demonstration,” Hong Kong Domestic Sen’ice (April 19, 1989), in FBIS-CHI-89-075 
(April 20, 1989), 19-20.
250 Andrew Giarelli, “Shanghai Officials Close World Economic Herald," World Press Review , May 1990,
p 26.
237 Cited in Michael S. Serrill, “Beijing Spring,” Time May 8 1989, p 38.
238 William R. Doemer, “Come Out! Come Out!” Time, May 1, 1989, p 44. Michael S. Serrill, “Beijing 
Spring,” Time, May 8, 1989, p 37.
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blurry. According to the Time journalist Daniel Benjamin, “Democracy” was an
ambiguous word in the eyes of the demonstrators.
For some of the protesters, who have no experience and little knowledge 
of democratic practices in other countries, democracy meant the opposite 
of everything associated with Communist Party rule. “They can’t 
enumerate concretely what they wan*,” says a diplomat in Beijing, 
describing the anti-government movement as fundamentally a “scream of 
the damned.” As Grace, 19, a pig-tailed student who spent Friday night in 
Tiananmen Square, put it, “We think everything must change.”259
As time went on, most Beijing students lost their enthusiasm and went back to classes.
“As the number of demonstrators in the square dwindled to nearly none, the students
decided to employ one of civil disobedience’s most sacred weapons, the hunger
strike.”260 To encourage more students to join the protest, Wan Dan and Wu’er Kaixi,
two student leaders of this protest, proposed staging a hunger strike during Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to China. Although the proposal was turned down by
the Beijing Students Federation, about 3,000 students from Beijing University and
Beijing Normal University participated in the Hunger Strike of May 13, and it became
the focus of the protest movement. More and more people participated in the movement.
Demonstrations on May 17 and 18 attracted over one million people, including workers,
journalists, soldiers, and other citizens. Obviously, the student protest had developed into
a mass urban movement. To control the situation in Beijing, the government declared
martial law on May 20. To show their support for the hunger strike, students from all
over China flocked to Beijing. It was reported that from May 16 to 27, 80% of over
200,000 students in Tiananmen Square were from outside of Beijing.261
259 Daniel Benjamin,
260 Ibid, p. 41.
“State o f Siege,” Time, May 29, 1989, p45.
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Some of the overseas Chinese students, especially students in the U.S., also became 
involved in the 1989 Pro-democracy Movement in March. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, they were supporters of the mainland pro-democracy activities. They supported 
the Beijing Open Letter and distributed information related to pro-democracy activities 
among overseas students in March, 1989. To meet the increasing demand of the students 
for specific information on these human rights and pro-democracy issues, the China 
News Digest (CND) news group was founded by four Chinese students in the U.S. and 
Canada on March 6 1989.262
Based on their own ideological concepts as well as anger at the Chinese government
for the Tiananmen Square tragedy, most American journalists regarded the students as
the hope for Chinese democracy in the future. The praise for the students and the
criticism of the Chinese government v ere overwhelming both before and after June 4.
According to one of the New York Times reports in May, the demonstrations in Beijing
represented the “special role of students in fostering rebellion and radical politics, both of
the left and right.” 263 After June 4, a report in the Miami Herald compared the
demonstrations with the student uprising in Poland in 1968 and quoted Adam Michnik, a
famous pro-democracy activist of Poland who said: “With all my heart I support those
students in Tiananmen Square...I believe that the blood they shed will not have been
wasted. That kind of blood is never wasted.”264 Mike Chinoy, a CNN Hong Kong Bureau
Chief, gave an eye-witness account of the tragedy:
Shaking fists and chanting anti-government slogans, a large and angry 
crowd of demonstrators confronted the first contingent of People’s 
Liberation Army troops to reach the square. In the eerie light, the soldiers
262 Ziye Zhou, “Hello Friend," China News Digest, March 22 1989.
26j Seymour Martin Lipset, New York Times, May, 24, 1989.
2o4 Janies McCartney, Miami Herald, June 19, 1989.
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aimed their rifles and opened fire. Amid screams and wailing ambulance 
sirens, I saw a cluster of people just outside the [Beijing] hotel gate bundle 
one bleeding body after another into open-backed bicycle carts, bound for 
nearby hospitals.203
This account became one of the most popular reports on the Tiananmen tragedy 
and was quoted by numerous people as proof of the peaceful demonstrations of the 
students and the violence of the cruel Chinese government. Chinoy described students as 
the organizers and main participants in this protest and as the main victims of the Beijing 
officials. However, at the same Beijing Hotel, James C. Hsiung, a professor at New York 
University who witnessed the events on the night of June 3-4, argued that protestors 
attacked the soldiers prior to the troops’ opening fire. He placed actual blame for the 
tragedy equally on the government and the protesting students.265 66 Winberg Chai, a life­
long scholar of Chinese culture and politics, regarded the tragedy as: “an unfortunate 
accident as a mix of confused, unprepared army, an unyielding, angry crowd that 
included hooligans, outside agitators, [and] students whipped to a frenzy in a volatile 
mood encouraged by media attention.”267 In fact, none of the student leaders gave their 
blood to the so called pro-democracy movement. Of approximately 700 people who died 
in this tragedy in Beijing, 51 were students, and 12 were soldiers. According to Gao 
Xing, the majority of the dead were common people.268 While the Hong Kong journalists 
were criticizing the selfishness and corruption of the student leaders, Senator Edward 
Kennedy was praising their “courage to speak out and stand up for democratic 
reforms.”269
265 Mike Chinoy, “Tiananmen Part but Not All o f  Modern-day China’s Legacy,”
http: 7asi3.cnn.coni SPl£ClALS/views/v. 1999/06,chinov.tiananinen.iun2. Accessed on June 1, 2004.
260 H.R. 2712, Chinese Students in America and Human Rights in China, p 135.
267 rbid.
2oS Gao Xing, ‘How Many People Died in the June fourth Tragedy,” China Spring, July 1991.
~6<> H.R. 2712, Chinese Students in America and Human Rights in China, p 1.
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In the American government, there were two very different approaches taken to 
the Tiananmen Square tragedy. There was a desire to express moral outrage and stand up 
for democratic values that echoed the Woodrow Wilson tradition in Congress. This desire 
was also combined with an interest group that wished to limit the imports of Chinese 
textiles. On the other hand, there was a careful calculation of America's strategic 
interests which followed the realpolitik school of Henry Kissinger and his many disciples. 
From the beginning, President Bush's approach to the Chinese crackdown involved 
balancing these two conflicting tendencies in U.S. foreign policy.270 71 27
The Bush administration responded cautiously to initial reports of the tragedy. 
To protect the safety of the Chinese students in America, within hours of the events of 
Tiananmen Square, Bush ordered the Attorney General to “ensure that no nationals from 
the People’s Republic of China be deported against their will.”27iAnd no such nationals 
were subsequently deported. On June 4, Bush expressed his deep regret over “the 
decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators and the consequent loss of life.”273 
But he made no direct criticism of individual Chinese leaders. Secretary of State James 
Baker even suggested that there was perhaps some responsibility for the violence on both 
sides. He also emphasized that the U.S. did not want to interfere in the internal political 
affairs of China.274 On June 5, as a response to the tensions within the American public, 
Bush suspended arms sales to China and canceled a planned exchange of U.S. and 
Chinese military delegations. But he rejected the economic sanctions some American
270 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Transfer to China, OTA-ISC-340, p 229.
271 Peter Riddell, Financial Times. 6/23/89, p 6 .
272 Ibid.
273 David Skidmore and William Gates, “After Tiananmen: the Struggle Over U.S. Policy Toward China in 
the Bush Administration,” http://www.drake.edu/artsci PolSci-personalvvebpaae'tiananmen.html. Accessed 
on June 21, 2004.
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politicians were advocating and announced that he had no intention of recalling the U.S. 
ambassador to China. Obviously, Bush deliberately made policies to keep normal 
relations between the U.S. and China.
However, domestic pressure emerged demanding that a tougher line be taken with 
China. Public protests against the Chinese crackdown spread to cities across the country, 
including New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Houston, New Orleans, 
Philadelphia, Seattle, St. Paul, and Buffalo. Mickey Edwards (R-Okla.), fourth-ranking 
Republican in the House, described President Bush’s initial response as “timid.” At the 
same time, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Max Kampelman, head of Freedom House, 
a non-partisan organization founded by Eleanor Roosevelt for democracy and freedom 
around the world, called for sanctions.274 75
Realizing that a totally normal relationship with China was not realistic in such a 
situation, President Bush acknowledged these pressures and called upon Beijing to 
recognize the validity of the student protest movement. Eleven days later, to ease the 
overwhelming public anger at the way President Bush “kowtowed” to China, the Bush 
administration suspended World Bank loans and high level contacts with Beijing. 
However, on the same day that Bush announced the halt on high level official contact, he 
secretly sent National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, and Secretary of State, Larry 
Eagleburger, to meet Beijing officials and showed his private friendship to Deng 
Xiaoping in a secret letter in which he expressed his belief that good relations between 
the United States and China were in the fundamental interests of both countries.276 *
274
275
276 “A Secrete Letter to Deng Xiaoping from Bush,”
Accessed on June 21, 2004
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Furthermore, even as American journalists were criticizing Deng Xiaoping and the 
Beijing officials for “the massacre,” Bush praised Deng for what he “personally had done 
for the people of China and to help his country move forward”277 in the same letter 
written on June 20, 1989.
Differences of opinion between the Bush administration and many in Congress
focused on two issues. The first issue was whether or not to protect Chinese students
through legislation. The second issue was whether or not to attach conditions to the Most
Favored Nations (MFN) status for China. Congress preferred to protect Chinese students
through legislation, and tough conditional MFN status for China to “improve Chinese
human rights.” In fact, the real reason for a conditional MFN status was the increasing
tension between the U.S. and Chinese over trade issues, especially in the textile trade
after the mid-1980s. As one U.S. government agency reported:
Textiles remain the primary irritant in U.S.-China trade. The current 
bilateral textile agreement with China places import quotas on a large 
number of items and permits the United States to negotiate further quotas 
when imports disrupt the domestic market. At least 20 categories of textile 
and apparel goods were under unilateral embargo by the U.S. in the spring 
of 1987 because they were found to have injured U.S. textile producers.
China depends on export of textiles and apparel for a quarter of its export 
earnings. Exports to the United States climbed to more than $760 million 
in the first half of 1986, about a quarter of total exports to the United 
States in dollar value.278
Accompanying the rapid increase of U.S.-China trade was the negative U.S. trade 
balance. According to U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. trade balance was $-3.5 
billion in 1988. This number was added to $-6.2 billion the next year, and $-10.2 billion
278 U.S. Congress, Office o f Technology Assessment, Technology Transfer to China OTA-ISC-340, 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1987), p 229.
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in 1990.279 As Chinese exports, especially textile exports, continued to expand, some 
within Congress continued to call for the protection of U.S. industry and U.S. 
administration officials warned that rapid growth in imports would not be permitted. 
Therefore, the “Tiananmen massacre” and the following lobby for a Chinese student 
protection bill provided an excellent opportunity for Congressmen who were not in favor 
of trade with China. Compared with targeting Chinese textile exports, focusing on the 
condition of Chinese human rights could gain them more support throughout the U.S.
However, the Bush administration insisted on using an executive order to protect 
Chinese students. Thus Bush could be more flexible within his China policy in the future. 
Regarding the second issue, Bush stood firm against the bill for conditional MFN status 
for China and gave China MFN status without any amendment during his administration. 
In the intense atmosphere, many nations exerted economic sanctions against the Chinese 
government after the Tiananmen massacre. Several reasons could justify Bush’s 
controversial as well as pratical China policy after June 4 1989.
First, financial matters had been a principle issue in the eyes of the administration. 
Bilateral trade between China and America had increased from approximately $1 billion 
in 1978 to over $14 billion in 1988. China had become America’s fifth largest trading 
partner in Asia. If China could not get MFN status, which allows a country to benefit 
from lower tariffs on goods exported into the U.S., it had to pay an average tariff of 45 
percent. As a result, China would potentially lose $7 billion to $15 billion annually in 
sales to the U.S. market if MFN status was revoked or altered.280 And Americans would
279 Wayne M. Morrison, IB91121: China-U.S Trade Issues, 
http: /■•ww'w.ncseoiiliiie.oru/'NLLi/CRSrenoils-' lieonomics. econ- 
35.cfm?&CFlD=14384963&CFTOKt-:N---65S313 1 I 3. Accessed on June 11,2004.
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also lose their chance to enter this huge market. “In the aftermath of Tiananmen, new 
contracted U.S. investment in 1990 was $537 million, 44 percent lower than in the 
previous year.” However, foreign direct investment (FDI) rebounded strongly after 
1990. The U.S. supplied approximately 7.6% of the actual FDI to China from 1991 to 
1995 and became the third largest overall single supplier of FDI to China. The total 
investment had reached over $3 billion by 1995.281 82
Second, China played a critical role in Asian geopolitics and global affairs. 
Improvement in relations with the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) had been a central 
objective of the four Presidential administrations since Richard Nixon. The U.S.-China 
relationship had progressed and prospered beyond anyone’s expectations, as China had 
worked with the United States to end the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, to end the 
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and to maintain stability in the Korean Peninsula. 
Both countries realized that they shared important common security interests globally, 
especially in Asia. In Henry Kissinger’s controversial essay published in the Washington 
Post, he argued that China remained “too important for America’s national security to 
risk the relationship on the emotions of the moment .... Sooner or later, the punitive 
sanctions will fail .... And geopolitical realities will dictate a rapprochement between the 
United States and China.”28j
President Bush himself was a follower of Kissinger’s school of thought. His initial 
training in foreign affairs had come during the Nixon/Kissinger era when George Bush 
served both as the first U.S. envoy to China and as American ambassador to the United 
Nations from 1974 to 1975. Following Nixon’s and Kissinger’s realpolitik principle,
281 US Department o f  State, Background Notes-China, 1997.
282 Ibid.
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improving U.S.-China relations continued to be a central objective of President Bush. 
Immediately after the Tiananmen crackdown, Bush consulted former President Richard 
Nixon. Nixon criticized the move toward tougher sanctions and urged Bush to stand firm 
against the “strange coalition of China bashers” seeking to disrupt relations between the 
two countries.283 84
Third, President Bush’s China policy had the support of several important Chinese
issue experts. Many scholars approached the Tiananmen tragedy in a similar way to the
administration. According to Professor Roger Des Forges, an expert in immigration
history from State University of New York, Buffalo:
It was tempting to interpret the violent suppression of the movement for 
more democracy in China in June 1989 as just the most recent proof that 
China lacks a strong tradition of democracy.. ..During the first few 
millennia of their history, Chinese and westerners developed in relative 
isolation from one another and naturally adopted rather distinctive 
approaches to democracy. Their preferred ideas, institutions, and states 
probably conformed rather well to their different physical environments, 
demographic structures, social systems, and economic organizations....
Further, we Americans might admit that our policies toward China have 
rarely placed the goal of democracy in China ahead of our own economic 
and strategic advantages.285
In short, Des Forges was saying three things: that what happened on June 4 did not 
prove that China lacked a strong tradition of democracy; that the Chinese approach to 
democracy is different from the Westerners’; and that Americans almost always put their 
own economic and strategic interests ahead of the goal of Chinese democracy. By saying 
this, Des Forges supported the idea that the Chinese might develop democracy according 
to their specific environments, demographic structures, social systems, and economic
283 Henry Kissinger, Washington Post, 1 August 1989, A21.
284 David Skidmore & William Gates, “After Tiananmen : The Straggle over U.S. Policy toward China in 
the Bush Administration,” http://www.drake.edu/artsci/PolSci.personalwchpaue, viananmen.html. Accessed 
on June 21, 2004.
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organizations. Meanwhile, historically and practically, Americans had always placed 
their own economic and strategic interests ahead of the goal of democracy in China.
Des Forges was not the only scholar who analyzed the tragedy and China policy 
from this realistic and historic perspective. Professor Winberg Chai from University of 
Wyoming in his testimony before a House committee argued that the “U.S.-China 
relationship must progress....it was critical to the political stability of China. And it was 
also important to the peace and stability of the world.”285 86
A fourth possible explanation for the President’s reaction to the Chinese crisis was 
the close relationship between the Bush family and China. When Bush was a special 
envoy to China in 1975, Deng Xiaoping was in charge of the negotiations between the 
U.S. and China as the representative of Beijing. Once Bush was placed in the position of 
the CIA director, Deng, as the vice Premier of P.R.C. congratulated him. Soon after Bush 
lost his job as the CIA director in 1979, the Chinese government invited him to visit 
China with a large delegation, including Mr. Baker, Mr. Lilley, and Chase Untermeyer, 
who were regarded as members of the “Bush Clan.” During this visit to China, Bush 
informed the Chinese that he planned to run for president in 1980 and discussed with 
Deng, the new leader of the Chinese government, prospects for developing China’s 
offshore oil industry.287
285 Roger V. Des Forges, “Democracy in Chinese History,” Chinese Democracy and the Crisis o f  1989, 
Chinese and American Reflections, p21, 37, 45.
286 H.R.2712, Chinese Students in America and Human Rights in China, pl78-179.
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A tour of Tibet, which had been closed to westerners since 1949, was also granted to 
the Bush delegation as a rare privilege. Yang Jiechi, the interpreter for the delegation on 
the 16-day journey (and a future vice foreign minister of China,) happened to be the 
person who received the personal message from Bush during Untermeyer’s secret 
mission to Beijing in late 1989. In this letter, President Bush expressed the American 
people’s regret over the Tiananmen tragedy, and stated his willingness to preserve the 
normal relationship that had been cherished and developed by five presidential 
administrations over the previous two decades.288
By late 1989, Canada and Australia were offering permanent residency to the 
Chinese students who were currently studying in either country.289 Bush’s veto of the 
Pelosi bill, the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, highlighted the 
conflicts between the administration and Congress. In the veto letter titled “Memorandum 
of Disapproval for the Bill Providing Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief,” President 
Bush described what happened in Tiananmen Square as “the even’.s” rather than “the 
massacre” which was the term used by the press and Congress. Although he used 
“violence” and “repression” later in the same letter, he also expressed his belief that “the 
[Chinese] leaders would return to the policy of reform pursued before June 3,” a belief 
with which few Congresspersons agreed.290 This veto demonstrated that at least by 
November 31, 1989, Bush still cherished a good relationship with Beijing and tried to 
keep the flexibility to revise China policy in the future.
288 Ibid.
289 Lome Waldman, LL.B., Memo on “Special Program” for Chinese Students in China,” China News 
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The bill vetoed by President Bush had been proposed by Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), a 
freshman in Congress who had been elected to the House in 1986. If Bush signed the bill, 
it would waive the two-year residence requirement. The “two-year rule” is an American 
legal regulation that applies to people issued J-l visas. This regulation requires that a 
person reside outside of the Unites States for two years following the time in which he or 
she has been issued a J-l visa in the United States. Meeting this requirement, the person 
is eligible to apply for an immigrant visa or specific categories of nonimmigrant visas.291 29
Bush’s new executive orders stated in this November, 1989 memorandum provided the 
same protection which the Pelosi bill offered to the Chinese students, even as he vetoed 
the bill itself. These orders included:
irrevocable waiver of the 2-year home country residence requirement which may 
be exercised until January 1, 1994; (2) assurance of continued lawful 
immigration status for individuals who were lawfully in the United States on 
June 5, 1989; (3) authorization for employment of Chinese nationals present in 
the United States on June 5, 1989; and (4) notice of expiration of nonimmigrant 
status, rather than institution of deportation proceedings, for individuals eligible 
for deferral of enforced departure whose nonimmigrant status has expired.29'
Angry at Bush’s action, on January 23, 1990, Congress organized Hearing H.R.
2712 to override his veto. With the support of the thirty-seven Republican Senators who
voted for the President, Bush won the first fight with Congress on Chinese student issues.
However, the conflicts between the administration and Congress continued.
In September 1991, three American congresspersons, Nancy Pelosi, Ben Jones, and
John Miller, went to Tiananmen Square and placed three white flowers there,
291 See “Two-Year Rule” in Definitions in this thesis.
292 George Bush, Memorandum of Disapproval for the Bill Providing Emergency Chinese Immigration 
Relief, November 30, 1989, http: bushlibrarv.iamu.edu research-papers 1989 891 13002.html. Accessed on 
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symbolizing “liberty, justice and democracy.”293 They also announced that “those who 
died here on June 4, 1989, did not die in vain. They were martyrs to these principles that 
we all hold dear, and they were catalysts to extraordinary changes that we see taking 
place throughout the world.”294
All of this praise for Chinese democratic activists was consistent with the statements 
Senator Gorton had made during the hearings on H.R.2712: First, he denied that the 
current Chinese government was a legal government, applauded Chinese students’ 
actions, and regarded them as fighters for justice and democracy. Second, he argued that 
a communist society was a world without democracy, and that any act against a 
communist country was one in support of democracy. So, what the students had done in 
1989, was both legal and good in the Congresspersons’ eyes. By this logic, what the 
Chinese government had done was illegal and evil. For instance, on Thursday, July 20, 
1989, Bruce Morrison, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, 
and International Law in the Judiciary Committee, characterized the actions of the 
Chinese government as “the overall suppression of the movement for democracy in 
China.”295 He also said that the United States should not only express its dismay to the 
leaders of China and the international community, but they should make every effort to 
protect the Chinese nationals currently in this country from the risk of harm from this 
vindictive government.296
293 David Holley, “American Create Stir with Tian An men Memorial China: Three members o f Congress 
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Supported by the press and the public, especially the 40,000 Chinese students in 
America, the Democrats initialed more and more bills on issues related to China. Among 
these, the student protection bill and the conditional MFN status for China bill were the 
most important. Combined with the student web-based lobbying campaign, their tireless 
effort led to the passage of the CSPA in 1992.
In conclusion, the incoherence in China policy between the Democrat-controlled 
Capitol Hill and the White House reflected the tensions of the late cold war era. China 
and the U.S. had had a common interest in resisting the threat of the Soviet Union at the 
time of Nixon’s visit. However, with the Cold War winding down by the latel980s, this 
“common interest” gradually lost its importance and conflicts could no longer be easily 
overlooked. Even before the Tiananmen Tragedy of 1989, China and the U.S. had 
clashed over economic issues and the future of Taiwan. Ever since June 1989, new issues 
had been raised regarding human rights and arms sales. In effect, both Congress and the 
President were seeking to adjust America’s China policy in order to best serve U.S. 
interests at the beginning of the post-Cold War era. Congressional Democrats argued for 
a hard line, threatening economic or diplomatic sanctions if Beijing did not yield to the 
U.S. demands. Assuming that time was on the U.S. side, the Bush administration and 
many in the private sector who had commercial relationships with China argued for a 
softer line that relied on carrots, not sticks. This struggle between a Presidential 
commitment to constructive engagement and a Congressional sword of Damocies had 
been shaped by the intense struggle between the Capitol Hill and the White House.
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CHAPTER VI
IFCSS AND THE CHINESE STUDENT PROTECTION ACT 
After June 4, 1989, many Chinese students in America participated in protest rallies 
to demonstrate their anger at the massacre at Tiananmen Square. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
government developed a “blacklist” of more than 40 demonstration leaders and labeled 
them “most wanted.” Some of them, such as Wang Dan, were quickly arrested by the 
police. Others managed to leave China and went to western countries. For example, Feng 
Congde and Chai Lin went to Hong Kong and then to France. Chai Lin is now an 
American citizen. Under the circumstances, the U.S. Congress spared no effort to see that 
the safety of Chinese students in America and Chinese human rights protestors was 
protected. In turn, the Chinese government accused the United States of violating the 
agreement for the return of Chinese students on the groundless assumption that they 
would be persecuted once they returned.
In fact, a collective refusal to go back had already been proposed by overseas 
Chinese students as a way of punishing their government. On May 19, immediately after 
the declaration of martial law in Beijing, a graduate student at Michigan State University 
sensed a crackdown by the government.297 As this student put it in the China News 
Digest,
It is now 10:39 pm 5-18 in Beijing. The government ordered students to 
leave TAM (Tiananmen) square by midnight. Zhao Ziyang has apparently 
resigned. The official loudspeaker in TAM order [ordered] all high school
2<)' "Extreme Emergency in Beijing Right Now,” China News Digest, May 19, 1989.
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and primary school students to leave now. Everybody knows what does it 
mean [it means].... Student leaders announced a news conference right at 
midnight. I can hardly express my feeling. It seems that if the worst does 
happen, we oversee [overseas] students can only refused [refuse] to go 
back collectively.298
In the same newsletter, a graduate student at the University of Indiana wanted “to 
do something really helpful,” including organizing a nation-wide protest by Chinese 
students in the United States. Interestingly, in the four e-mails responding to the 
declaration of martial law, nobody mentioned how best to protect themselves because 
they thought they were “in a much safer position” than students in mainland China.299 In 
fact, many overseas students did not regard their safety as a big issue, at least prior to 
June 4, 1989. Some of them considered not going back to China collectively as a great 
punishment for the Chinese government. These 40,000 Chinese students living in the 
U.S. knew that they were very talented individuals and were of great value to China.300
Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) first appeared in the pages of China News Digest a 
week after the Tiananmen tragedy. She denounced the government in Beijing and 
accused it of moving “outside the circle of human behavior when they killed their own 
children” in her speech titled “Mourn for the Freedom Martyrs.”301 Pelosi was also the 
first U.S. politician who proposed a bill to protect Chinese nationals in the U.S., a 
proposal that received universal support from overseas Chinese students. The grass-root 
lobbying campaign organized by the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and 
Scholars (IFCSS) was one of the most important factors contributing to the future 
passage of CSPA. IFCSS was a national Chinese student presence in the United States
299 Ji Han, “Serious happening On Its Way!!!” China News Digest, May 19, 1989.
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with the support of China News Digest (CND), an independent electronic publication. 
CND was formed at the same Chicago meetings (July 29 to July 31, 1989), at which 
iFCSS was established.301 02 Pooling the resources of three existing Chinese electronic 
forums -  ENCS, the News Digest, and the China News Group -  CND was the most 
influential Chinese electronic news group from the day it was formed at the First 
Congress of Chinese Students and Scholars in the U.S.303
This new electronic publication had all the characteristics of a mature 
communications organization: an editorial board, style guidelines, and an organized 
distribution network. In early September, it began operation and published compilations 
of American news, news of Chinese students in Canada, and news from China. More than 
4,000 Chinese students entered their names into the subscription list. Some of these direct 
subscribers were local student activist leaders and some were students in engineering or 
computer science who had access to the network in the late 1980s and early 1990s. After 
they received information by e-mail, they distributed the messages to local students 
through their associations or local e-mail lists. As a result of this collective effort, CND 
became the new Chinese student “community center” within a few weeks.
At the peak of the popularity of CND, the electronic news group helped IFCSS to 
efficiently and economically organize approximately 40,000 Chinese students who were 
scattered in universities throughout North America. For instance, CND provided daily 
reports on the debates surrounding the Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA) during the 
summer of 1992. According to the publication of July 28, 1992, a special report on the
301 Cited from Les Earnest, Associated Press, “Two Men Saying They Work at Consulate Announce 
Defection at Rally,” China News Digest, June 11, 1989. CND posted this information without permission.
302 “A Brief Introduction to Dr. Yang Jianli’s Activities in Promoting China’s Democratization,”
Into:.-''.■'www.chinaeweeklv.con. iianliact.htm. Accessed on June 20, 2004
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Status of the PRC National Protection Bill was issued by IFCSS headquarters dealing 
with their concern about the bill. First, it informed the students that the bill was in the 
House Rules Committee (HRC) and explained the function of the HRC. Second, it urged 
the students to call concerned Congressional representatives, members of the Judiciary 
Committee, and members of the Rules Committee. It also gave suggestions on what to 
say when students made phone calls. Third, it identified the number of the bill (SI216), 
and asked the students to lobby for a closed rule, which would prevent further 
amendments to the bill. Fourth, it reported the result of the Haitian amendment and 
analyzed the possibility of Bush’s veto of the CSPA.304
It was at this crucial moment that the IFCSS headquarters distributed the special
report on the Status of the PRC National Protection Bill, which contained instructions on
what Chinese students could do to save S1216. These instructions were clear and
concrete. For example, through CND’s e-mails IFCSS advised the students on how to
make a phone call to a Congressional delegate. IFCSS first told them that if they
telephoned personally, one sentence was enough. To convince the Chinese students who
had never made such a call to do so, the organizer carefully explained the reasons for
such a call by describing the routine work at the office of a Congressperson:
Congressmen receive tens or hundreds [of] calls a day on a certain issue, 
they do not remember who said what. They just keep a record of how 
many messages [are] received on a bill and how many [messages] support
31)3 Bo Xiong, “The Make [Making] of China News Digest
,l)4 The Haitian amendment was proposed by Michigan Congressman Conyers to give permanent residency 
status to Haitian refugees. Chinese students and some supporters of S 1216 had insisted on rejecting this 
amendment because they thought this amendment would increase the chances for the defeat of this bill. 
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and how many oppose the bill. On this level [individual lobbying level], 
the NUMBER of calls is the key.305
By telling the Chinese students that the number of personal phone calls was the only 
thing that mattered, the above information successfully diminished the fear of students 
who had never called a Congressperson; at the same time, it encouraged them to make as 
many phone calls as possible.
Sending Christmas cards to both concerned and opposed Congressional delegates 
was another strategy. For example, Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) — a supporter of 
President Bush’s China policy who opposed the student protection bill — received 
approximately 1,000 Christmas cards from Chinese students. The number was more than 
he got from his own state. This outpouring of cards supported Simpson’s earlier warning 
in a Senate speech that the Chinese students are “tough. . . . They have fax machines. 
They have used the computer systems of every major university. . . . They are good and 
they know exactly what they are doing.”306
Another factor that contributed to the success of the Chinese students’ lobbying 
movement was the free legal support they received from east coast lawyers. The students 
were supported by the Washington law firm of Arent, Fox, Kitner, Plotkin, and Kahn 
which had lawyers who were active in federal, state, and municipal bodies prior to 
joining the firm. It is not clear why the attorneys served Chinese students without charge. 
One possibility is that the attorneys’ own politics were aligned with those of the students. 
Whatever the reason, the attorneys had “been very helpful” according to CND’s report on 
July 31, 1992. For instance, sample letters, talking points, bill analyses, and a nine-page
305 Ibid.
306 Norman Matloff, “A Fax on Both Your Houses,”
http;/ heather.cs.ucdavis.edit'nub/1mmii*ration/AsvRcf/C’SPA.hunt. Accessed on June 20, 2004.
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lobby strategy were all prepared by John Mitchell, one of the lawyers of Arent Fox. 
Mitchell usually faxed documents to the headquarters of IFCSS. Then, Zhao Flaiching 
immediately made the materials available to Chinese students by using electronic mail. 
Comparing the documents with the earlier report on the status of the PRC National 
Protection Bill, it seems fairly clear that the report was also written under the guidance of 
John Mitchell. For instance, the suggested letter in the report and the sample letters in the 
document were identical. It was also likely that it was the attorneys who gave advice to 
Zhao Haiching, so he could respond quickly and properly on the issue of the Haitian 
refugees.
Interestingly, the CSPA finally signed by President Bush was drafted by the 
Republicans in Congress, and aimed to enhance the Republicans’ control of policies 
related to China. Its purpose was to “provide for the adjustment of status under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of certain nationals of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) unless conditions permit their return in safety to that foreign state.”307 The Act 
authorized the Department of Justice to grant permanent resident status to PRC nationals 
who were in the U.S. after June 4, 1989, and before April 11, 1990, unless the President 
certified by July 1, 1993. that it was safe for such individuals to return to the PRC.
The Protection Act was based on the premise that it was unsafe for the Chinese 
students to return to China. But was it really unsafe for Chinese students to go back to 
China after June 4, 1989? According to Chinese government accounts, the government 
promised to be lenient with students who returned, even if they had been misled into 
protesting the Chinese government’s crackdown on the uprising without knowing the
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truth. It also insisted that it had not been monitoring protestors in America.307 08 For people 
who doubted the credibility of the Chinese government, the following information from 
an IFCSS document might have seemed more reliable:
According to a cable from the U.S. Consul in Shanghai, China, over 
120 returning [students]....who had come to China for various reasons 
were interviewed [as they prepared to go back to the U.S.]. Not one 
reports any problem with the authorities.30
Another example is related to the experiences of Xun Ge. Xun Ge was a leader of 
IFCSS and a graduate student at Texas A&M University. According to his account, 
although the Chinese authorities trailed and harassed him while in China in December 
1990, Xun Ge returned to America safely.310 Assuming that students’ safely returning to 
the U.S. from China would undermine the Act’s credibility and thus its chances for 
implementation,”311 the “IFCSS broadcast a computer message in October 1992 and 
urged the students to postpone visits back to China until the Act was implemented in 
1 9 9 3  ” 3i2 2 U0 Daying’s experiences also strengthened the argument that overseas 
Chinese could go back to China safely. Zuo’s husband benefited from the CSPA and 
received his green card in 1993. But Zuo came to America after April 11, 1992, so she 
had to apply to be an American permanent resident as the spouse of her husband. It took 
her two years to get the green card and this long process postponed their visit to China. 
After both had received green cards, Zuo and her family went back to China and visited
307 “Chinese Student Protection Act o f 1992,” CIS NO: 92-PL102-404, http://wwvv.cpas.c.u- 
tokvo.ac.ip/cis/asia/ent>/92-PL 102-404.html. Accessed on June 20, 2004.
308 “WHAT’S NEW”, Friday, 7 July 1989 Washington, DC. 
http://wvvw.eps.org/aps/WN/WNS9Avn070789.htrnl. Accessed on June 20, 2004.
309 Norman Matloff, “A Fax on Both Your Houses,”
http:, heather.cs.ncdavis.edu/nub/Fnimiaration/AsvRefyCSPA.html. Accessed on June 21, 2004.
310 Gary Lee, The Washington Post, “Chinese Students Urge U.S. to Press Beijing for Human Rights 
Concessions; White House Insists Trading Status Be Extended Without Conditions,” June 5, 1991.
311 Norman Matloff, A Fax on Both Your Houses,
http://heather.es.ueda vis.edu/rmb/lmmiuration/AsvRef'C'SPA,html. Accessed on June 22, 2004.
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their relatives in August 1995. They went back to China again in 1997, 2000, and 2002, 
and did not encounter any harassment at the hands of the Chinese government.312 13
Obviously, fear of being persecuted if they went back was not the primary reason 
most of the Chinese students asked for protection from the U.S. government. As was 
discussed in Chapter Four, less than 10% of overseas Chinese students had been involved 
in the pro-democracy protests in the U.S. by June 4, 1989. Of those who had been active 
protestors in the U.S., dozens of them were on the unwelcome lists of the Chinese 
government. Indeed, even in the case of Xun Ge, it is likely that he was trailed because of 
his effort, while in Beijing, to contact Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming, two prominent 
Chinese dissidents who were jailed.314
Also quite telling in this regard is a debate between two Chinese students at
Stanford University in February 1992. During a discussion on whether or not the
Association of Chinese Students and Scholars at Stanford (ACSSS) should sign an open
letter to protest Li Peng’s visit to the UN, ACSSS board members who opposed a
collective signing argued that it would be a political act and might put students at risk.
However, another student, Li Xiaorong, rejected this analysis. As Li put it,
This concern is reasonable. But in the past year, people who have 
done more serious things have gone back to China without being 
punished....if you sign as an organization, no individual will be picked 
out.315
In fact, what happened after the Chinese nationals obtained their green cards also 
strengthened the argument that both U.S. Congress and IFCSS offered false reasons for
312 ibid.
313 Linxiang Zhu, Chinese Students and Scholars in Grand Forks, tape 11.
J'4 Chen Zhuo, “I will be with Juntao When He Is in Hot Water,” China Spring, June 1991.
315 “Stanford CSS A Board of Directors Resign for Blocking Protest Letter,” China News Digest, February 
22, 1989.
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asking for protection from the U.S. government. After 1994, a sudden rush of Chinese 
nationals returning to the mainland appeared in the U.S. Chinese communities and this 
clearly indicated a minimal amount of fear.316 With a green card, these Chinese would not 
have to apply for an entry visa when they reentered America, but they were not 
guaranteed freedom from persecution in China as they were still Chinese citizens, 
holding Chinese passports. Theoretically they could be forcibly detained in China if the 
Chinese government wanted to find fault with them. The whole idea of protecting 
students and granting them green cards was so they would not have to go back to China. 
But many did go back almost immediately after they got their green cards.317
The real basis of the protection act might have been rooted in the desires of the 
students who had their own reasons for punishing the Chinese government or for personal 
reasons such as career, economic, and academic concerns. The Congressmen and 
Congresswomen who supported the CSPA also had their own reasons for influencing 
President Bush’s China policy, particularly on issues regarding the MFN trade status and 
the coming election.
In the eyes of IFCSS leaders, the Act was a punishment for the Chinese 
government as well as a way to influence Chinese domestic policy. The leaders of the 
1989 protests did not need the CSPA because they were immediately granted permanent 
residency in the U.S. when they asked for political asylum. But the act did serve as a 
wonderful opportunity “to tell the Chinese government that if it doesn’t want to suffer a
316 Fu Xuanning, “Impact o f  the 1993 Chinese Student Protection Act on American and Chinese Societies,” 
Journal o f  Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 95, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 3.
31' Norman Matloff, A Fax on Both Your Houses,
http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/pub/lmniiiiration/AsvRefyCSPA.html. Accessed on June 22, 2004. Also 
supported by Zeng Huiyan, “June Fourth Green Card Holders, Chinese American’s Valuable Political 
Assets,” World Journal, September 5, 2004.
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brain drain, it can change its ways.”318 According to Zhao Haiching, “the only way that 
the government will improve its human rights record is under pressure by the U.S. and 
other countries in the West.”319
The Chinese Student Protection Act was also valuable for these democratic 
activists in the United States. Without the 40,000 Chinese students and scholars, they 
would lose potential followers who could support them financially. As IFCSS 
representative Gao Hong put it,
The minimum budget of IFCSS is about $200,000, including salaries, rent, 
communication, travel, etc. Is it very difficult to get $200,000? I don’t 
think so. If we had 10,000 students join the insurance plan (a health 
insurance plan initiated by the 1991 term’s IFCSS Headquarters), we will 
get $200,000. We have 40,000 students and scholars in the US. If our plan 
is a good one, if it is competitive, we should be confident about this. I 
think this should be our direction.320
When Gao Hong gave this talk, IFCSS had total expected expenditures of 
$17,800. Its cash available was $17,071.34. That meant if its headquarters paid every bill 
on time and received no further funding, it would “run out of money either in later 
February or early March.”321 Therefore, gaining support from local Chinese community 
and conducting fund-raising successfully was crucial to the survival of IFCSS.
Several activists’ “Cash and Deposit Theory” regarding the student protection act 
is another important perspective which helps explain the overseas democrats’ support for 
the Act. As Ding Chu put it in an interview in 1992, a student who immediately went 
back to China was “cash” which could be consumed right away by the Chinese people, 
while students who chose to stay in the U.S. were “long term certificate deposits” which
318 K. Connie Kang, “Chinese Students Fight for Residency Immigration,” The Los Angeles Times, Oct 4, 
1992.
319 Ibid.
320 Wu Fang, “CND Interviewed IFCSS (Part II): IFCSS's Financial Operation,” February 21, 1992.
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would mature in the future. Therefore, both cash and certificate deposits were valuable to 
the Chinese people.* 322 *For instance, in the 1950s, Qian Xueseng and other scholars in the 
U.S. chose to go back to China. These scientists and scholars were Chinese’s cash. 
However, other Chinese Americans, such as Zhenning Yang and T.D. Lee, chose to stay 
in American for a variety of reasons. These scientists were certificate deposits according 
to the “cash and deposit theory” because they greatly contributed to the development of 
modem Chinese science and technology as was discussed in the previous chapters.
This “theory” was sparked by the prominent dissident Chen Ziming when he said 
farewell to Ding Chu before Ding left China for America. Early in 1986, Chen Ziming 
established the Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (BSESI), the 
first and biggest private social science research institute in “socialist” China. Chen had 
been the president of this institute for three years when he was arrested after June 4th for 
having been a “Black Hand” of the 1989 pro-democracy Movement.32 'Chen was also 
one of the very few people who decided to stay in China and face the charges of the 
Chinese government. He was sentenced to thirteen years in jail. It is this dissident who 
regarded “Chucai Yu Haiwai” (educating specialists overseas) as important as the pro- 
democratic activities he and his fellows were participating in, in China, because he 
believed that it was more difficult to build a new world than to destroy an old one, and
’2I Wu Fang, “Report on IFCSS’s Financial Operation (An Excerpt)," China News Digest, February 21, 
1992.
3'2 Ding Chu, “Green Card, Certificate, and Back Up,” China Spring, August 1992.
j23 Committee to Protect Journalists: “Chen Ziming Completes 13-Year Prison Sentence,"
http: \vw w.cpi.onz news. 2002 China 17oct02na.html. Accessed on November 1, 2004. “Black Hand” is
what the Chinese government called Wang Bingzhang and Chen Ziming for their roles and activities in the
1989 Student Pro-democracy Movement.
120
that this new Chinese rorld be hoped for would need many well-educated and 
democratically-inclined leaders.324
Secondly, and probably of greater importance was this: in the eyes of the majority of
overseas students who had little concern for politics, the protection act would help them
achieve their American dream sooner. According to China specialist Leo A. Orleans, in
the later 1980s the reason why Chinese scholars chose to stay in the U.S. centered
on inadequate compensation and generally poor living conditions in 
China; on the residual mistrust of intellectuals, recurrent intrusions of the 
state into the lives of individuals, and the related political considerations; 
and, for scientific personnel, China’s inability to provide them with 
facilities, equipment, and projects that will challenge and satisfy their 
professional abilities and ambitions.325
However, the majority of these scholars were J-l holders and had to go back to China and 
serve state institutions for at least two years before they applied for an immigrant visa. 
Under the President’s Executive Order of 1990, this two-year service restriction was 
waived for J-l students. Even if their passports had expired and were not renewed by the 
Chinese government, they could still have legal status and be eligible to apply for 
permanent residency by January 1994.
For students who were F-l holders, the President’s Executive Order served as a 
work permit because it authorized them to work off campus. This relief became more 
significant when the job market, especially the physics market, became tight in 1989 and 
reached its lowest point around 1992 and 1993.326 According to physics Professor Tao 
Rongjia at Columbia University, several factors contributed to the situation:
325 Leo A. Orleans, Chinese Students In America: Policies. Issues, and Numbers, p 116.
326 Li Xiaolin, “Interview with Tao Rongjia.” hup: ustcar.uslc.edu.cn'Interviews.iao ri.htnil. Accessed on 
June 22, 2004.
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Layoffs of US defense industrial physicists and engineers 
following the end of the Cold War, shrinking research funding in physical 
science, and influx of physicists from Russia and East European countries 
to the US job market. It was a pity situation that many talentfed] young 
physics itudents were forced to leave physics because of shortage of 
physics jobs during that period [1989-1996].327
Considering that over 20% of the Chinese students and scholars were in physics 
in 1986, and that almost 20% of graduate students were in physics, it is clear that these 
“talented young physics students” were the very people who were forced to leave physics 
after they completed their studies. Without the President Executive Order (PEO), it would 
be very difficult for many of them to find a decent job due to the situation in the physics 
job market as well as their non-permanent resident status. For students who had not 
finished their study, the President Executive Order served as a work permit and working 
off campus legally might greatly improve their income.
For people who were married, this legal ability to work became even more 
important because they could now earn enough money in the U.S. to bring their spouses 
to America. Guo Danping’s experience illustrated the importance of CSPA for her 
family. Guo’s husband, Zeng Huawei, came to the U.S. as a J-l scholar in 1990. Then 
Zeng brought Guo Danping to the U.S. and changed his status to F-l after April 11, 1991. 
Without the President’s Executive Order, it would have been far more difficult for Zeng 
to change his status from J-l to F-l. Then in 1993, Zeng applied for the permanent 
resident status according to the Chinese Student Protection Act. Although she arrived in 
the U.S. after April 11, 1991, Guo Danping also applied for a green card as the spouse of 
Zeng. She got her green card in two years. The procedure for her application was much
327 Ibid.
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simpler than for other Chinese who applied for their green cards with the support of their 
employers.
According to Leo A. Orleans, 54% of 2,519 J-l Chinese were married in 198 5.328 
Prior to 1984, the number of visas issued to J-l holders’ family members was below 100. 
However, this number increased to 318 in 1984 and 2,030 in 1985. Despite the clear 
statement by Chinese officials that the issuance of permits for spouses to apply for visas 
to join their student mates would be drastically restricted, the number of visas for J-l 
holders’ family members continued to be above 2,000.329 That meant that 90% of J-l 
holding Chinese eventually brought their spouses to the U.S. Moreover, once they arrived 
in the U.S., many of the spouses become students in their own right. This extremely large 
increase in J-l holders’ family members played a crucial role in the late 1980s brain drain 
phenomenon. The arrival of their family members undoubtedly influenced the return 
decisions of J-l holders. It was the arrival of family members that made the decision of 
extending the stay or permanently staying in the U.S. more desirable. Usually, it took a 
Chinese student seven to ten years to go through his or her process of getting a U.S. 
degree, finding a job, and receiving a green card. For most Chinese who benefited from 
CSPA, it only took half a year to two years for them to get green cards. That is 
undoubtedly a great advantage.
Ironically, this protection act might also have been very desirable in the eyes of 
many high ranking Chinese officials. According to Fang Lizhi, the Associate Director of 
the Chinese Education Department, Teng Teng, telephoned the American Embassy in 
Beijing to protest the President Executive Order (PEO). Only one hour later, his secretary
28 Leo A. Orleans, Chinese Students in America, Policies, Issues, and Numbers, p 98.
329 Ibid., p 96.
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telephoned the U.S. ambassador to arrange an appointment for Teng’s wife. As it turned 
out, Teng’s wife wanted to apply for a U.S. visa because her four children were all in the 
U.S. Therefore they were all protected by the PEO and became permanent residents of 
the United States. 330 Another official, Yuan Mu, shared the same experiences. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, the offspring of high ranking officials had been among the 
first group of the seventh wave of overseas studies, including Deng Zhifang, the youngest 
child of Deng Xiaoping.331 Deng Zhifang and his wife both studied physics at the 
University of Rochester. Their son was bom in Rochester and is a U.S. citizen. Another 
example is the offspring of former President Jiang Zeming. Of two sons, the eldest, Jiang 
Mianheng received his Ph.D. in electrical engineering from a U.S. university. He is 
currently a vice president of CAS, China’s top government think-tank. The younger son, 
Jian Miankang, studied in Germany and currently works for a German company, 
Siemens.332 Therefore, China specialist Gao Xin argued that many Chinese Communists 
secretly welcomed CSPA because numerous offspring of CCP officials would benefit 
from this Act.333
The CSPA and its related bills served other purposes as well, in that it helped 
Congressional Democrats get the support of the Chinese students in America in order to 
pass their bill granting conditional MFN status for China. In effect, the Democrats hoped 
to gain the support from the overseas Chinese community as they bargained with 
President Bush on his China policy. This explained why when some students complained
330 Xiao Yang. “Fang Lizhi Discussed with Students in Berlin,”
http:;/people.freenet.de/chinatowTV''Theme/History 64.htm. Accessed on June 23, 2004.
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about the MFN bill, the congresspersons were so angry that they criticized the students 
for their selfishness, being concerned only with getting their green cards rather than with 
Chinese human rights.32 34 Although a freshman in the House, Nancy Pelosi, a Democratic 
Representative from a San Francisco district containing a large population of Chinese- 
Americans, showed an acute sense of politics in making good use of this wonderful 
opportunity. She met Zhao Haiching and warned him that the students could not argue 
against the MFN bill if they wanted the CSPA.335 *After this meeting, Zhao Haiching 
posted a report on China News Digest to inform his readers about the key points of the 
meeting and to urge the students to support the Congress on the MFN b ill/36
The CSPA also served as an important bargaining chip for Democrats who led the 
negotiations between Congress and the Bush administration. If Bush lost control of the 
Chinese student bill, he would lose a critical card dealing with the Chinese government, 
for after the bill became law, it might be too difficult for President Bush to grant favors to 
the Chinese government by using his executive power to send the Chinese students back 
to China. Realizing its importance, President Bush had vetoed H. R. 2712 on December 
30, 1989 and successfully lobbied the Republicans in Congress to support him. Thus the 
Senate failed to override Bush’s veto in January 1990. According to Senator Alfonse M. 
D’Amato (R-N.Y.), although he supported the students “spiritually, he had to vote with
332 “Jiang Zeming: President, People’s Republic o f China,”
http: 'www.chinaonlinc.com/rcfcr/bioaraohies/securc/REV-Xemin3.asp. Accessed on June 23, 2004.
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the President.”337 According to Zhao Haiqing, the Republicans “played it as a partisan 
issue, as Democrats against Republicans. . . . [The Chinese students were] the victim of 
their politics.”338
Zhao Haiqing’s criticism of the Republicans was also true of the Democrats. 
Congressional delegates who wanted to put riders on the bill represented another 
interesting aspect of this complicated bill. For instance, Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) of the 
Black Caucus tried to attach a measure that would have granted temporary U.S. residency 
for 11,000 Haitian refugees. Rep. Jack Brooks (D-TX) and others supported this 
amendment. Fearing this would kill the bill, Zhao Haiqing instantly and successfully 
organized a campaign against the rider with the assistance of John Mitchell, Nancy 
Pelosi, and Sen. Slade Gorton (R-WA).
This bill was favored by the congressmen who were concerned with the severe 
shortage of people with doctorates in science and engineering. Earlier on June 30, 1989, 
American Physical Society (APS) President James Krumhansl urged the key members of 
Congress to take legislative action to enable Chinese students and scholars on J-l visas to 
apply for permanent resident status because they “could still be placed in grave personal 
jeopardy when they return to China . . . .  These young people are among the most 
brilliant and dedicated researchers in the world.”339 Senator Gorton’s statement reflected 
the opinions of the Congressmen influenced by this idea. At the hearing of H.R. 2712 on 
January 23, 1990, Senator Gorton said if “worst came to worst for those students, and 
they all stayed here permanently, my rough guess is they would probably increase the
337 Marianne Yen, “Chinese Students Feel Let Down by Senate Vote; D ’Amato Called ‘Key’ in Failure to 
Override,” the Washington Post, Jan 27, 1990.
338 Ibid.
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gross national product of the United States by about 1 percent by reason of their skills. 
They are exactly the kind of people we would like to have as Americans.”39 40
The U.S. as a whole, and the Chinese students in America, benefited from this act. 
Its enactment helped approximately 80,000 Chinese students attain their American 
dream. It meant economic, academic, and ideological opportunities for these young 
Chinese. It also accelerated in two ways the trend of Chinese students’ going to America 
to study. The first was through peer pressure among schoolmates. In this atmosphere of 
“going abroad fever,” many Chinese students and young lecturers came to the U.S. after 
June 4. For example, there was an instructor at Beihang University who had participated 
in the April 27 grand protest. He was from a small town in Hunan province and had no 
plan to study abroad at first. As the son of a high school mathematics teacher who had 
become an instructor at a nationally known university, he had been satisfied with his 
achievement and his $25 monthly pay until his graduate school classmates left Beijing for 
the U.S. one by one. Realizing that he was being left behind by his peers, this instructor 
decided to take the TOEFL and GRE exams in order to go to the U.S. It took him two 
years to prepare for the two tests. When he finally went to the U.S., he was already in his 
thirties. Of his sixty college classmates, approximately thirty became overseas students or 
scholars. 341 This peer pressure was even stronger in the top ten Chinese universities. One 
graduate student from Beida claimed that over ninety percent of his college classmates
339 WHAT’S NEW, Friday, 30 June 1989 Washington, DC.
Into: www.cns.M'u aps/WN WN89 \vn063089.html. Accessed on June 2, 2004.
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were in the U.S.342 A survey in 2000 revealed that 70 percent of students at China’s top 
five universities planned to study abroad, most of them in the U.S.343
This trend of going to America was accelerated by Chinese students in America who 
encouraged and helped their relatives and friends in China to follow them. In contrast to 
the earlier Chinese immigrants who came primarily from costal provinces of Guangdong 
and Fujian, the 80,000 Chinese who benefited from CSPA came from different places all 
throughout China. If each of the 80,000 influenced at least four family members and 
relatives in their hometown, another 320,000 Chinese natives who would go to the U.S. 
to achieve their American dreams.
As a result of this trend, from 1989 to 1994, the number of Chinese students in the 
U.S. grew more rapidly than the number of foreign students from any other country. The 
total number of Chinese students studying in the U.S. kept increasing and reached 
approximately 78,000 by the end of 2001, making the U.S. the country with the biggest 
number of Chinese students enrolled. Altogether, approximately 189,000 Chinese had 
studied in the U.S. by 2002.344 At the same time, the number of Chinese nationals 
applying for non-immigrant visas to the U.S. had tripled over seven years from 1991 to 
1998. The Beijing consulate alone “processed 119,453 visas in 1998, compared with 
77,773 in 1994 and 41,639 in 1991.”345 According to a U.S. immigration official in 
Beijing, ninety-nine percent of the Chinese students remained permanently in the U.S. 
They stayed by taking high-tech jobs, marrying American citizens, or simply remaining
343 Ibid. Tape 3.
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in the U.S. illegally.346 Not surprisingly, the visa refusal rate for Chinese nationals 
increased sharply compared to the early 1990s. According to the United States 
Information Service, only a small portion of the requests for visas were refused in the 
early 1990s. However, the visa refusal rate for Chinese nationals reached 23% in 1997.347 
Despite the high refusal rate, there were approximately 1,500,000 people from China in 
the U.S by 2000. China had become the second leading country of birth for the nation’s 
foreign-born population according to U.S. Census Bureau.348
Two people, Haiching Zhao and Nancy Pelosi, built national reputations after they 
were involved in student bills. The former became the most popular activist in the 
Chinese lobbying movement from 1989 to 1993. Then he served as a member of the 
Washington-based National Council on Chinese affairs. Later, Zhao worked as President 
of National Chinese Services, which had been selling medical coverage to people with 
student visas and their dependents. He worked in this capacity until May 2002 when the 
Washington District's Department of Insurance and Securities suspended his status as an 
insurer of foreign students, due to a change in the insurance laws.349
The Chinese student bill was Pelosi’s first step into Chinese Human Rights, which 
became one of her most important issues from 1989 until the present. With support from 
the Democrats in Congress, Nancy Pelosi won a national reputation as a fighter for 
democracy during the bargaining with the Bush administration. Pelosi was elected House 
Democratic Whip in October 2001. In November 2002, she became the leader of the
346 Ibid.
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Democrats following Richard Gephardt, who had also worked closely with the Chinese 
students.
The U.S. also benefited from this Act. The 80,000 students who stayed in the U.S. 
were among the best-educated Chinese as well as survivors of the current Chinese 
education system, which required “a combination of many years’ extremely hard work, 
strong aspirations, natural intelligence, and a stroke of luck.”350 Most them had obtained 
their bachelor’s degrees before they came and were in a master’s degree or a doctor’s 
degree program when they campaigned for the CSPA. Nationally the number of 
doctorates awarded to Chinese stude s tripled between 1990 and 1996, from 477 to 
1680. After they graduated, they worked as scientists and engineers in every type of 
American institution and industry from system engineering and control science to clinical 
nutrition.
Last but not least, it is still too early to declare the Beijing government the loser. It 
would depend on the future influence of these Chinese-Americans on the development of 
China in the long run. For better or worse, patriotism and nationalism had been strong 
forces in Chinese modem history and will probably continue to be. Ironically, the 
protection act stimulated the return of many Chinese scholars and experts, among them 
the future Managing Director of Microsoft Research China, Ya-Qin Zhang, future CEO 
of Asialnfo, Ding Jian, and future President of North American International Exchange 
Center (NA1EC), Jia Hao. Interestingly, two of them had served as leaders in the first 
tenn of the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS)
34'5 Jeff Clabough, “D.C. Suspends Insurer o f Foreign Students,”
http://washinuton.bizioiirnals.com/washinifton/storics/2002/05/13/dailv54.htrnl. Accessed 
on June 21, 2004.
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Headquarters. Jia Hao had been President of the Research Committee and Ya-Qin Zhang 
had been the Coordinator of the Board of Directors of IFCSS. The CEO of Asiainfo, 
Ding Jian, is the same person who actively participated in the 1989 Student Pro­
democracy Movement. He was one of the several Chinese students who went back to 
China to support Beijing students in May, 1989. During the time he was in Beijing, Ding 
Jian acted as the reporter of the China News Digest (CND). After June 4, Ding Jian was 
arrested when he was boarding an airplane back to the U.S. on June 10.33' Ding was 
finally released and came back to the U.S. He obtained his Masters’ degree in 
Information Science from UCLA. From 1990 to 1993, Ding Jian worked as a System 
Engineer at the University of Texas, Arlington.332
In 1993, Ding Jian, founded Asiainfo Computer Network Co., Ltd. in Texas, along
with Edward Tian (Tian Shuoning), the company’s former president, and other Chinese
students then studying in the United States.333 In January, 1994, Ding Jian returned to
Beijing with the aim of bringing the Internet to China. Their company, Asiainfo, was
financed by a seed fund grant of $500,000 from a Chinese American, Liu Yaolun.
Although a businessman who made his fortune in real estate, Liu Yaolun believed that he
could benefit China as well as himself by investing in high-technology. As Liu put it,
I have been building houses in the U.S. all my life. However, China does 
not need me to build houses for her. China needs high-technology. High- 
technology is one of the main factors which contributed to America’s 3501*
350 Fu Xuanning, “Impact o f  the 1993 Chinese Student Protection Act on American and Chinese Societies,” 
Journal o f  Northeast Asian Studies, Summer 95, Vol. 14, Issue 2, p 3.
351 v i 1 (a) UN 1X A . CC. CO I. U M BIA. E DU. “Ding Jian -  Our Reporter, Was said Arrested,” China News 
Digest, June 10, 1989.
,52 Ding Jian, “Ding Jian Janies,”
http://www.weforum.ortt/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf'Content-'Ding'/^OJiaiPAlOJames. Accessed on 
October 27, 2000.
15J Ding Jian, “Biographic Profile, "
Into: 'wwvv.chinaonline.coiivreieivbiouranhies business James Dina.asp. Accessed on October 15, 2004.
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becoming the number one world-power. Investing in China’s high- 
technology is good for Chinese. I support Ding Jian and Tian Shuoling.354
As a sharp businessman, Liu believed that he made the right decision in investing in 
the Chinese Internet. As overseas high-tech experts, many Chinese students and scholars 
had discussed the possibilities of the utilization of Internet in China. Early in 1993, 
several Chinese students in the U.S. bet on when China would have the Internet. Some 
said in two years. Some said in three years.355 All of them proved to be wrong. China had 
its own internet in 1994 with the efforts of both government and the returning overseas 
students. Among the latter, Ding Jian is one of the leaders who had made crucial 
contributions to the establishment and development of the Internet in China.
Asialnfo’s first crucial contract was to connect the Internets of China and 
America. In the summer of 1994, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce planned to visit China. 
One of the Secretary’s activities was sending an e-mail to th ; U.S. from China. Although 
China had already had its own Internet for scientists in 1994, there was no connection 
between the Chinese and American Internets. Therefore, the Chinese government decided 
to invest $ 2,500,000 to connect the Internets of China and the LJ.S. Asia Info got the 
contract and started its path toward being the “architect” of the Chinese Internet. From 
1995 to 1997, Asiolnfo completed more than 100 Internet projects which covered over 
twenty provinces in China. In fact, 70% of the information on the Chinese websites was 
transported on the Internet built by Asiolnfo.356
354 “Ding Jian: The Idealist in the Capital Market,” littn: \vww.nka.oiH.cn data. deinil.isp'.'articlclD -2645. 
Accessed on October 15, 2004.
355 Ibid.
3,6 Yin Zhihua, “Asialnfo’s Ten-year Development,"
http://www,cww,net.cn/'CwwSpecial Article.asp?id- 7351. Accessed on October 27, 2004.
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Unlike his peers who went back to China, Jia Hao is one of the great majority 
who chose to stay in the U.S. He is currently the president of the North America 
International Exchange Center (NAIEC) which aims at promoting academic, scientific 
and technological, business, professional and other cooperation and talent exchanges 
between the U.S. and China. NAIEC is an independent, non-profit institution registered 
in the U.S. and headquartered in Washington, D.C. Aiming to serve as a bridge between 
U.S. and China, NAIEC has successfully held five North American Conferences on 
Exchanging Business/Trade and Overseas Talent from 2000 to 2004. In fact, as discussed 
in the previous chapters, the bridge role played by Jia Hao and his colleagues in NAIEC 
has been played by Chinese Americans, such as T.D. Lee and Anna Chan Chennault 
(Chen Hsiang-mei) for more than one hundred years.357
In conclusion, although the rationale of the Chinese Student Protection Act 
proved to be unfounded, the Act itself turned out to be beneficial for almost every group 
involved, including the Chinese students who came to the U.S. before April 11, 1990, and 
their families, the Democrats, the Bush Administration, and arguably China in the long 
run.
35' Chen Hsiang-mei, the Mandarin Chinese name o f Anna Chen Chennault, is currently the Honorary 
Advisor o f NAIEC. She was the first female reporter for the Chinese Central News Agency, the first person 
of Chinese ancestry to be a success in politics in the U.S., and in the American capital was known as "the 
hostess o f Washington.” Since the 1980s, Madame Chennault has donated approximately $8,000,000 to 
mainland Chinese educational institutions.





Under the terms of the CSPA of 1992, approximately 80,000 green cards have 
been issued to Chinese nationals, including students, scholars, and illegal immigrants. 
The majority of them call their green cards “June Fourth Cards” because they shared the 
belief that without the Tiananmen Square Tragedy in 1989 they would not have gained 
U.S. permanent residency status.358 For the majority of June Fourth Green Card holders, 
it was a windfall or a blessing because they neither participated in the 1989 student 
protests nor in the lobbies of CSPA.
The “blood card” is the negative title for the June Fourth Green Card. The 
majority of people who use this term are overseas democratic activists and groups, such 
as the Chinese Democracy and Justice Party (CDJP). Although they shared the idea with 
June Fourth Green Card holders that these green cards were gained with the price of the 
protestors’ blood on Tiananmen Square in 1989, they asked for protection of the much 
smaller group of people who had directly participated in the 1989 student protests or who 
had been overseas democratic activists.3' 9 They further argued that the majority of 
overseas students and scholars had no direct relations to the 1989 Student Pro-Democracy
358 Zeng Huiyan, “Northeastern Chinese in New York,” http://www.tanuben.com/'WYinanbi/04/dbren.htm. 
Accessed on July 6, 2004. Gao Zhan, “For These Could Not Be Forgotten,”
httn://www.chinesenewsvveek.com/106/Feature/8662.htinl. Accessed on July 6, 2004.
Han Shu, “Huang Guyang Case,” httn://ww\v.xvs.ora'xvs'ebooks/others scicnce/daiia2/huanuguvaniz7.txt. 
Accessed on July 6, 2004.
W ,g Hui, “The Influence o f June Fourth Card,” Beijing Spring, August 1993, Into: hi/.c.oru bis he 06 SO. 
Accessed on July 6, 2004.
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Movement. Therefore these students and scholars would not encounter any danger after 
they went back to China.359 60 These activists wanted and had worked for Chinese human 
rights and a better society as a whole. In their eyes, the return of Chinese students and 
scholars from the U.S. would accelerate the speed of Chinese democratization.361 
Therefore, the CSPA of 1992 was not desirable because it changed 80,000 Chinese 
nationals into U.S. permanent residents and helped them start new lives in the U.S.
However, no matter what they prefer to call the green cards issued under the 
terms of the CSPA, no Chinese nationals, except leading members of IFCSS who 
organized the lobbies, agreed that it was dangerous for them to go back to China without 
a U.S. green card. In fact, IFCSS asked for—and approximately 80,000 Chinese nationals 
received—the protection of the American government in the wake of June 4, 1989, 
largely because of their own, often complicated, reasons for not wishing to return to 
China. As discussed in the previous chapters, the great majority of Chinese students and 
scholars wanted green cards in order to achieve their American dreams, while many 
leaders of IFCSS wanted to punish the Chinese government. The actual reasons behind 
the passage of the CSPA had been rooted in American political desires, American 
partisan conflicts, and a sophisticated lobbying effort on the part of Chinese students and 
scholars. Although the rationale of the Chinese Student Protection Act proved to be 
unfounded, the Act itself turned out to be beneficial for the Chinese students and scholars 
who arrived in the U.S. before April 11, 1989, the U.S., and -  in the long run, perhaps 
China itself.





Consent Form for Female CUSPEA Members
You are being invited to take part in an oral history project that aims to record the social 
life and experiences of female CUSPEA members. There are two scholarly goals of this 
project. The first goal is to record creativities and achievements of Chinese-American 
scientists and scholars. The second goal is to demonstrate Chinese female students’ 
diverse responses toward a different social setting.
You will be interviewed by Linxiang Zhu, a graduate student in History Department of 
UND. There will be three interviews altogether. Each interview will last 30 to 60 
minutes. You are expected to decide how long an interview should be. In the first 
interview, you will be asked several gender-related questions as well as general questions 
about your background and important choices. This will be an unstructured interview. It 
means that, although the principal investigator may interact with you -  ask questions, ask 
for detail, for clarification, and so on -  she should avoid, as much as possible, forcing you 
in any direction. In other words, back off and let you express yourself.
If you are interested in participating in the second and third interviews, please read the 
following: The second interview will be a dialogue. You will be asked three to six 
questions developed by the principal investigator based on the information she gains in 
the first interview. The third will be a group interview, better known as the focus group. 
Instead of interviewing one person at a time, the principal investigator will get a group of 
two to four interviewees and discuss something controversial.
The interview will be conducted in either Chinese or English and will be recorded. After 
that, the principal investigator will code subject data, remove identifying information, and 
report data in aggregate form. Lastly, a report of the interview will be sent to the 
supervising Professor James Mochoruk. One copy of the report will be sent to the Chester 
Fritz Library at the University of North Dakota. The principal investigator will also write 
a paper focusing on female CUSPEA members with the intent to publish it. Any 
information that is obtained in connection with this study and can be identified with you 
will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. The research 
records will be retained for at least three years following the completion of the study. The 
principal investigator needs your permission to keep the tapes as permanent records, so 
she can use them in her future oral history study. Your decision whether or not to give her 
the permission is voluntary.
The society, especially the American and Chinese scientists, will benefit from learning 
about the female Chinese-American’s experiences, culture, and voices. Your help with
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this study may also benefit research in social studies, behavior studies, history of science 
and economy.
During the interview, you may experience discomfort due to the subject matters 
addressed. Your decision whether or not to participate is voluntary . If you decide to 
participate, you are free to discontinue the participation anytime.
If you have questions about the research, please contact Linxiang Zhu at 701-777-2704 or 
Dr. James Mochoruk at 701-777-3381. If you have any other questions or concerns 
regarding your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Office of Research and 
Program Development at 701-777-4279.
RE:
1. Participation is voluntary and no penalties or loss of benefits will result from refusal to participate.
2. The subject may discontinue participation at anytime without penalty.
3. Any unexpected change o f the interviewee’s life and any uneasy feeling caused by the words of 
the principal investigator may result in the termination o f a subject’s participation in the study.
4. The subject will be shown or will have access to the final report o f the study. The principal 
investigator needs to gain permission from the participants before she publish any paper based on 
the materials she gains in this project.
5. The subject will receive a copy o f the Consent Form a week after he or she signs the original form.
ALL OF MY QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED AND I AM ENCOURAGED 
TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS THAT I MAY HAVE CONCERNING THIS STUDY IN 
THE FUTURE.
I have read all of the above and willingly agree to participate in the first interview 
explained to me.
Subject Signature Date
1 have read all of the above and willingly agree to participate in the first and second 
interviews explained to me.
Subject Signature Date
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I have read all of the above and willingly agree to participate in the first, second and third 
interviews explained to me.
Subject Signature Date
I have read all of the above and willingly agree to give the principal investigator Linxiang 




The Number of CUSPEA Students Enrolled by Years
No Universities & Colleges 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 Total
I Arizona State U. 0 0 0 2 "V 3 0 0 0 1 1 9
2 Boston College 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 6
3 Brandeis U. 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 0 2 2 0 10
4 Brown U. 0 0 1 2 I 2 1 3 1 0 0 11
5 C1T 0 0 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 3 15
6 Camegie-Mellon U. 0 1 2 7 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 21
7 Case Western Reserve U. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
8 CUNY, Brooklyn C. 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 11
9 CUNY, CityC. 0 3 4 1 1 3 0 2 0 2 0 13
10 CUNY, Hunter C. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
11 CUNY, Queens C. 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 4
12 C. of William & Mary 0 0 1 t1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
13 Cornell U. 0 0 4 1 2 0 3 1 2 2 i 16
14 Columbia U. 5 3 3 4 4 3 6 6 2 6 4 46
15 Dartmouth U. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
16 Drexel U. 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 5
17 Duke U. 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 8
18 Harvard U. 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 9
19 Indiana U. 0 0 3 i 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
20 Iowa State U. 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 4 3 0 1 14
21 Illinois 1 T 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
22 Johns Hopkins U. 0 0 3 1 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 10
23 Louisiana State U. 0 0 0 1 1 7 3 1 0 0 0 13
24 M IT 0 0 2 5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 10
25 Michigan State U. 0 0 2 4 6 4 4 2 3 1 2 28
26 Montana State U. 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 6
27 New York U. 0 0 6 7 2 2 8 6 6 6 7 50
28 Northwestern U. 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 1 2 2 13
29 Ohio State U. 0 0 2 4 5 6 0 0 0 2 2 21
30 Pennsylvania State U. 0 0 5 2 3 1 3 2 1 0 1 18
31 Princeton U. 0 0 2 4 1 1 0 3 2 3 1 17
32 Purdue U. 0 0 8 1 4 4 1 0 0 2 1 21
33 Rice U. 0 0 0 3 1 3 3 2 1 0 0 13
34 Rutgers U. 0 0 3 5 4 2 6 2 1 0 0 23
35 Stanford U. 0 0 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 13
36 SUNY, Albany 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 6
37 SUNY, Buffalo 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
38 Stevens I T 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
39 Syracus U. 0 0 2 0 ! 0 0 0 0 0 (1 3
40 Texas A & M U. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 3 1 8
41 U. of Arizona 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 2 2 0 4 14
42 U. of British Columbia 0 0 0 1 0 I I 0 0 0 1 4
43 I : C Berkeley 0 0 3 2 1 3 1 2 0 0 2 14
44 U C Irvine 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 1 i 7
45 U C L A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 i 2 0 0 4
46 U C S D 0 0 3 1 2 1 3 2 3 8 4 27
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47 U C S  B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
48 U. of Chicago 0 0 3 5 2 0 2 3 4 2 8 29
49 U. of Cincinnati 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
50 U. of Colorado 0 0 3 2 1 1 2 1 4 1 0 15
51 U. of Connecticut 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 6
52 U. of Florida 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
53 U. of Georgia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
54 U. of Hawaii 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
55 U. of Houston 0 0 2 2 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
56 U. of Illinois 0 0 3 1 4 1 2 4 1 1 1 18
57 U. of Iowa 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 6
58 U. of Kentucky 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
59 U. of Maryland 0 0 1 7 3 2 1 3 3 2 2 24
60 U. of Michigan 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 4
61 U. of Minnesota 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 3 2 1 3 15
62 U. of Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
63 U. of Oregon 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 7
64 U. of Pennsylvania 0 0 3 0 5 2 3 1 3 i 0 18
65 U. of Pittsburgh 0 1 6 3 3 6 3 2 0 0 0 23
66 U. of Rochester 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 4 2 3 3 17
67 U. of Southern California 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 3 0 1 10
68 U. of Texas, Austin 0 0 3 2 2 3 4 2 3 3 0 17
69 U. of Utah 0 2 1 4 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 17
70 U. of Virginia 0 1 2 6 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 16
71 U. of Washington 0 0 4 2 1 3 2 2 6 2 3 25
72 U. of Wisconsin, Madison 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
73 U.of Wisconsin,Milwaukee 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 2 1 2 0 9
74 Vanderbilt U. 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
75 Virginia Polytech.Institute 0 0 3 3 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 13
76 Yale U. 0 0 2 2 2 2 3 1 0 3 2 17
Total* 5 13 126 124 119 108 103 95 72 76 74 915
*By the original plan the duration of CUSPEA Program was 5 years. Afterwards it was suggested by the Minister of 
Education, China, to extend the Program from 1986 for another 4 years with the number of recommended students 
being reduced.
SOURCE: Shen Keqi, Zhao Kaihua, “Early History o f CUSPEA," a talk presented at the CUSPEA & 
Beyond Symposium, November 24, 2001, Pupin 301, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA.
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